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Abstract 
 
The thesis, consisting of an extended artwork (Toy Zoo) and a theoretical text, 
aims to explore a concept of abstraction and relate this concept to an affect of 
comedy. The proposal of the thesis is that abstraction, looked at in a proper 
way, is funny. Abstraction is imagined not as the absence of ‘content’ or the 
generalization of form, but as a condition of language occasioned by a 
categorical loss, the loss of the ground that attaches meaning to a thing. The 
work takes this dissonance in language as its subject-matter. In a series of 
photographic images, representations of mental or conceptual objects whose 
mode of representation alters the meaning of the term, it presents abstraction 
not as a formal reduction or the presentation of a higher order but as the 
historical view of a void subject-position. Its argument is that the view from 
this position is comic. 
The text develops a concept of abstraction from Hegel’s description of ‘the 
abstract work of art’. This ‘absolute’ abstraction, a condition in society to 
which art responds, is the premise through which various forms of abstract 
production, in art and elsewhere, are read. The generic forms of the epic, 
tragedy and comedy, as analyzed by Hegel, provide models that are applied in 
the context of ‘real abstraction’ and to certain positions in art. An analysis of 
value in capital aims to identify the logic of this form of production with the 
structure of tragedy. Against this ‘ready-made’ abstraction of modernity, the 
non-dialectical relationship of abstract necessity and the individual, the text 
argues for a form of comedy. Comedy, as a genre in art, proposes a subject-
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position that, recognizing itself in abstraction, recognizes abstraction not, as in 
‘real abstraction’, as necessity but as the condition of its own freedom. 
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Preface 
The following text forms part of a thesis submitted for a PhD in Fine Art at 
Goldsmiths, University of London. Together with the text, the thesis consists of 
an exhibition of artwork, images of which are included as an appendix in the 
present document. The thesis is practice-based and practice-led. The artwork is 
the motivation and present end of our research. The text, we intend, may serve 
to make clearer the logic of the artwork, but is not a commentary on it and does 
not address it directly. A separate section in the appendix describes the methods 
of production and material qualities of the work, and its ideas. The text is an 
independent piece of research; its broad field of enquiry is in large part outside 
the strict domain of art. Using recognized authorities and explained premises, it 
makes an argument and comes to a conclusion. Our artwork, on the other hand, 
makes assumptions and guesses whose logic may only become apparent in 
practice.  
Our thesis is in two parts, which use different mediums and methods to make 
their case. It is also situated in two contexts. The first is ‘fine art’; in practice 
our context is contemporary art, which, to differentiate this term from the 
totality of artworks made in the present time, we take to mean works that 
evidence in some way a contemporary idea of art. The prefix, if not redundant, 
implies a  reference to a specifically different historical situation or form. 
Contemporary artworks in some way acknowledge or address a difference of 
the present time – in the situation of art at least – from a previous time. This 
difference, whether in medium or concept, defines their contemporaneity; it is 
the contemporary subject of the work. Our thesis also directly addresses the 
question of contemporary difference. Our artwork uses an old-fashioned 
 9 
medium – large-format film photography; its concept is however contemporary. 
The text aims to address a specific difference of the contemporary category. A 
long theoretical and historical prelude supports its contemporary conclusion. 
In practice, contemporary art sits in a discursive context. Contemporary 
artworks, aside from their formal properties, can be distinguished by the writing 
that supports them. A background of contemporary theory, taught in art 
schools, is reflected in some distillation in their form. The movement away 
from the aesthetic – from the primacy of formal and medium-specific concerns 
–is situated in the context of a discourse about what art is or can be and reflects 
ideas about art’s function and meaning different from those of modernism or 
the enlightenment. A rejection of the modernist separation of art and life 
accompanies an engagement with particular concerns – whether political, 
social, cultural or personal. The discursive turn, situating art in the context of 
other discourses than art, locates in this engagement a critical value that 
separates art from simple visual pleasure or entertainment. 
The present work subscribes to most of these norms. The text addresses issues 
in the world represented in discourses other than art. Our artwork aims to 
represent a specific contemporary situation. The thesis does however differ in 
some ways in its approach. The central chapters of the text consist of a detailed 
consideration of a 19th century theory of art and an examination of an aspect of 
capital, read directly through Marx’s work. References to artworks to illustrate 
its argument are mainly to early 20th century modernism, and the examples of 
contemporary artworks it uses date from the 1960s. Its concerns do not fit 
easily into the categories of discourse through which political identity is 
frequently articulated in contemporary artworks. Both our arguments and our 
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artwork appear abstract. The excuse we offer for this is that it is dictated by our 
subject. 
Our project is situated by and directly addresses ‘the transdisciplinary object’ of 
capital. ‘The reproach of abstraction’ articulated by Peter Osborne1 informs 
both its philosophical understanding and its view that the separate discourses 
through which contemporary artworks may invite themselves to be read are 
subsumed under the category of capital. Particular contemporary categories and 
discourses can only recognize and represent their actual situation by taking it 
into account. The commodification of artworks in the market is merely a fact, 
separate from their use-value. The idea of a space of art separate from this 
situation – the romantic idea – appears now as part of the bourgeois imaginary 
and a fantasy produced by capital itself. The choices that capital offers are to 
reproduce its categories knowingly or unknowingly, or to refute them.  
Our thesis is situated in two contexts – the discourse of art and the form of 
capital. It aims to bring one to bear on the other. The artwork presented as part 
of this thesis consists of a number of photographs of a consistent form. What 
these photographs represent is not immediately clear. Individually they 
represent an object, but an object that resembles a sign rather than any actual 
thing. Together they have the appearance of a grapheme. What appears to be a 
language is presented to the viewer, inviting itself to be read. The immediate 
subject of our text and premise of the artwork is concept of representation. The 
categorical determination of phenomena brings into view a critical concept of 
language as something that is both multiple and void. Abstraction is the actual 
                                                
1 Peter Osborne. ‘The reproach of abstraction’, in Radical Philosophy 127 
(September/October 2004) 
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condition of language; there is no natural representation, only the play of 
categories and the work of their construction. The categorical void invisibly 
situated in every concept is what our work aims to use productively. Our text 
consists of an investigation of the position and effective mechanisms by which 
this might be achieved.  
The position of the subject in the genres of tragedy and comedy gives a specific 
focus to a general concern with the subject’s assumed position in different 
structures of representation. Comedy is read not merely as a different and light 
genre, but critically as bringing into view the same material – a categorical void 
and indeterminacy – from a different position. In our argument, objects become 
funny when they lose their normal categorical determination and reappear 
clothed in another category. In this transition the subject is positioned 
momentarily as categorically void, accepting the indeterminacy of categories 
and celebrating this socially in laughter. The critical value of the comic subject-
position in the situation of capital is what our work aims to explore. Our 
artwork is an experiment in randomly engineering an affect of categorical 
indeterminacy both formally and conceptually. If its humour is deadpan, this is 
our preferred mode. Our text, unfortunately, is not funny, but aims to develop a 
radical concept of comedy whose relevance to a contemporary situation is made 
clear. The contemporary, as a recognizable category of art, came into being in 
the early 1960s at a moment that the text aims to locate with precision. A 
critical movement in the categories of thought is proposed by a single event. In 
its initial forms this contemporary work was frequently, sometimes literally, 
and in our argument essentially, comic. Our claim for comedy aims to situate 
the concept as an objective and rational response to an actual condition; the 
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appearance of a categorical void that theoretically dissolves all existing 
categories, including those of capital, and reveals their transience.  
In the half-century since the initial explosion of the contemporary, its artworks, 
recuperated by capital, have lost their comic edge, becoming instead objects of 
value and veneration. The revolutionary energies of the 1960s appear now 
devoted to the production of surplus value. Contemporary art production that is 
critical, situated discursively in particular real life situations, articulates its 
opposition ethically in work that tends to the genre of tragedy. Our project is 
premised on the view that the enemies of art exist in practice in an economic 
form, of which any social or personal account is only an incomplete 
representation. The abstraction of capital requires that an artwork address its 
conditions of representation if its particularity is not to become a mere use-
value recuperable in exchange. The thesis aims to take this abstraction and view 
it under different categories – in our case none. A categorical disinvestment 
that, as such, has no meaning is proposed as an effective social means of 
opposition in our situation. Against the discursive turn – work that in 
opposition to an unformulated abstraction aims to say something in particular – 
we offer a work that, taking the form of language as its subject, says nothing. 
Ernesto Laclau, in ‘Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?’2, argues that, 
in trying to signify the limits of signification, and the limits therefore of the 
existing order, ‘there is no direct way of doing so other than through the 
subversion of the process of signification itself’. The empty signifier is not only 
valuable but necessary to the position of opposition. He proposes, in effect, that 
                                                
2 Ernesto Laclau. ‘Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?’ in 
Emancipation(s), Verso, London and New York, 2007, p. 39. 
 13 
the different voices of opposition to the existing system can be united under the 
party of the empty signifier. Our images are offered as banners to this party. 
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1. Introduction 
Our interest is abstraction in general. Particular abstractions – ‘real abstraction’, 
psychical objectlessness and, in relation to these social and individual 
abstractions, abstract art, ‘the abstract work of art’ – motivate and provide the 
background of this study. But these particular forms, in our argument, are 
manifestations and symptoms of a general abstraction. Abstraction in general – 
in the abstract, as it were – is prior to and necessary for the understanding of 
social and individual forms of abstraction and genres of art. Abstraction, 
concerning as it does the discourse of universals, we approach philosophically. 
This introduction lays out the proposed philosophical schema within which our 
practical and theoretical work is constructed. It then goes on to outline our 
specific use of these linguistic presumptions in the context of actual 
abstractions and how they support our position. 
Abstraction, in our proposal, concerns the relation between particulars and 
universals; between a particular instance of a thing and the universal term – the 
concept or category – that describes, in general, an object of common 
experience. When we speak of a cat (as on a mat, for example) the reference to 
our particular cat is also, for the object to appear in thought or speech, a 
reference to the universal cat, the category of cat abstracted from any and all 
particular cats. Felix thus carries the universal in him. As well as being an 
actual cat, our cat is also an abstract cat, a conceptual cat, a categorical cat 
resting on a universal mat.  
Abstraction, as the regulator of the relation between universals and particulars – 
concept and thing –  concerns, in our proposal, the functioning of language – 
our thought of the world. Abstraction is not metaphysical, except in the sense in 
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which all the objects of mind are metaphysical. As a function in language – in 
all languages, whether composed of thought, objects or words – abstraction 
enables things to appear as objects in thought or speech; it establishes the 
relations of difference and commonality between objects and between people. 
In abstraction experience becomes repeatable. The generality of the concept 
allows it to be articulated in relation to other objects, to be a unit in a language. 
The uniform quality of catness, that all cats are grey in theory, allows the cat as 
such to be separated from the dog, and allows the cat and dog and, in the 
abstraction of a concept, all objects to be counted and measured, to be 
organized in a common space and time and articulated as objects of knowledge. 
Pragmatically and socially, the concept is more important – more real – than 
the thing.  
Our concern with abstraction, which is theoretical and practical – philosophical 
and political – is what abstraction is, where it comes from and the mode in 
which it functions in a system of signs. What we are opposed to, in general and 
in the various practical forms in which it manifests itself, is ‘natural 
abstraction’, a naturalized concept of abstraction. This form is present in 
science (in its claim to a literal knowledge of nature), in some types of art, and 
operates generally in society as an ideological evasion of a political category. 
Natural abstraction assumes a movement from the concrete to the abstract; it 
proposes the abstract as a generalization from the particular. Multiple instances 
of cats enable the abstraction of the concept of cat. A quality or set of qualities, 
a certain felinity, is separated from its material support: this spirit essence, 
distilled from the bodies of individual cats, represents the catness of cats. 
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Natural abstraction is an abstraction from,3 the extraction of a common concept 
from the mass of experience. It substitutes a form for a particular content, and 
taking its method of substitution as natural, it takes this form to be  a natural 
form.  
Against natural abstraction, our text proposes a different concept. In the natural 
schema of abstraction, knowledge conforms to objects, the concept of the 
object being given by the object itself. Thought is given by experience. The 
claim of this schema of abstraction to be a natural kind of representation, given 
by how things are, is what Kant’s critical view overturns.4 Kant reverses the 
traditional relationship between abstract categories and individual phenomena. 
In the critical view, knowledge does not conform to objects; objects conform to 
knowledge. The appearance of things itself requires, a priori, certain categories 
without which nothing can be thought. As it is inconceivable to think 
something that does not in some way exist in time and space, these categories, 
transcendental to all particular objects, are necessary for and precede the 
appearance of individual objects. Kant separates the noumenal – the world as it 
is, things in themselves – from the world of phenomena – the world as it 
appears to us. Phenomena therefore only separate themselves from the 
unknowable noumenal realm, only become objects accessible to thought, after 
                                                
3 The general idea that there are two opposing and irreconcilable concepts of 
abstraction is taken from Emmanuel Martineau (Malévitch et la Philosophie: 
La Question de la Peinture Abstraite, Lausanne, L’Age d’Homme, 1977) who 
distinguishes between abstraction from (abstractio ab) and abstraction to 
(abstractio ad). See sections 2.1, 2.2 and 5.3 below. 
4 Most of the ideas about the specific meaning of the word ‘critical’ are taken 
from Peter Osborne. ‘The reproach of abstraction’, Radical Philosophy 127 
(September/October 2004). See section 2.1 below. 
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having already passed through a procedure of abstraction. The concrete – actual 
phenomena that are perceived in experience – is the result of the abstract.  
Kant’s enquiry critically changes the nature of reality. The noumenal realm 
may be out there – the unknowable unconscious of the world – but what we 
perceive as natural, as phenomena, as being objective, is already structured by 
categories which are the properties of thought, not of things. What we know as 
things are representations of things. In the critical view there is no natural 
perception, no given in nature (except the nature now given by mind), and 
therefore no natural representation: all things betray the character of the 
categories through which they are thought. Reality – the phenomenal world – 
takes on the character of a language, in which things appear as operands within 
a system whose grammar and basis for meaning is provided by its 
transcendental categories. What we know are not things but a language of 
things. In the critical view this language becomes visible as a thing, where the 
validity of the world we see in it depends on the validity of its categories. 
Kant’s enquiry opens into question the status of the categories. In the critical 
view, they transcend – lie outside and beyond – the system that they govern; are 
not derived from the content of the system but are prior to it. They are the 
properties of mind, not of things. For Kant the categories are innate to the 
workings of mind and therefore universal – transcendental not only to their 
content but to categories of time and space. In this categorical transcendence 
critical philosophy returns to a natural abstraction – an idea of natural 
representation – even if this nature is located in human nature and not in the 
world that the categories organize. Absolute and natural categories, given by 
reason, confirm the transcendence of the human.  
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Kant’s critical abstraction stands as an intermediate point between natural 
abstraction and the concept we aim to develop. Critically reversing the primacy 
of abstract and concrete, it then returns to naturalism through reason. Hegel’s 
dialectical concept reopens the critical path. For Hegel, the concept is 
composed in direct opposition to a thing and is the inversion of a thing. 5 All the 
essential properties of an actual cat (a particular body) are absent in the 
concept, as all properties of the concept (a universal form) are absent in our cat. 
The concept is the medium of our revolt against nature and a form of culture’s 
revenge on it – an articulation of mind (Geist) that organizes phenomena for its 
own purposes. That categories organize phenomena is given. In history as 
Hegel views it, however, the phenomenal world is not a unified field. 
Phenomenology of Spirit6 is a study of the different phenomenological forms 
manifest in history –different forms of society and consciousness that appear 
not as invariants laid down by nature but a historical product of mind. Different 
ideas and concepts of the universal – different categories of time and space – 
mark out different epochs in history. Abstraction, determined in the critical 
view as the spatial and temporal categories that organize the appearance of 
phenomena, is not in history a single thing. Multiple categories, different 
concepts of time and space taken as universals, appear at different times and 
places. Universals are also particular.  
The historical view of the categories substitutes historical products of mind for 
natural or transcendental invariants. It proposes different abstractions, and 
                                                
5 See Robert Stern. Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit, London and New 
York, Routledge, 2002, chapter 2 ‘The dialectic of the object’. 
6 G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller, Oxford and New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1977. 
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abstraction as the failure of universals rather than the method of their 
completion. If in Hegel they are resolved into a whole – as universal history – 
our premise in this text does not follow Hegel’s progression to its end in 
absolute wisdom. In our argument, a particular moment in Phenomenology, 
connected with art, short-circuits Hegel’s long march to absolute wisdom and 
cleanses Geist of the connotations of Spirit. The section in Phenomenology on 
‘The Religion of Art’7 forms the basis of the argument of this text, providing 
the theoretical ground for a concept of abstraction in language and experience. 
The conditions that Hegel proposes for the emergence of ‘absolute art’ and his 
analysis of the principal genres of Greek art lead us to our conclusion. In this 
section Hegel describes a moment of transition when the old categories are no 
longer adequate to the situation, but new ones have not yet been put in place. 
The passing away of the ethical order is followed immediately by a time of 
categorical loss and evacuation. The Greek religion of art fills this categorical 
void. In this moment, Hegel theorizes an absolute categorical void in which the 
world appears as ‘shapeless essence’ and consciousness as ‘absolute unrest’. 
Abstraction, which appeared previously as a specific failure in universals, is 
brought here to an absolute point. A moment of total abstraction – a categorical 
void – punctuates in history the shifting movement of categories. This moment 
is absolute: it is not another meaning in a changing series of meanings, but a 
non-meaning.  
In our argument, we use the concept of total abstraction – a categorical 
dissolution that represents nothing – as an empty signifier whose presence 
                                                
7 G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller, Oxford and New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1977 pp. 424-453.See sections 2.3, 2.4 and 
chapter 3 below. 
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locates the function of various full signifiers – absolute categories in societies 
or thought. Art, for example, is looked at not in its independent existence, but 
as an element in a dynamic structure of crisis and recuperation. Its crisis is one 
of representation – a situation where the existing categories of representation 
are no longer adequate to a situation. The different genres of epic, tragedy and 
comedy appear as different forms of response to such a situation. Each, in 
different ways, proposes a relationship between something and nothing – 
meaning and non-meaning – but are differentiated by how they represent these 
incompatible elements and the position they occupy in relation to them.  
Our reading of Hegel has been informed by Judith Butler’s and Slavoj Zizek’s 
studies of power and ideology.8 Our argument for comedy has also been much 
influenced by Alenka Zupancic’s Hegelian interpretation of the genre.9 
However, the Lacanian theory that underpins especially Zizek’s arguments, 
while not actively disavowed, is not taken up in our text. In our argument there 
are only symbolic orders. Our reading of Hegel is of a Hegel after Derrida.10 
That there is nothing outside the text we take in its critical meaning that all we 
can access and think about are representations in language. The idea of access 
                                                
8 J. Butler. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1997. J. Butler. ‘Restaging the Universal: Hegemony 
and the Limits of Formalism’, in J. Butler, E. Laclau and S. Zizek. 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. 
London and New York, Verso, 2000. S. Zizek. Tarrying with the Negative: 
Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology. Durham, Duke University Press, 
1993: S. Zizek. ‘The Spectre of Ideology’, in S. Zizek (ed.), Mapping Ideology, 
London and New York, Verso, 1994. See section 3.4 below. 
9 Alenka Zupancic. The Odd One In: On Comedy. Cambridge, Mass. and 
London, MIT Press, 2007. See section 3.6 below. 
10 Stuart Barnett (ed.). Hegel after Derrida, London, Routledge 1998 
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to anything else is metaphysical. All phenomena form part of a symbolic order, 
structured by categories that are both imaginary and necessary. Total 
abstraction – a categorical evacuation – is an effect of language, of the 
simultaneous appearance of different and incompatible categories. It does not 
stand in a special relation to the Real, where this term has any implication of an 
ontological absolute or things in themselves. Our argument is not that 
categorical abstraction gives access to anything outside the symbolic order. It 
reveals only the nature of language. Our abstraction is not a discrepancy 
between language and truth – between the phenomenal and noumenal – nor 
between representation and presentation – a discrepancy between categories 
and phenomena. As all phenomena are structured by categories, to be a 
phenomenon means to conform to category. The categorical void, in our 
argument, is strictly a discrepancy between categories.  
Freud’s economic model of the psyche, where unbound affects produce a 
condition of ‘objectlessness’, informs our concept of abstraction.11 This 
problem and pathology is however situated, in our context, in language; as a 
disorder of language it crosses the divide between the individual and the social. 
Gregory Bateson, in his essay on schizophrenia,12 proposes a specific 
discrepancy and incompatibility in language that, in his argument, account for a 
pathology. Different communication modes enable different and sometimes 
incompatible messages to be simultaneously received. Non-verbal media – 
posture, gesture, facial expression, tone and context provide a mode of 
                                                
11 See section 5.1 below. 
12Gregory Bateson. Steps to an Ecology of Mind (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999) 
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communication which may be at variance with the verbal communication. 
Different languages, which comprise the communication as a whole, may 
present incompatible messages such that the receiver, unable to understand the 
mode to which they belong, is left in a ‘double-bind’. Bateson’s double-bind, 
which he relates to schizophrenia, is not a simple matter of mixed messages, 
but of categorical indeterminacy. Different modes of communication imply at 
the same time different and incompatible categories, and it is the inability to 
resolve this incompatibility – and a residual categorical indeterminacy – that for 
Bateson characterizes schizophrenia.  
Our premise is of an abstraction that is an effect of an inconsistency of different 
categories simultaneously at work in phenomena. Visual and verbal forms, for 
example, may simultaneously present incompatible categories. This 
incompatibility is not in the words or visual image, but only in the difference 
between them. It is not therefore represented in words or images, and unless 
resolved into a concept, is felt only as affect. In Bateson’s argument the 
incompatibility is resolved, in an aberrant form, in schizophrenia. Though the 
schizophrenic inadequately comprehends categories in the world, an absolute 
categorical concept is put in their place as the schizophrenic subject himself 
becomes the only valid category in a delusional and constantly threatened 
structure of meaning. Bateson also relates categorical indeterminacy to humour, 
which in his description is precisely a play of different communicational 
modes. Its comical effect arises when the labeling of the mode undergoes a 
dissolution and resynthesis. The incompatibility that in one instance results in 
pathology becomes in humour the basis of its comic effect. 
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Our concern with abstraction is preliminary to an investigation of comedy. The 
aim of the text is to relate these two categories. The subject of abstraction is 
joined with the subject of comedy by a conjunction – represented in our title by 
a dialectical ‘and’ – that is a moment of categorical dissolution. Abstraction and 
comedy view this common object from opposite sides. As in Bateson’s 
example, what appears on one side as an existential threat that occasions a 
pathology – as tragic – appears on the other as the basis of comedy. This is not 
to say that madness is funny, or to suggest any equivalence between their two 
positions; the lunatic and the comedian, however,  look at the same material in 
different ways. The concept of total abstraction we have laid out is used to 
establish a subject-position of comedy. This position is then employed in 
contrast and opposition to the positions of other subjects – the subject of 
tragedy and the subject of capital. Our text aims to bring into critical view a 
specific and real form of abstraction. The subject that the position of comedy 
opposes is capital – a concept of value in ‘real abstraction’ that functions in 
exchange as an independent subject in the process. How its categories appear to 
change in the face of total abstraction  – the subject-position of comedy – is the 
question that the thesis aims to investigate. The position of comedy is 
contrasted with the position of the subject in the genre of tragedy. This latter 
position is identified in our argument with the subject of capital. Comedy, in 
our claim, is not merely a different genre from tragedy, the one concerned with 
suffering, the other with a happy ending. A simple difference and opposition 
allows one to be characterized as real, the other as light entertainment. The 
critical claim for comedy as a genre of art is that it represents the same material 
shorn of its particular categorical determination. As a movement beyond 
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representation – an assumed categorical void and abstraction – it not only 
changes the phenomena in question but brings into view, in their arbitrariness 
and transience, their categories of representation. 
The concept of concept of comedy we propose situates the genre in the play of 
categorical indeterminacy. Formally, comedy is considered as a categorical 
shift. Objects in the world become funny in a movement in which they retain 
their objective form but reappear under different categories. A moment of 
categorical dissolution – expressed in jokes by the comic pause – precedes the 
form’s reconstitution under a new category. Our argument for comedy concerns 
the position of the subject in this genre. We take from Wittgenstein that humour 
is a way of looking at the world.13 Comedy is in the subject position of the 
viewer, not in an object that arrives with its categories intact. There is no comic 
object, only objects that become comic when reconceptualized under a different 
category. A formal view of comedy – as a form of representation that falls 
within a category – is replaced by the view of comedy as a position of the 
subject, assumed equally by performer and audience, whose relation is not one 
of identification but of commonality. This subject-position is void – 
momentarily categorically disinvested. Its commonality is this void – the shared 
recognition of the absence of categorical absolutes. It is expressed in collective 
laughter. The speculative argument of the present work is that this void subject-
position, collectively assumed, returns comedy to its broad original meaning – a 
poetic story with a happy ending. 
                                                
13 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, tr. P. Winch, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1980, p. 78e. See section 5.2 below. 
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The next chapter introduces the main concepts that form our argument. It lays 
out the different concepts of formal and total abstraction, relating them to 
practices and genres of art, and introduces our concept of comedy. It aims to 
outline the structure of our argument, the detail of which is given in the 
following three chapters. Chapter 3 is a detailed consideration of Hegel’s 
writings on art; chapter 4 is a technical exposition of ‘value’, derived from a 
reading of Capital. Chapter 5 is concerned with comedy, object-loss, a modern 
and a contemporary moment. These disparate and apparently unconnected 
pieces of research only come together at the end in a clear conclusion that has 
the character of the fortuitous. 
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2. Abstraction and comedy 
2.1 ‘Common’ abstraction 
Abstraction and Comedy is concerned with an uncommon concept of 
abstraction and an affect of comedy. The work’s aim is to develop a concept of 
abstraction, to track its implications in practice, and to relate it to an idea of 
comedy. Its proposal is that abstraction, looked at in a proper way, is funny. 
The ‘abstract work of art’ realizes itself in the genre of comedy. ‘Abstraction’, 
as used here, has a different sense to the way it is commonly understood in the 
context of art, and we rely on Emmanuel Martineau, writing about Malevich14, 
to provide a terminology in which to discuss this difference. In his terms, 
‘common abstraction’ and ‘total abstraction’ define two opposed procedures 
and positions, in modern art and in general. The latter, which appears second, is 
in fact primary. The core of abstraction is total abstraction; common abstraction 
a vulgar procedure of methodological recuperation. ‘Total abstraction’, in the 
sense proposed in the present work, is a condition of language and thought, an 
ideational loss and affective presence that motivates and is made manifest in 
various forms of production. Its implications, we argue here, run through all art 
whether commonly abstract or not. They end, we propose, beyond the current 
state of production, in comedy.  
We start with an illustration of ‘common abstraction’ (fig. 1). Kandinsky’s 
Composition V (1911) is a typical – in its own claim prototypical – example of 
the common idea of abstraction in modern art – of ‘abstract art’ –  an idea 
whose limitations the work demonstrates. Composition V forms part of a series 
                                                
14 Emmanuel Martineau. Malévitch et la Philosophie: La Question de la 
Peinture Abstraite, Lausanne, L’Age d’Homme, 1977. 
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(Compositions I-VII (1909-13)), the development of which, as Kandinsky 
claimed, was the beginning of abstract art. In the earlier paintings figures can 
still be made out, set in a Fauvish landscape. By Composition V (1911) such 
identifiable figures have disappeared, merged into a ground, that by the final 
paintings has ceased to resemble a real landscape but becomes some other, 
more ideal, space. In the development of the series, abstraction is shown as the 
progressive removal of identifiable, figurative elements: the marks on the 
canvas, no longer denoting some nameable entity, become ‘abstract’. Some 
other space, different from that of material things and the material world, is 
enabled to appear. In this idea of abstraction, a loss – of representation, 
figuration, objects – is compensated for by the appearance of another value. 
Abstraction is a procedure of transfiguration rather than non-figuration, of the 
translation of the figure into another, ‘higher’ realm. The withdrawal from the 
representation of individual entities is undertaken in the interest of a value that 
the work as a whole represents. 
The logic of this procedure is described in Kandinsky’s writing, where the 
signifier that valorizes the procedure, repeated in the titles of the works, is 
‘composition’. The ‘composition of the whole’ is the principal aim of the 
artwork.  
‘Many objects have to be considered in the light of the whole, and so 
ordered to suit this whole. Singly they will have little meaning, being of 
importance only in so far as they help the general effect. These single 
objects must be fashioned in one way only; and this, not because their own 
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inner meaning demands that particular fashioning, but entirely because they 
have to serve as building-material for the whole composition.’15  
The whole to which individual elements are subordinated, in which cause they 
lose their individual identity, is an aesthetic whole directed by ‘inner necessity’: 
an aesthetic that Kandinsky identifies with the spiritual. Abstraction, the 
subordination and suppression of individual elements, serves the representation 
of a ‘whole composition’, of a spiritual or cosmic world that exceeds the 
material. The representation of this world, in Kandinsky’s argument, requires 
the use of ‘pure’ forms and ‘pure’ colours, but his aim remains to represent 
something. Golding writes of Kandinsky: ‘when we look at his paintings, even 
if we cannot ‘read’ them in terms of subject-matter, we are still aware of the 
fact that we are looking at works of profound cosmic significance, at works that 
are about something.’16 This something is precisely identified by Kandinsky: ‘I 
calmly chose the Resurrection as the theme of Composition V and the Deluge 
for the sixth.’17 Abstraction returns as representation in another dimension, a 
symbolism based on intuitive resemblance. Common abstraction, following on 
from Impressionism’s perception of things as colour and form, methodically 
pursues this indifference to enable an evacuation of the subject, the merger of 
figure and ground into one complete, unified, compositional entity. The viewer 
is invited on this ‘path to the absolute’.  
                                                
15 Wassily Kandinsky. Concerning the Spiritual in Art (1912), tr. Michael T. H. 
Sadler, Tate Publishing, London, 2006, p. 60. 
16 John Golding. Paths to the Absolute: Mondrian, Malevich. Kandinsky, 
Pollock, Newman, Rothko and Still. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 
2000. p. 94. 
17 Quoted in Golding 2000, p. 98. 
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The claim of a painting to ‘profound cosmic significance’ appears now risible. 
The humanistic hubris is based on an identification with god, long recognized 
as insanity. However, even without Kandinsky’s identification of the aesthetic 
with the spiritual, a notionally immanent and pure aesthetic argument for 
abstraction betrays the same formal procedure. The logic of Greenberg’s 
‘historical apology for abstract art’18 is directed to a ‘purity’ achieved by the 
work’s autonomy, its separation from anything outside itself. His Kantian 
immanent critique (comparable to Kandinsky’s ‘inner necessity’) requires that 
the work exclude any external reference that might distract or threaten its 
‘aesthetic consistency’19, that to be true to the purity of its medium it must not 
refer to anything outside itself, neither to objects nor to the sort of three-
dimensional space in which objects might exist. ‘The purely plastic or abstract 
qualities of the work of art are the only ones that count’.20 In Greenberg’s 
argument, painting abandons referential figuration to become what it purely is –  
paint on a surface – but also to enable the work to occupy a space all of its own 
and not one shared with objects in the world. The separation of the artwork is 
the objective disguised under the name of ‘purity’. Through its forms and 
colours, its ‘plastic and abstract qualities’, it constitutes a restricted totality, a 
gated community of art into which everyday objects are not allowed to intrude. 
An abstract value, whether ‘composition’, ‘aesthetic consistency’ or simply 
                                                
18 Clement Greenberg. ‘Towards a Newer Laocoon’ (1940), in Art in Theory 
1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul 
Wood, Blackwell, Oxford and Malden, Mass. 1992, p. 558. (Harrison and 
Wood (ed.) 1992) 
19 Clement Greenberg. ‘Modernist Painting’ (1965), in Harrison and Wood 
(ed.) 1992, p. 759. 
20 Greenberg 1940, p. 558. 
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‘art’, substitutes for a relation to the actual world, whose disorder is 
compensated for in this value. 
Whether in Greenberg’s ‘immanent’ or Kandinsky’s ‘spiritual’ variant, 
abstraction in this understanding equals subtraction, at the level of individual 
representation, justified and aesthetically recuperated in the composition of a 
complete, unified form. It works as a spatial distribution, presenting the 
organization of space into a form that speaks and takes on meaning only at the 
level of the whole. In the establishment of a separated, absolute space in which 
every element, individually abstracted, contributes without remainder in the 
composition of the whole, the abstraction of modernity tends to totality, the 
absolutization of a rationality whose objective equivalent is death.  
Abstraction, in the current critical perception, is associated with a discredited 
modernism and modernity. The ‘reproach ’21 to this form of abstraction is clear: 
it ‘strips the world of its living and flourishing reality and dissolves it into 
abstractions.’22 The grey of theory replaces the green of existence, an 
overdetermination of form and hypostasis of categories that does not recognize 
the individuality, difference and vitality of the content that they govern. In 
modern life, already for Hegel, ‘the individual finds the abstract form ready-
                                                
21 See Peter Osborne. ‘The reproach of abstraction’, Radical Philosophy 127 
(September/October 2004). Osborne makes the essential point, in response to 
the general reproach, that the ‘concrete’ has always already been filtered 
through abstraction, the transcendental categories through whose action 
phenomena appear as such. Post-critical enquiry must focus on the categories 
of abstraction (spatial, temporal, causative etc.), the transcendental imaginary 
that governs any particular meaning. Any naturalized assumption of 
individuality remains the subject of ideology.  
22 G.W.F. Hegel. Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, Tr. B. Bosanquet, 
London and New York, Penguin Books, 2004,  p. 60. (Hegel 2004)  
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made.’23 In ‘real abstraction’ – Marx’s characterization of capital – a form of 
society appears in which ‘individuals are now ruled by abstractions’.24 The 
critique of modernity, reflected in the ‘contemporary’ and ‘postmodern’ labels 
by which recent art and thought attempt to differentiate themselves from the 
modern, is a critique also of abstraction.  
The present work readily joins ‘the reproach of abstraction’. Following Peter 
Osborne25, however, it sees the concrete and individual as already the wrong 
side of abstraction, already subject to an abstraction that functions ideologically 
because it is unrecognized. If the concrete is already abstract, with phenomena 
always already subject to transcendental categorization, the critical question in 
the regime of ‘transcendental necessity’ is which sort of abstraction. Common 
abstraction, the abstraction of historical modernity, of capital, is the 
‘transdisciplinary object’, the dominant form that the present work seeks a 
position of opposition to. Its argument, however, is not from the position of 
particularity – the concrete – but from the position of a different concept of 
abstraction. From this position, it argues, the limitations of the common, 
‘modern’ idea of abstraction come into view, as does the possibility of a 
different and more critical concept of abstraction and abstract art.  
------------------------------------ 
 
                                                
23 G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller, Oxford and New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 19. (Hegel 1977) 
24 Karl Marx. Grundrisse: : Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, 
tr. Martin Nicolaus, London and New York, Penguin Books, 1993, p. 164 
25 Peter Osborne. ‘The reproach of abstraction’, Radical Philosophy 127 
(September/October 2004). See footnote 8 above. 
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2.2. ‘Total abstraction’ 
Emmanuel Martineau, in his work on Malevich, contrasts common or vulgar 
abstraction  (‘un concept naturel, vulgaire de l’Abstraction’) with an 
‘abstractum absolutum’ or ‘abstraction totale’ (total or absolute abstraction).26 
Common abstraction is an abstraction from (abstractio ab); it extracts a general 
form, method or system from a particular content. Total abstraction, by 
contrast, is not an abstraction from anything, but only an abstraction to 
(abstractio ad) something. It is derived from nothing. This type of abstraction, 
‘much as it offers itself to us as second, is in reality the first and the highest 
abstraction: supreme abstraction’.27 Malevich is cited as an example of this 
higher abstraction. In his work, ‘without any doubt’, we confront a thought 
more conscious (conscient) than Kandinsky.28 The difference, for Martineau, is 
between creation and reduction.29  
Martineau borrows his scholastic terminology from Aquinas; a detour into the 
theological dimension illuminates his distinction. Aquinas distinguishes 
between formal abstraction and total abstraction. Formal abstraction (abstractio 
                                                
26 Emmanuel Martineau. Malévitch et la Philosophie: La Question de la 
Peinture Abstraite, Lausanne, L’Age d’Homme, 1977, pp.32-3. Martineau’s 
two concepts of abstraction are discussed in J-C. Marcade. ‘K. S. Malevich: 
From Black Quadrilateral (1913) to White on White (1917); from the Eclipse of 
Objects to the Liberation of Space’, in S. Barron and M. Tuchman (ed.). The 
Avant-Garde in Russia, 1910-1930: New Perspectives, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass. and London, 1980, p. 23n.  
27 ‘bien qu’elle se soit offerte à nous comme seconde, est en réalité la première 
et la plus haute Abstraction: l’Abstraction suprème’. Martineau 1977, p. 33. 
28 ‘Nous nous trouvions sans aucun doute un penseur beaucoup plus conscient 
que Kandinsky et Mondrian…’ Martineau, 1977, p. 73. 
29 Martineau, 1977, p. 15. 
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formalis), which belongs to the philosophy of nature, is ‘the abstraction of an 
intelligible object of thought from the matter that surrounds its intelligibility’. 
Total abstraction (abstractio totalis), which belongs to mathematics, is ‘the 
abstraction of a logical whole from its subjective parts. It is an abstraction 
common to all the sciences’.30 Both, however, are abstractions ‘according to 
simple apprehension’. Aquinas identifies a third degree of abstraction, which he 
terms separation. This abstraction, belonging to metaphysics, no longer a 
matter of ‘simple apprehension’, is instead an abstraction ‘according to 
negative judgment’, unsupported by nature or mathematics. In practice, 
Aquinas’s formal and total abstractions are part of the same schema. The 
‘logical whole’ of total abstraction is not in practice derived from its constituent 
parts, but precedes and explains them, provides a term and a method by which 
they are put in place and arranged in an order. Any individual act of formal 
abstraction – the translation of a thing into a concept – presupposes a pre-
existing totalizing regime. This total structure is a formal structure, in that what 
it sustains is a purely formal arrangement between the constituent elements. It 
is abstract in that the term that guarantees this formal structure is 
supernumerary, transcendental to the constituent elements. It is precisely its 
lack of connection to anything else, its emptiness, that enables it to function as 
a total, full signifier.  
                                                
30 Edward D. Simmons. ‘In Defense of Total and Formal Abstraction’, in New 
Scholasticism 29 (1955) p. 428. See also John Peterson. Aquinas: A New 
Introduction. University Press of America, Lanham, Md. and Plymouth, 2008, 
‘Types of Abstraction’, pp. 151-2.  
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Abstraction by negative judgment (separatio) is used by Aquinas to derive 
being – the subject of metaphysics – as something separate from predication 
and substantive qualities but which does not cancel them out. Being cannot be 
derived from what is, from phenomena, but only from what is not (negative 
judgment). Aquinas’s concern with being comes under the regime of a Being 
that is separate, above and beyond any material qualities. That it cannot be 
derived from them denotes the necessity of faith. But negative judgment, at the 
entrance to being, also opens up the way to categorical loss, the collapse of 
knowledge, the formal-total system and its transcendental signifiers. 
Separation, in the medieval anxiety, was also separation from god, accidie, 
hopelessness, despair. Negative judgment, which in the Hegelian turn will 
negate its own negation in the reconstruction of the world, is an absolute 
abstraction that sublates the formal-total type. It introduces (by the back-door) a 
different temporality. 
Martineau’s two abstractions imply different temporalities, the common type 
remaining tied to the history from which it is derived: total abstraction, which is 
not from anything, points only to the future. The signifier that in Malevich’s 
writing guarantees this temporal orientation is ‘nothing’. ‘Nothing influences 
me and “nothing”, as an entity, determines my consciousness’.31 Of the first 
Suprematist exhibition of 1915 he writes, ‘we intend to reduce everything to 
zero… [and] will then go beyond zero’.32 The zero or ‘nothing’ which 
                                                
31 K. Malevich. God is Not Cast Down (1922). Included in T. Andersen (ed.), 
K.S. Malevich. Essays on Art 1915-1933, Vol. 1, tr. X. Glowacki-Prus and A. 
McMillin, Copenhagen and London, Rapp & Whiting, 1969, p. 188. 
32 Malevich letter of May 1915, quoted in B. Alsthuler. The Avant-Garde in 
Exhibition: New Art in the 20th Century, Harry N. Abrahams, New York 1994, 
p. 78. 
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predicates the artist’s subject position – ‘I  have transformed myself in the zero 
of form...’33 – enables the ‘non-objective’ consciousness in which we ‘accept 
nothing as pre-determined – as constituted for eternity’.34 An absolute 
contingency of determination – ‘nothing’ – aims to ‘teach our consciousness to 
see everything in nature not as real forms and objects, but as material masses 
from which forms must be made, which have nothing in common with 
nature’.35 In Malevich’s first manifesto, the idea of nature and the history of art 
are linked together and both equally rejected. If the Cubists and Futurists have 
moved beyond nature, they are still painting modern-day Madonnas, are still 
tied to an aesthetic derived from and sanctioned by history. The absence of 
anything ‘secure and unshakeable’ in Malevich’s ‘non-objective world’ re-
orients the subject to the future, to forms yet to be made which are not derived 
from anything – cannot be counted as natural nor are sanctioned by history – 
but instead emerge from nothing. Hence, for Martineau, ‘creation’, the wit to 
make something out of nothing. 
Malevich rejects the term ‘abstraction’, preferring ‘non-objectivity’ 
(bespredmetnost). Non-objectivity is not a condition of the work, but of 
consciousness and the world. It becomes a task of politics. Abstraction of this 
type is not the representation through phenomenological reduction of a 
universal – the implicit transcendental subject-position of Kandinsky. Instead, 
its abstraction is located in a subject-position of the artist that is evacuated to 
                                                
33 K. Malevich. From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The New Realism 
in Painting (1916). Included in T. Andersen (ed.), 1969, p. 19. 
34 Malevich The Non-Objective World (1927). Included in H. Chipp (ed.). 
Theories of Modern Art: A Source Book by Artists and Critics. University of 
California Press, Berkeley, L.A. and London, 1968, p. 344.  
35 Malevich (1916), (Andersen (ed.) 1969, 25). 
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‘nothing’, from which position the non-objective world, a world without 
categorical determination, becomes imaginable. If Kandinsky’s is a view of the 
abstract from the position of representation, Malevich’s is the view of 
representation – the world of signification – from the position of the abstract. 
The subject that comes into view from this position of non-objectivity is 
representation itself, the status of signs. The Black Square,36 which at different 
moments in Malevich’s writings stands for ‘world economy’, Lenin, ‘non-
objective feeling’ and ‘nothing’,37 is a sign of the arbitrariness of signs (an 
enlarged typographical full-stop standing for the absolute openness of the 
future); but also, for T. J. Clark, a sign of the times, of ‘a world where the sign 
is arbitrary, because subject to endless social convolutions’.38 Malevich’s work 
emerges out of a particular context, the ‘economics of the transition period’, 
when the uncertainty of signs in the non-objective world had become objective. 
Malevich, addressing the question of what sort of signs come out of nothing, 
links the consciousness that makes this enquiry with a political programme. 
The non-objectivity that is the condition of his work is already represented in 
communism. ‘Communism is already non-objective. Its problem is to make 
                                                
36 The Black Square includes Black Square (1915) (figure 2) and the various 
other versions of this sign that appear in Malevich’s work. 
37 see K. Malevich. The Non-Objective World (1927), (Chipp (ed.) 1968, p. 
343): T. J. Clark. Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism. 
Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1999, pp. 225 and 251: L. 
Zhadova. Malevich, Suprematism and Revolution in Russian Art 1910-1930, 
Thames and Hudson, London 1982 p. 299.  
38 T. J. Clark (1999), p. 256. 
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consciousness non-objective, to free the world from the attempts of men to 
grasp it as their own possession’.39  
Martineau relates Malevich’s position of abstraction to a movement of 
liberation, a liberation of a more radical kind than as commonly understood, 
whose object and agent is the human. The movement of the human towards 
freedom is limited to the extent that either or both of these terms are 
predetermined. This liberation, Martineau writes, requires as its precondition 
the liberation of the signifier ‘freedom’ from its own constraints.40 The 
liberation of the sign is a precondition of the liberation of the human. The 
signifier that accomplishes this first, necessary move is ‘nothing’.  Malevich’s 
pictorial abstraction ‘is a liberation, that which liberates the Nothing’.41 
‘Nothing’ is an instrument in ‘the liberation of freedom’.42  
‘Nothing in the  objective world is as ‘secure and unshakeable’ as it appears 
to our conscious minds. We should accept nothing as pre-determined – as 
constituted for eternity. Every ‘firmly established’ familiar thing can be 
shifted about and brought under a new and, primarily, unfamiliar order.’43 
‘Nothing’ is the one actual thing, not only to our conscious minds but in the 
objective world, that is ‘secure and unshakeable’. This fulcrum of a radical 
abstraction ‘speaks to us the name of a modernity more secret than that 
                                                
39 K. Malevich. Appendix From the Book on Non-Objectivity (1924). Andersen 
(ed.) 1969, p. 348. 
40 Martineau, 1977, p. 33. 
41 ‘L’Abstraction picturale est un libération, celle qui libère le Rien’. Martineau 
1977, p. 47. 
42 Martineau, 1977, p. 33.  
43 Malevich The Non-Objective World (1927). (Chipp (ed.) 1968, p. 344). 
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designated in the expression Russian Avant-Garde’.44 The supreme form of 
abstraction that Malevich demonstrates – Martineau’s ‘absolute’ or ‘total’ 
abstraction – is a more extreme and radical idea than common, ‘modern’ 
abstraction. As its totality cannot be recuperated in a form, it remains abstract. 
The ‘nothing’ that is Malevich’s master signifier, the absence of any categorical 
ground, is precisely what liberates the signifier, enables it to float freely in a 
world of signs. Russian formalism emerges from Russian nihilism. In total 
abstraction, Malevich envisages a society of signs, of black and red squares 
(and other shapes) that speak to each other, signs whose meanings are 
constantly being remade. Non-objectivity is a condition of the subject – of 
consciousness: in not seeing the world as object the subject also ceases to view 
itself as object, which is its liberation. Subject-matter disappears, but also 
crucially any defined subject-position, which, being now ruled by nothing, 
becomes free. 
------------------------------------ 
2.3. ‘The abstract work of art’ 
A complete theory of abstraction (in the sense proposed here) is condensed in 
Hegel’s analysis in Phenomenology of Spirit on the Greek ‘religion of art’.45In 
describing the first work of art as ‘the abstract work of art’,46 and laying out the 
conditions in which it emerged,  Hegel proposes the conditions of abstraction. 
A particular disorder in society, a hole or fracture in the structure of 
                                                
44 ‘que nous parlait au nom d’une modernité plus secrète que celle qui désignait 
l’expression d’avante-garde Russe’.  Martineau, 1977, p. 73. 
45 G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller, Oxford and New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1977 pp. 424-453 (Hegel 1977) 
46 Hegel 1977, p. 425 
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representation, motivates the first production of art. In Lectures on Aesthetics47 
– the final and full exposition of Hegel’s aesthetic theory – the role of 
abstraction in art is generalized. All art is abstract in Hegel’s specific sense: it 
takes the abstract, the unrepresented or unrepresentable as its material and 
content. The failure of representation in society is the space where art operates. 
Hegel’s account, both in the Greek context and in the broader sweep of art 
history, illuminates what abstraction is, its problems and pathos, and outlines 
different forms and genres in which art responds to it. The success or failure of 
different forms of art is determined, in part, by their relation to the abstract. 
The first ‘abstract work of art’ that Hegel considers is a Greek statue – the 
statue of a god.48 In practice, as Aesthetics makes clear, this is not the first 
abstract work in history, but it is, for reasons particular to the Greek situation, 
the first work of ‘absolute art’. The differentiation of art is in a particular 
response to abstraction. The conditions that, in this instance, give rise to art are 
succinctly (if abstractly) described by Hegel: ‘the passing-away of the ethical 
order’49 (Sittlichkeit), ‘the night in which substance was betrayed and made 
itself into subject’, ‘absolute unrest’, and the unnamed threat of a ‘shapeless 
essence’ that threatens the individual with violence. The loss of Sittlichkeit, of 
customary society, is in general the loss of an Idea, of the spatial and temporal 
categories that underpin representation and structure relations in a society. The 
                                                
47 G.W.F. Hegel. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford and 
New York, Clarendon Press, 1988 (Hegel 1988).  G.W.F. Hegel. Introductory 
Lectures on Aesthetics, Tr. B. Bosanquet, London and New York, Penguin 
Books, 2004 (Hegel 2004). 
48 see figure 3 below 
49 Hegel 1977, p. 426. 
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categories of place and time that in traditional society provide the substance – 
the life-world – of the individual are shattered. It is not only that the individual 
has lost the substance of a life-world in which it was previously immersed 
without remainder; language itself has lost the means to represent this whole. 
Language, a structure of representation, loses the categories that stabilize 
meaning, loses itself therefore and collapses into non-meaning. This 
‘abstraction’ is the condition that art seeks to represent and overcome. 
The loss of Sittlichkeit marks a particular moment of transition. But such 
moments have occurred ‘from all time’; history, in Hegel’s sense, depends on 
them. The movement of Spirit is punctuated by the collapse and failure of Ideas 
in society, torn apart by their own contradictions, out of which some new Idea 
emerges. Hegel’s own period, the beginning of the modern, is another such 
moment: ‘…it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and period of 
transition to a new era’.50 In such moments, the categories that construct 
meaning and order society – its representation of universals, which guarantee 
representation as such – come into violent contradiction with the particular 
circumstances of the time, such that the whole system of representation which 
forms that society falls apart. The antitheses that characterize this condition – 
‘in the abstract… the contrast of the universal and particular’51 – have 
disquieted consciousness from all time; they reach a peak of ‘unbending 
contradiction’ in modern culture. Art is one means of responding to this 
representational loss and abstraction. 
                                                
50 Hegel 1977, p. 6.  
51 Hegel 2004, p. 59. 
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Hegel situates the production of art – ‘absolute art’ – in the context of a 
perennial but at moments acute crisis in the way society represents itself. It is a 
crisis in language therefore. Art, which responds to this crisis, is however 
neither the only nor the first form that responds to abstraction. The Greek 
‘religion of art’ is first of all a religion and only later art. For Hegel, art is the 
middle term in the triad of religion, art and philosophy: religion is the primary 
form in which fear, terror, pathos and the inadequacy of language are dealt with 
and brought to rest; art supersedes religion, and philosophy will supersede art. 
These disciplines, though differentiated in various ways by medium and 
intention, are all equally forms of abstract production; they are disciplines that 
in one form or another make the abstract their subject, and attempt, through 
their forms of representation, to deal with it. The fracture in language and 
society is put back together though the terms and representations – rituals, 
objects and ideas – of religion, art and philosophy. Language is re-stabilized 
through these terms, which in different ways give an account of meaning. 
Hegel’s argument situates art in the context of other forms of abstract 
production, but it also proposes a critical difference. Art, for Hegel, is 
differentiated from religion and philosophy first by its medium. It represents its 
Idea in a ‘sensuous and objective form’, where these other two respectively 
employ ‘picture-thinking’ and ‘the concept’. It is also however differentiated by 
its intention. In Aesthetics, the three eras of art are classed as symbolic, 
classical and romantic. But it is only in the second of these that ‘absolute art’ 
appears. The first work of absolute art, the Greek statue, is a religious object, 
but in the ‘religion of art’ it expresses a quality and an ambition absent in the 
merely ‘symbolic’ productions of earlier religious forms.  Such productions – 
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the Egyptian representations of gods for example – are a synthetic and artificial 
recombination of natural forms: they represent the abstract, the unrepresentable 
and unknown, and become the signs that, in ritual and belief, bind together a 
society. Surpluses are devoted to their production. These symbolic 
representations of an abstract power, however, remain ‘one-sided’. The 
innovation of Greek art, the Western innovation, is that it introduces, in 
opposition to the abstract power, an idea of the individual. The ‘abstract work 
of art’ – the first work of ‘absolute art’ – is ‘abstract and individual’. It presents 
the universal – the god – in the form of an individual, as it aims more generally 
to reconcile the individual – the individual’s consciousness of itself and its own 
powers – with the abstract.  In the loss of Sittlichkeit, as well as absolute unrest 
and pathos, there also emerges an idea of the autonomous individual ‘in the 
unrestricted thought of his free self’; an ‘absolute levity’ in the individual’s 
consciousness of its own freedom. The Greek religion of art, ‘absolute art’, is 
distinct from earlier religion and its forms of symbolic production in that it 
aims to reconcile the abstract with the consciousness of the individual. In 
representing the abstract and universal, as earlier religious forms of symbolic 
production do, it does not do so only ‘one-sidedly’, in a representation in which 
the individual (artist and audience) does not recognize itself, but also attempts 
to represent the actual consciousness of the individual.  
------------------------------------ 
2.4. Abstract production 
 Hegel’s theory proposes a clear structural picture of abstraction, the relation of 
its condition to a loss, and this loss and crisis to a mode of recuperation. On one 
side there is a primary abstraction, the ‘shapeless essence’, which appears as a 
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disturbance in society and consciousness, and is an effect of the loss of the 
categories – in the Greek instance the spatial and temporal conceptions implicit 
in Sittlichkeit – that establish meaning in a society. On the other are forms of 
abstract production, including religion, art and philosophy, that seek to 
recuperate from the condition of abstraction, and which through 
representations, objects and concepts that give shape to shapelessness aim to re-
establish a meaning and basis of a social bond. The loss of an Idea is not only 
the loss of a particular full signifier, a ruling principle in society (Sittlichkeit for 
example), but, because this categorical break fractures also the meaning of 
individual terms, the loss even of the means to represent what is lost. The 
unrepresented becomes therefore unrepresentable. A hole in language, felt as an 
unrest in society and a disturbance in consciousness, is precisely in its 
universality invisible. Language, as constituted at that moment, cannot describe 
its own condition. Total abstraction, as opposed to the common idea, is not a 
representation of a universal, a form that has application to all forms. It is both 
more particular – the condition of a specific historical moment – and more 
general, in that it is not a form or representation, rather it is the moment of 
collapse of a whole system of representation.  
Art, like religion and philosophy, is a response to abstraction. Art emerges out 
of religion, and is in the Greek world a ‘religion of art’ –  the form that in 
Hegel’s account follows ‘natural religion’ and is succeeded by ‘the revealed 
religion’. Unlike in the earlier forms of religion, however, in the religion of art 
– classical Greek art – the abstract is brought into relation with the individual. 
The figure of the artist (Kunstler) appears, who is different from the ‘artificer’ 
(Werkmeister) of earlier symbolic production in that he, while representing the 
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abstract, also aims to represent his own individual consciousness. The  
abstraction resulting from the end of customary society is recognized in Greek 
art not only as unrest and ‘pathos’ but also as the ‘levity’ of an individual 
consciousness freed from its customary constraints. Greek art aims to reconcile 
these two ‘powers’. In this aim, from the beginning, it fails. The first abstract 
work of art is ‘abstract and individual’, but only immediately. Though it 
represents the abstract and  universal in the figure of a god, and also gives this 
figure an individual, human form, the relation between the abstract (universal) 
and the individual is only immediate, that is, it is not articulated. There is no 
mediation or reconciliation of the two. The idealized individuality it presents is 
not one in which the actual individual recognizes itself, nor one that represents 
the actual experience of the artist. Its individuality remains trapped within an 
abstract, ideal form. In the reconciliation that is sought of the abstract and 
individual, this work fails. The religious object fails as a work of art. The 
failure of this initial form, in Hegel’s narrative, sets the work of art on a path in 
which, in a succession of different forms, it moves towards self-consciousness. 
Hegel traces the development of Greek art from its initial abstract form, 
through its various ‘abstract’, ‘living’ and ‘spiritual’ forms, to its final form – 
comedy. He analyses the media, workings and conceptions of these various 
forms and genres of art, and the basis of their success or failure. At the outset, 
the work represents only an abstract subjectivity: the individual remains subject 
to an abstract idea of the universal and is produced as a reciprocal of this 
abstraction. What the individual actually is remains unrepresented in the work. 
The progressive development of Greek art, which is also a progressive 
development of consciousness, is the movement from an abstract subjectivity to 
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an actual (wirklich) individuality. Actual individuality is what the work of art 
reveals. The movement towards the individual is not however the loss and 
disappearance of the abstract. In the final dialectical resolution of the antithesis 
of the abstract and individual, it is not that either of these two terms cease to 
exist, but that they exist reconciled. In the supersession of earlier ideas and 
representations of abstraction, a concept of abstraction appears in which the 
individual recognizes itself, recognizes what it actually is. The genre in which 
this consciousness is represented is comedy. 
------------------------------------ 
2.5. The epic, tragedy and comedy 
Hegel’s account locates the production of art in the context of other forms of 
abstract production – religion previously, philosophy subsequently, but also 
potentially other forms. It identifies a critical difference in the aims of art: 
unlike the other forms it aims not only to represent and deal with the abstract, 
but to ‘represent and reveal’ the reconciliation of the abstract and individual. 
Art, Hegel’s theory suggests, proposes an idea – a particular meaning and 
consciousness – of the individual. This individuality is formed out of a specific 
concept of and relation to the abstract. The form of art, in Hegel’s account, that 
represents and reveals the actual individual is comedy. In comedy, the 
individual ‘stands forth in its nakedness and ordinariness, which it shows to be 
not distinct from the genuine self, the actor, or from the spectator’.52 The 
procedure that in comedy reconciles the abstract and individual is the 
fulfillment of art’s difference. In this final form, for Hegel, art returns to itself; 
                                                
52 Hegel 1977, p. 450. 
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it escapes finally from the religious, cultic and abstract functions that had 
overlaid it in its earlier manifestations. It reveals instead the pure position of 
art. 
The present work aims to analyze the procedure of comedy, the conceptions of 
abstraction and the individual inherent in it, and to relate this procedure to a 
general position in art. The genre of comedy emerges in opposition to the 
preceding form of tragedy, in response to its contradictions and failure, in the 
same way that tragedy emerges from the form of the epic. The epic, tragedy 
and comedy are the three forms of the ‘spiritual’ (geistige) work of art, where 
the work enters the medium of language – a language is now ‘lucid’ unlike the 
inchoate or enigmatic language of earlier forms. Within this triad, in Hegel’s 
analysis, the epic and tragedy appear as intermediate forms of art and of 
consciousness, representations of a still incomplete and abstract subjectivity. 
Comedy sublates – cancels, incorporates and transcends – these forms. Comedy 
is the radicalization and development of the epic and tragic view, a 
radicalization and completion of the intention implicit in art from the 
beginning. The epic, tragedy and comedy present three basic models of 
response to abstraction, three generic structures of thought and production. 
Theses alternative forms of response to abstraction – alternative structures and 
productions that deal with it – present their own concept of the individual, their 
own ‘shapes’ of consciousness. Epic and tragic consciousness is represented in 
art, not only in their Greek originals but in the modern day ‘religion of art’. 
‘Comic consciousness’ presents a critical view of these forms. 
The argument for comedy is not only against residues of epic and tragic forms 
in contemporary art production. Hegel’s view of abstraction and abstract 
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production generalizes the problem of abstraction from the restricted zone of art 
production into society. Abstraction, a crisis in representation, is a crisis in the 
social before it is individual. This social fracture and separation – the collapse 
of meaning – is what abstract production serves to heal. Operating in the space 
of the void of the Idea, religion, art and philosophy supply the terms and 
signifiers, the subjects, heroes and drama – in short the Idea – of a new social 
order. In the same way that the forms of art supersede each other, driven to 
evolve by their contradictions, so do the forms of society. Abstract production 
includes all the forms by which societies represent themselves to themselves; in 
practice the forms in which surplus production is disposed of. It is not only 
philosophy that is a form of abstract production but also, we argue, political 
economy. These ‘real’ forms, producing real subjects, conform in their 
structure to the forms laid down in the epic and tragedy. They employ the same 
procedures to achieve their narrative and dramatic power. Their transcendental 
categories, even where their phenomenal content is changed, retain the same 
form and function. A dynamic abstract shape unites the categories of art and 
general production. 
The epic, we argue, performs the ‘elementary ideological operation’,53 
presenting a full signifier, a term that though itself empty binds together all 
other terms and therefore constructs a world that is whole and complete. It 
brings to rest in an ideal form the absolute unrest that motivates it. The epic 
narrative composes a regime of representation, where representation fulfills its 
                                                
53 S. Zizek. Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of 
Ideology. Durham, Duke University Press, 1993, p. 130 (Zizek 1993) See also 
S. Zizek, ‘Introduction: The Spectre of Ideology’, in s. Zizek (ed.), Mapping 
Ideology (London and New York: Verso, 1994) p. 23 
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original function of representing an ideal – exemplary – form. In this, it 
establishes a standard and hierarchy of values, quantified by proximity to the 
ideal. The epic form is a procedure of idealization, of splitting, but the heroes 
who represent ideal human types are in the narrative form necessarily located in 
the past, and now lost. The epic, a traditional form of ideology, recognizes the 
loss inherent in abstraction; but in idealizing this past and providing a term of 
continuity between it and the present, it enables an identification with the ideal 
that serves, psychically and socially, to overcome the disorder of the present. 
The failure of the epic, for Hegel, is that the audience cannot recognize 
themselves in the remote ideal: ‘determinate natures cannot find themselves in 
this purity’.54 The audience, afforded a temporary identification with the ideal, 
in the consciousness of their actual conditions of existence feels only the pathos 
of distance from it. Its subjectivity is located in this space of loss, not in its 
actual existence and powers. In the epic, the affective anxiety of abstraction is 
diffused through the whole world rather than made a visible term and brought 
to a point of recognition in an individual figure: ‘an air of mourning is wafted 
over the whole epic’55. The epic therefore appears as a repressed form of 
tragedy, the ideological superstructure of a tragic material base. The procedure 
of ideological conversion, in which a ‘name’ or other representation ‘contains’ 
a set of dispersed, abstract affects, is, Butler writes, ‘always and only tenuous’. 
‘The contingency that the name seeks to subdue returns precisely as the spectre 
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of the thing’s dissolution’.56 The epic form, as an implicit, inverted 
representation of the unrest of abstraction, gives way to the form of tragedy 
where the ‘spectre of dissolution’ is brought into the explicit content of the 
work. 
Tragedy, emerging out of the dissolution of the epic form, is a different form of 
representation. Whereas the epic is a narrative, its action necessarily located in 
the past, tragedy (in the Greek form) is a live, dramatic performance where the 
characters appear in a ‘real’ form before the audience. And where the epic uses 
an idealization to cover over the loss and disorder of the present, tragedy makes 
the conflict of ideal and real, order and disorder, the basis of its drama. What 
the epic procedure implicitly accomplishes the drama of tragedy explicitly 
articulates. In tragedy, for the first time, an actual, credible individual appears. 
The drama bears the hero’s name. But this idealized, exemplary figure is 
brought to an end by a power greater than itself, a power that is no longer, as in 
the epic, figured as a god, but is instead a power of ‘abstract necessity’. 
Tragedy plays out the dramatic opposition of abstract and individual but, as the 
force that makes the work a tragedy, it conceives the abstract as an inescapable 
‘power’ to which the individual is subject and in which it cannot recognize 
itself. The individual is idealized in its losing battle with this power. 
In Hegel’s classification romantic art, characterized by a turn to inwardness, is 
the form that differentiates modern from classical art. Romanticism brings to 
the fore the individual figure, the artist; it presents a dynamic movement of 
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Formalism, in J. Butler, E. Laclau and S. Zizek. Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London and New York, 
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drama and conflict, as opposed to the rest and serenity that, in romanticism’s 
differentiation, comes to be identified with the classical. In the modern, western 
narrative of self-identification and self-affirmation, the classical world is 
elevated to the status of an epic. The epic form, a style and narrative that is 
serene, classical, idealized and venerates the past, becomes in the ‘classical age’ 
(the later 17th and 18th centuries) the official form of culture. Romanticism, 
arising in opposition to official culture and its practical consequences, opposes 
the static, epic form with one that is live, dramatic and individual; and where it 
imports idealized, epic forms these are transmuted through inwardness to a 
private sphere in which, in their separation, they speak the language of tragedy. 
The classical, splitting off into neo-classicism as the form of official culture, is 
represented in romanticism in the lyric, the fragment, the ruin. Modern culture, 
ruled by abstractions, establishes and represents its culture in epic and tragic 
forms. The epic-tragic nexus remains now the dominant form. The generic 
mass of cultural production conforms to these models, and in both of them the 
cultic origins of culture become apparent. That these forms are also embodied 
in real production – in the ‘real abstraction’ of capital – is the argument of the 
present work. The tragic character of capital, and the implication of epic 
structures of thought in this tragedy, situate the claim for comedy.  
------------------------------------ 
 
2.6. ‘Real abstraction’ 
‘Real abstraction’ embodies the claim that ‘[t]he fundamental character of 
capitalism is revealed in the tendency to make abstract categories live as though 
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they were concrete… The abstract, in capitalist society, functions concretely’.57 
Though capital may be also divided between an ideological superstructure and 
a material base, real abstraction proposes that the Idea of capital is adequately 
represented in material forms, in commodities and money, in actual forms of 
production, and not merely confined to some separate ideological space. 
Capital, in its actual form of material production, is driven by and consists of 
abstract and ideal forms; capitalism is ‘the culture of abstraction par excellence, 
…a society… traversed by powers of abstraction’.58 A particular modality of 
social abstraction is identified as the difference between capitalism and other 
modes of production. The categories of thought that govern society can be 
derived from the act of exchange.  
Real abstraction proposes a related or alternative set of abstractions built into 
actual production, a logic and dynamic by which in production these 
abstractions reproduce themselves. Real abstraction – capital – is not, however, 
total abstraction; it is not a complete categorical collapse or suspension and 
therefore freedom. Capital, which is not only a thing and a mode of production 
but also a social form, through the strict application of a mode of production of 
surplus-value reproduces the form of bourgeois society. This society is ‘ruled 
by abstractions’, a set of transcendental categories, represented in commodities 
and money, that lay down a structure of thought, a diagram that can be 
interpellated in a subject and becomes, through a strictly mechanical procedure, 
the means by which capital reproduces and expands itself. These categories, in 
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real abstraction, are represented not only in ideology but in the forms of real 
production, in commodities and money. Capital, in the acts and objects of 
exchange, expresses its Idea. The question of real abstraction concerns the Idea, 
the particular form of abstraction that is represented in a material form in 
capital. The present work aims to analyze the Idea implicit in the ‘value’ that 
Marx identifies as represented, in addition to use-value and exchange-value, in 
commodities and money. Value is represented in its ‘fully-developed shape’ in 
money but also in a disguised form in commodities. Its substance is abstract 
labour. The production by value (abstract labour) of surplus-value, and the 
separation in capital of surplus-value from the value (abstract labour) that 
produced it, allows the formation of another abstract, ideal and notional value, 
different to and precisely separated from labour. This value, a universal power 
of transformation and a principle of absolute otherness therefore, is represented 
qualitatively and ideally in money. Capital, as the means by which money 
reproduces and expands its own value ‘automatically’, is the system that 
enables the material and quantitative representation of this value.  
The argument from value concerns the contradictions inherent in the Idea of 
capital. The universal, which in capital remains abstract and merely other to 
any existing forms, stands in opposition to any individual form, including the 
form of capital itself. The logic of capital is its own end and elimination. In 
capital, the value of money – its abstract power of transformation – is 
transferred to the individual possessor of money; it becomes a subjective power 
of transformation. An abstract, universal power enables the ‘individuality’ – 
effective agency – of the subject of capital but it also restricts and defines this 
‘individual’ as subject, a mere personification of capital whose forms of 
 53 
expression remain abstract. The conjunction of universal and individual in this 
formation is unresolved. The tension between them creates its dynamic and 
dramatic form.  
Capital, in its particular conceptions of the (abstract) universal and of the 
individual, and in the disposition of these two terms, conforms to the basic 
structure of tragedy. In Hegel’s analysis, tragedy takes as its content the explicit 
opposition of the abstract and individual. It is the drama of this opposition, of 
an inherent and necessary division between them. On one side a fully 
individuated figure appears, the eponymous hero, individual in the sense that 
‘its law is only a law of its character’.59 On the other side, opposing this first, is 
an abstract power, a ‘universal’ that is no longer, as in the epic, represented by 
transcendental figures, the gods, but instead as an idea of ‘abstract 
Necessity’.60 Tragedy presents on the one side the individual ‘as the ground and 
cause of everything,’61 but on the other, as the actual agent of the hero’s 
inescapable end, an abstract power, ‘the negative power of all the shapes that 
appear, a power in which they do not recognize themselves but, on the contrary, 
perish’.62 This basic structure of division is repeated in political economy, 
where money, an economic necessity, appears in the guise of ‘abstract 
Necessity’, and the subject of capital, who has the individuality and freedom 
that money buys but is always ultimately subject to its economic power, stands 
in for the tragic hero. 
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Hegel’s analysis makes clear that though the drama of tragedy appears 
superficially as the conflict between an individual and ‘abstract Necessity’, this 
‘Necessity’ is in practice the outcome of a conflict between ‘one-sided’ 
individuals. What appears in tragedy as an abstract force independent of the 
individuals is itself the effect of a ‘collision’ between a ‘one-sided’ individual 
and other equally one-sided individuals. Necessity is the view from the tragic 
subject-position, a subject that the system of tragedy itself produces. Its flawed 
and ‘one-sided’ individuality, unbending in its abstract idea of itself, produces 
its own downfall. The idea of the individual in capital – the ideological form 
articulated also in real production – is an inherently tragic formation and 
representation. Comedy marks the dissolution of this concept of the individual. 
------------------------------------ 
2.7. Comedy 
Comedy, it is proposed, is a movement beyond representation, an effect of 
language, and the assumption of a particular subject-position. ‘For Hegel, the 
passage from tragedy to comedy is about overcoming the limits of 
representation’.63 To clarify this move, it is helpful to reiterate the function of 
representation. To represent is not to show a thing but to reference a universal. 
What is represented is a category, a unit in a system of representation; what is 
represented therefore in any speech act is ‘representation’ itself, a system of 
meaning and order of things. The universals or transcendental categories that 
govern a system of representation are reaffirmed in the meaning of sentences. 
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The epic and tragedy represent, in different forms, the universal, and represent 
the subject in relation to this universal. In the epic, ‘the subject narrates the 
universal’; in tragedy, ‘the subject enacts or stages the universal’.64 A law that 
stands apart from the individual is affirmed in either case. 
In comedy, however, according to Alenka Zupancic, ‘the subject is (or 
becomes) the universal, the essential, the absolute. Which is also to say that the 
universal, the essential, the absolute become the subject.’65 Instead of 
representing the abstract (as something other than itself), the subject assumes 
its position. The claim of comedy here is not that the comic subject is in some 
way full, representative, as Chaplin’s tramp is sometimes held to be, of all 
humanity. Instead that the comic subject is precisely abstract, assumes the 
position of abstraction and views (and provides a view) of representation from 
that position. The comic reversal is a switch in the subject between 
representation and abstraction; the subject moves over to the side of the void. If 
the previous forms of the epic and tragedy view abstraction from the position of 
representation and have it as their implicit or explicit subject-matter, by 
representing it – bringing it into a system of meaning and law – they aim 
precisely to deny what it is. In comedy the subject assumes the position of the 
void, of its own absence and subjective evacuation, and, from this disinvested 
position looks back at the world of representation. Comedy is the view from the 
void. 
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The void that is proposed here is a purely linguistic phenomenon. To represent 
it otherwise would be to return to the view of tragedy. Comedy arises in the gap 
between representation and presentation, the meta-language of the situation and 
language, the place of enunciation and what is said and seen from this place. 
‘Representation’, distinguished from ‘presentation’ in Badiou’s theory of 
appearances, corresponds to the categories that organize phenomena into 
objects that can be presented to consciousness and articulated as language. A 
‘normal’ situation is the congruence of representation and presentation; the 
categories are adequate but not excessive to the phenomena they represent.66 
Abnormality falls on two sides. An excrescence, in Badiou’s terminology, is a 
surplus of representation over presentation, an overdetermination of form that is 
not justified by the content, which are the actual phenomena that are controlled 
by this form. An abstract production is a signifier that is in practice empty and 
without content but which is represented as full, as charged with the 
determination of meaning. The signifiers of the epic and tragedy present 
examples of such excrescences, evidencing a formal abstraction that governs 
their production. Comedy, we propose, is a different type of abstraction, a 
deficiency of the categories, of representation, arising precisely in a suspension 
or deficiency in the rules of categorical determination. Comedy is the pratfall of 
universals.  
Greek dramatic comedy, in Hegel’s analysis, is an assault on the categories. 
‘The pure thoughts of the Beautiful and the Good … display a comic 
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spectacle…’.67 The gods, ethical maxims, specific concepts of duty, right and 
value are all equally subordinated to individual consciousness and are seen not 
as absolute powers separate from consciousness but ‘mere semblance’ which 
are secondary to and dependent on it. ‘The pretensions of universal essentiality 
are uncovered in the self’.68 Comedy raises the individual above the categories 
that construct meaning but, in the final turn that differentiates comedy from 
irony, turns this categorical dissolution also on itself, on the individual. In irony 
what is ‘dissolved’ and ‘brought to nothing’ is ‘all that is objective’;69 all 
positive content, without distinction, is subsumed in the ‘absolute subjectivity’ 
of the I. Irony brings to nothing every category except the individual, the ‘I’ 
that remains the transcendental signifier through which all other content is 
produced. In comedy, the individual is equally ‘nothing’. I becomes 0. The 
final ‘transcendental’ category that is dissolved in comedy is the category of the 
individual. Comedy is ‘inwardly self-dissolving’.70 It is ‘the laughter in which 
the characters dissolve everything, including themselves’;71 What is comical ‘is 
a personality or subject who makes his own actions contradictory and so brings 
them to nothing, while remaining tranquil and self-assured in the process’.72 
Irony appears therefore as the final subject-position of tragedy, in which, 
because everything objective is tragic and will be brought to nought, it justifies 
its own absolute subjectivity. Related to itself through an absolute negativity 
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that requires ‘the annihilation of everything specific’, ironical consciousness is 
a ‘mask’ that ‘has a sense of the deficiency of this abstraction’.73  Comedy is 
also therefore a liberation from irony. In comedy the subject becomes nothing: 
the reversal of comedy is that it no longer, in whatever disguised form of 
representation, makes  ‘abstraction’ its subject matter, but assumes it as its 
subject-position to view ‘representation’ from this position. The arbitrariness of 
the categories of thought, the appearance of things stripped of these universals, 
grounded instead in nothing, becomes the subject-matter presented in its 
subjective view. 
------------------------------------ 
2.8. Modern, modernity, modernism 
The argument for comedy and the structural shape and subject-position 
proposed here – the recognition of total abstraction – touches on the question of 
modernity. The epic/tragic form of abstraction that comedy is set in opposition 
to are types of modern, formal abstraction, the structures of capital and 
therefore of historical modernity, or the era of capital. The subject-position 
found in comedy is however directly equivalent to a reflexive concept of the 
modern, where  ‘modern’ is distinguished from modernism (the artistic 
movement that flourished, approximately, from 1863 to 1962)74 and from 
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modernity (the historical period, the era of capital). The ‘absolutely modern’ is 
a conceptual and not a historical category. In Jameson’s argument,75 it is not 
that in modernity a new figure appears in history (for new forms, figures and 
shapes of consciousness have appeared in history many times previously), but 
that this figure, for the first time, has the sense of itself as new and different 
from all previous figures in history. In this reflexive category it is modern. The 
idea of an absolute beginning, epitomized in Descartes’s project ‘to demolish 
everything completely and start again right from the foundations’,76 marks 
modern consciousness. This absolute beginning implies a complete categorical 
collapse, the ‘madness’ that Derrida identifies in the Cartesian thought 
experiment that concludes in the cogito. Modernity, as illustrated in Derrida’s 
analysis of Descartes, is a movement of crisis and recuperation. At the outset it 
is a categorical collapse where radical doubt and absolute suspicion taken to a 
point of ‘madness’; this is followed by recuperation in the certainty of the 
cogito, the modern subject. This latter signifier, the foundation for a new, 
modern order, is however neither (as Jameson argues) a substantial entity nor is 
it legitimately derived from what went before. It is transcendental to its own 
conditions. The contradiction and tension between the two parts of the 
movement constitute, for Hardt and Negri, the ongoing crisis of modernity.77 
On the one hand, there is ‘the discovery of the plane of immanence’, the 
                                                
75 Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity: Essays on the Ontology of the 
Present London and New York: Verso, 2002. 
76 Réné Descartes. ‘Meditations on First Philosophy’ (1641), in R. Descartes, 
Selected Philosophical Writings, tr. J. Cottingham and R. Stoothoff, Cambridge 
and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988 p. 76. 
77 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 2000. 
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collapse of the existing transcendental signifiers; and on the other, in a reactive 
and retentive move by the existing powers, a form of transcendental 
recuperation. The plane of immanence is where things in the world are allowed 
to form their own categories; the possibility therefore of a future which may be 
as different from the present as the present, in modern consciousness, is 
different from the past. Modernity consists thus of a modern moment – 
categorical collapse, absolute beginning and the temporality of the new; but 
also, in an unresolved conflict and contradiction, of anti-modern elements – 
transcendental signifiers that seek to control and organize this modern world 
consciousness in the interest of the existing powers.  
Modernism, the generality of modern art, displays both ‘modern’ moments (in 
the sense proposed here) and the retrogressive tendencies of modernity. A 
radical modernism that reshapes the categories of art (Malevich, Duchamp, 
Dada, Dubuffet) confronts a traditional modernism, which represents a 
traditional aesthetic in new forms (Kandinsky, Cubism, Matisse, de Kooning). 
Neo-classicism and romanticism are the alternative poles of this secondary 
modernism: the one predominant in cubism and the heirs of Cezanne and 
geometric abstraction; the other in Gauguin’s and Van Gogh’s descendants, 
Symbolism and Expressionism. ‘The shape of the square confronts the 
silhouette of the amoeba.’78 Both of these forms, we claim, operate in the 
epic/tragic nexus, employing the procedures of these genres – idealization and 
completeness on one side, the drama of division and the destruction of the ideal 
on the other – to achieve its effects. If modernism arose in opposition to an epic 
                                                
78 Alfred H. Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art (1936), in Harrison and Wood (ed.) 
1992, p. 363. 
 61 
and idealized idea of art (the 19th century academy), in its form of opposition it 
tends towards tragedy. In this it resembles (and represents in a literal, mimetic 
way) the form of capital that reveals itself and is able to function without its 
‘epic’ ideological superstructure.  
The ‘modern’ (absolutely modern) in modernism has a different affect. It is 
impossible to recuperate Duchamp or Dada to the epic or the tragic. Already in 
Manet, the collapse of accepted categories (of art, of decorum etc.) coincide 
with an affect that is comic. Le déjeuner sur l’herbe, exhibited at Salon des 
Refusés of 1863, is received in Zola’s fictional description in the genre of 
comedy.  
‘It was one long-drawn-out explosion of laughter, rising in intensity to 
hysteria. As soon as they reached the doorway, he saw visitors’ faces expand 
with anticipated mirth, their eyes narrow, their mouths broaden into a grin, 
and from every side came tempestuous puffings and blowings from fat men, 
rusty, grating whimperings from thin ones, and, dominating all the rest, 
high-pitched, fruity giggles from the women. A group of young men on the 
opposite side of the room were writhing as if their ribs had been tickled. One 
woman had collapsed on to a bench, her knees pressed tightly together, 
gasping, struggling to retain her breath behind her handkerchief. The rumour 
that there was a funny picture to be seen must have spread rapidly, for 
people came stampeding from every other room in the exhibition and gangs 
of sightseers, afraid of missing something, came pushing their way in, 
shouting ‘Where?’ – ‘Over there!’ – ‘Oh I say! Did you ever?’ And shafts of 
wit fell thicker here than anywhere else. It was the subject that was the main 
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target for witticisms. Nobody understood it; everyone thought it “mad” and 
“killingly funny”…. ‘79 
Escaping and challenging the genres of romanticism, neo-classicism, realism 
and the others, whether epic or tragic, precisely in the denial of any categorical 
determination, the work produces an effect that is comic. If in Wittgenstein’s 
dictum courage is the same as originality,80 the originality of the avant-garde is 
the courage of the ‘aviator’ who flies above the categories. Staled through 
repetition, the comic affect is buried beneath layers of interpretations and 
concepts and meanings of art that the work itself brings into production. Even 
the absolutely modern can in time be recuperated in culture to a timeless value. 
Comedy however appears as a vital affect at critical moments in modernism, in 
an unreconciled conflict with traditional modernism. In the return of the 
modern to its original meaning – the contemporary – the comic affect of 
categorical collapse comes to the fore. 
------------------------------------ 
2.9. Universal comedy 
In comedy, according to Hegel, art returns to itself. Comedy does not represent 
the universal or view it from the position of the individual, a subject of 
representation, but is the assumption of the position of the ‘universal’ by the 
individual; it is the view of representation from the position of abstraction. How 
phenomena appear to spirit. The subject position of comedy, the effect of a 
                                                
79 Emile Zola, The Masterpiece, tr. T. Walton, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
and New York, 1999, p. 139. 
80 Wittgenstein. Culture and Value, tr. P. Winch (Chicago and Oxford: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980) p. 36. 
 63 
categorical collapse from which the subject’s representation of itself is not 
exempt, relates to the temporality of the modern – it necessarily involves the 
new in that ‘all that is familiar is lost to sight’ – but also to the position of art. 
The correspondence of comedy and art is not only, as Freud suggests, an equal 
purposelessness. A degree of subjective disinvestment and a play on the 
categories, norms and forms of the anterior period – in short an imagination in 
excess of the transcendental imaginary of the time – distinguish the critical 
works of art history from the generic productions of their period. The value of 
this work is not that it is greater than the categories and establishes a new 
transcendence, a new abstract order but, critically, that it is less than them. In 
this it is comic, even if, by dint of its axiomatic evasion, it avoids the genre of 
comic art. The categorical indistinction of the modern concept of art, that ‘it 
offers something… which exceeds and ruptures the fixity of determinate 
judgment, in a singular and logically indeterminate manner’,81 differentiates art 
from other disciplines that as bodies of knowledge depend on categorical 
determination. In this way the idea of art is essentially modern.  
The modern idea, emerging out of Kant’s critical examination of the categories, 
appears in Hegel through the inflection of the categories by history. The 
modern is not for Hegel immediately a temporal category or the temporality of 
the new. What is modern is not the loss or introduction of any particular 
category, whether temporal or spatial, but the suspension of the absolute 
validity of all categories. The recognition that there is no natural or 
transcendental ground for meaning – that critically all categories that shape 
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meaning are judicial, human and historical – is for Hegel the modern Idea. The 
product of the transcendental imagination – the transcendental imaginary – 
translates in Hegel into the Idea, without which any society cannot function but 
which evolves in history. The modern Idea is the Idea of no Idea, that there is 
no absolute natural or transcendental ground from which meaning can be 
derived. If, in Lyotard’s classic determination, modernity is the era of ‘grand 
narratives’ – epic forms of thought – the idea of the modern proposed here in 
opposition to historical modernity is, from the beginning, the collapse of such 
categorical ideas. History, in Hegel’s sense, is the succession of meanings that 
are contingent, temporary and one-sided. The modern moment, the zero-point 
from which history comes into view, is the universal suspicion of categories; 
and, in the absence of any absolute or natural ground, meanings can only be 
either arbitrary or arrived at through mutual recognition.  
The modern recognition Hegel proposes – that there is no fundamental, either 
natural or transcendental, ground for meaning and no absolute authority, 
therefore, in language and human affairs – implies a temporality and a 
collectivity. The universal suspicion of categories displaces the work of making 
meaning from the past into the future. As what has been and what is has no 
general meaning, such meaning exists only in the future. The absence of any 
absolute ground leaves only the mutual recognition of different agents as the 
basis for meaning, a meaning that is partial and particular until such mutual 
recognition is extended to all and becomes universal. History (universal 
history) is the collective work of the construction of such a universal meaning, 
but a meaning that, because it does not and has not existed, in the present or 
past, is the distinctive meaning of the future. The present work is the 
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construction of a future meaning. Language in this moment is not organized by 
reference to abstract categories, to fixed and predetermined meanings that 
constitute its law, but is freely remade in its temporary collective situation. The 
collective recognition of nothing, a recognition also therefore of the individual 
unopposed by anything outside itself, proposes a connection and a mutual 
recognition that is also a collective freedom. Language returns to a 
pragmatically social function, articulating a still open idea of freedom and the 
purposelessness of its happy end. The pleasure of comedy indicates the affect 
of this condition of language,  an affect predicated precisely on nothing, the 
void, and the community of their mutual recognition. The mutual recognition of 
‘nothing’ in itself produces the collective and produces universal history in the 
genre of comedy. As Malevich proposes, ‘Come comrade aviators, swim in the 
abyss’.82   
------------------------------------
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3. A whole history (of art) from abstraction to comedy (Hegel) 
3.1. The primal scene of art 
It is in the collapse of habit – ‘this happy life of custom’ – that Hegel locates 
the emergence of ‘the first work of art’.1 Previously, ‘the individual is content 
with the limitations of his existence and has not yet grasped the unrestricted 
thought of his free self.’2 Now, with ‘absolute unrest and the passing away of 
the ethical order’ (absolute Unruhe und das Vergehen der Sittlichkeit),3 the 
autonomous individual emerges, who frees himself from immersion in a 
particular life-form (family, local community, custom) and instead begins, as 
Zizek writes, ‘to recognize the substance of his being in another, secondary 
community, which is universal’4. Hegel identifies this moment – ‘the passing 
away of the ethical order’ and the corresponding movement from a local to a 
‘universal’ consciousness – as creating the conditions for the beginning of art. 
‘In such an epoch’, he writes, ‘absolute art makes its appearance’.5 The loss of 
Sittlichkeit – ‘the passing away of the ethical order’ – opens up a new space of 
being. No longer immersed in a particular and local community, the individual 
subject gains ‘the unrestricted thought of his free self’, the consciousness of 
itself as individual instead of being defined and limited by the customs and 
                                                
1 Hegel’s discussion of ‘the first work of art’ and the Greek ‘religion of art’ is 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit (tr. A.V. Miller, Oxford and New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1977 pp. 424-453) (Hegel 1977). The phrase ‘this happy life 
of custom’ comes from J.N. Findlay’s ‘Analysis of the Text’ p. 580. Quotations 
from this source are referenced (Findlay, Hegel 1977) 
2 Hegel 1977, p. 425 
3 Hegel 1977, p. 426 
4 S. Zizek. The Ticklish Subject. London and New York, Verso, 1999, p. 90 
(Zizek 1999) 
5 Hegel 1977, p. 426 
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habits of its community. At the same time, losing the reassurance and meaning 
provided by custom, place and familiar relations, the individual apprehends its 
world as ‘abstract’, a ‘shapeless essence’ (ungestalteten Wesen), and as ‘the 
power over him from which he suffers violence’.6 It is the contradiction 
between on the one hand the individual’s sense of its own freedom, of the 
‘negative power’ of individuality, and on the other the sense of a ‘universal’, 
‘abstract’ power opposing and threatening its particular individuality, that in 
Hegel’s theory creates the conditions in which art comes into being. It is out of 
the division and conflict between the abstract universal and the individual that 
the first work of art – ‘the abstract work of art’ - emerges as an attempt to 
reconcile this contradiction.  
This primal scene of art contains within it the basic elements of the Hegelian 
drama. A moment of separation (Trennung), the ‘disseverance which snaps the 
bonds of communal life and love’7 sunders an original unity (Einsein) and 
leaves in its place within consciousness and within life a fundamental 
contradiction and division (Entzweiung). The task of art and philosophy then 
emerges as the cancellation of division (die Aufhebung der Entzweiung). In 
Lectures on Aesthetics8 Hegel describes the ‘final end and aim of art’ as the 
                                                
6 Hegel 1977, p. 427 
7 G.W.F. Hegel Early Theological Writings. Tr. T.M. Knox, Chicago 1948, p. 
186. Quoted in C. Taylor Hegel. Cambridge and New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999 p. 58 (Taylor 1999). The description of Hegel’s overall 
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(‘Self-positing Spirit’) pp. 76-126. 
8 G.W.F. Hegel. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford and 
New York, Clarendon Press, 1988. (see Hegel 1988) The quotations from the 
introduction to Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics have generally been taken from 
the translation by B. Bosanquet (G.W.F. Hegel. Introductory Lectures on 
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reconciliation of a division or opposition which appears in various different 
forms. ‘Formulated in the abstract, it is the contrast of the universal and 
particular’.9 More concretely, it appears in the antitheses of abstract law and 
individual phenomena, of the sensuous and spiritual, of the ‘cold command’ of 
duty and the ‘warm feelings’ of individual interest, of inward freedom and 
natural necessity, and in the antithesis ‘of theory and subjective thought 
contrasted with objective existence and experience’.10 It is a ‘fundamental 
distinction and antagonism between that which is real essentially and in its own 
right, and that which is external reality and existence’.11 In practice, the 
‘discrepancy in life and consciousness’ is between an existence ‘entangled in 
nature’, as ‘a prisoner in common reality and earthly temporality’, and ‘a realm 
of thought and freedom’ in which man, in retaliation against the oppression and 
violence he has experienced in nature, ‘strips the world of its living and 
flourishing reality and dissolves it into abstractions’.12 ‘Modern culture’, Hegel 
writes, has forced these collective antitheses up to ‘a point of most unbending 
contradiction’.13 Even as modern consciousness understands the demand that 
the contradiction be resolved, it cannot release itself from the fixity of these 
oppositions, such that the solution remains ‘a mere ought’ and consciousness is 
condemned to ‘the unrest of a perpetual to and fro, which seeks a reconciliation 
                                                                                                                             
Aesthetics. Tr. B. Bosanquet, London and New York, Penguin Books, 2004) 
(Hegel 2004) 
9 Hegel 2004, p. 59 
10 Hegel 2004, p. 59 
11 Hegel 2004, p. 59 
12 Hegel 2004, p. 60 
13 Hegel 2004, p. 59 
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without finding it’,14 In such circumstances, where ‘the culture of the world has 
fallen into such a contradiction’, the task of ‘the reawakening of philosophy’, 
and also ‘the reawakening of the science of art’, is ‘to undo or cancel it’, to 
show that what constitutes truth is the dissolution of these oppositions and that 
these oppositions are self-dissolving; ‘not in the sense, as may be supposed, 
that the opposition and its two sides do not exist at all, but that they exist 
reconciled’.15 ‘Art has the vocation of revealing the truth in the form of 
sensuous artistic shape, of representing the reconciled antitheses just described, 
and, therefore, has its purpose in itself, in this representation and revelation’.16 
If ‘the cancellation of division’ is the aim of art, and ‘truth’ lies in this 
cancellation, a more specific and more fundamental concept of the ‘division’ in 
question is proposed by ‘the first work of art’, that is the ‘abstract’ work of art 
that Hegel reviews in Phenomenology. ‘The first work of art’, he writes, ‘as 
immediate, is abstract and individual.’17 The two contradictory terms of the 
division (Entzweiung) into which the original unity (Einsein) breaks down and 
which art attempts to bring together are ‘abstraction’ and ‘individuality’. These 
two terms appear as prior to and more fundamental than the various antitheses 
that Hegel enumerates in Lectures on Aesthetics. They can be immediately 
derived from the ‘passing away of the ethical order’ which in Hegel’s account 
gives rise to the conditions for the emergence of art. ‘Abstraction’ – in its 
‘absolute’ meaning – and the ‘individual’ – whose meaning art is a continual 
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attempt to locate – are the two basic terms, the zero and one of a binary system, 
that motivate and constitute the conceptual elements of the first work of art and 
explain its subsequent history. 
The ‘passing away of the ethical order’ denotes not just the collapse of a social 
situation, the loss of the ‘substance’ in which the subject is immersed, but also 
the loss of a system of representation and structure of meaning derived from 
that social order. In the passage from Sittlichkeit (‘the ethical order’) to 
Moralität (individual morality), a structure of meaning, derived from what is 
customary (sittlich) and from custom (Sitte), disappears.18 A system of 
representation based on habitual and familiar relations, a sense of place and the 
established and unquestioned connections between an individual and its world, 
which define its sense of self, comes to an end. The structure of custom which 
holds together and gives meaning to the individual shapes that appear 
disappears. In place of this dense, ‘full’ network of connections, an empty, 
‘abstract’ space opens up, which is without definition or shape (ungestalteten) 
and undetermined by established rules of representation, since it is outside the 
meaning defined by custom and familiar relations; it is outside representation 
                                                
18 ‘Sittlichkeit: ‘almost = morality in the English sense. It means the habit of 
virtue, without the reflective aspiration after goodness as an ideal’. Hegel 
stresses the derivation of the word, and of the adjective Sittlich, from Sitte, 
‘custom’. Hence he gives it the flavour of ‘(conformity, conforming to) 
customary morality’. (Bosanquet, in Hegel 2004, p. 137) See also the entry for 
‘ethical life and custom’ in M. Inwood. A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford and 
Malden, Ma., Blackwell, 2003, pp., 91-93. ‘Moralität is individual morality, 
arrived at by one’s own reason, conscience or feelings. Sittlichkeit is the ethical 
norms embodied in the customs and institutions of one’s society.’ In Hegel’s 
Natural Law (1802) ‘Moralität, as private, bourgeois morality, is assigned to 
the commercial and wealth-producing class, while Sittlichkeit is the preserve of 
the ruling, warrior class’. (Inwood 2003, p. 92) 
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and meaning as such. ‘Abstraction’, the first condition to which the artwork 
responds, is what falls outside ‘representation’. In its ‘absolute’ sense it implies 
not just the loss of individual representations or objects within a field of vision, 
but the loss of the system of rules, conventions, habits and relations that create 
the overall field of representation and define the relations and meaning of 
objects within that field. It is not the loss of objects but the loss of the meaning 
of objects derived from their determined relation to others. The ‘absolute 
unrest’ that follows the passing of the ethical order is a scene without any fixed 
determinations, a void in which the loss of the structure by which things are 
represented leads to the disappearance of those appearances. The abstraction 
that results is not one whose meaning can be understood in its difference from 
the structure that preceded it but is now lost, for differential meanings appear 
within a structure of representation and this is precisely what has been lost. In 
this sense it is ‘absolute’.  
In Hegel’s analogy this moment of passage is ‘the night’: ‘the night in which 
substance was betrayed and made into Subject’.19 ‘the fathomless night of self-
consciousness in which the ethics of custom are betrayed’.20 The individual 
wakes up alone in this night of abstraction, even in the daytime, and finds 
himself in this state of loss. As the existing system of representation does not 
apply in this space of abstraction, the individual who experiences it has no 
means to represent, describe, understand or know it; it is merely felt as an 
unbound affect without any corresponding ideational content. ‘Abstraction’, in 
its opposition to the  ‘individual’ or to any other ‘positive’ term, is of a 
                                                
19 Hegel 1977, p. 426 
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different order to the antitheses that Hegel lists in Lectures on Aesthetics. The 
distinctions between ‘sensuous’ and ‘spiritual’, ‘duty’ and ‘interest’, etc. are 
between two terms existing as opposites within a certain system of 
understanding; their opposition is the function of a set of rules and relations that 
determines their antithetical meaning. They act, in effect, as the nodal points of 
a system of meaning. Hegel proposes, in place of the system of understanding 
which determines them as antithetical, a different and ‘universal’ system of 
Reason, in which they no longer appear as opposites but are reconciled at a 
higher level of meaning. However the division that ‘abstraction’ establishes is 
not the difference between two terms within a system of representation, but the 
division between a system of representation as such and what is external to that 
system. The division between ‘abstract’ and ‘individual’ is not like that 
between ‘universal’ and ‘particular’; it is not a division between two 
antithetical meanings, but between a meaning and non-meaning.  
In Hegel’s narrative, the first ‘abstract’ work of art makes this abstraction and 
the ‘pathos’ that the artist feels in the face of it the material and content of the 
work. The work of art, Hegel writes, ‘is essentially a question’.21 This question 
is posed by what is in experience but not in knowledge, by what cannot be 
comprehended within an existing structure of meaning or articulated within an 
existing discourse. The ‘shapeless essence’ that arises at the point where a 
certain structure of meaning comes into question is the first subject of the work.  
Art, in Hegel’s theory, is not the only means of responding to the experience of 
abstraction. ‘(I)n its content, art stands on one and the same ground with 
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religion… and philosophy’.22 Art, religion and philosophy all have the same 
‘content’; they address the same abstract ‘absolute’. What differentiates them is 
the forms in which they respond to this problem and the means by which they 
‘bring home to consciousness their object’.23 Art has the form of ‘sensuous 
intuition’; it apprehends the ‘absolute’ in ‘an immediate and therefore sensuous 
knowing’, and presents it to consciousness ‘in the form and shape of the 
sensuous and objective’.24 Religion has the ‘subjective’ form of ‘pictorial 
thinking’, whereas, in ‘the third and last’ form, philosophy unites the objective 
form of art and the subjective form of religion in the concept, ‘the free thinking 
of absolute spirit’.25 At the outset, Hegel writes, religion and art were identical, 
as the form of expression of religion was ‘sensuous and objective’ 
representation: ‘the earlier stages of religion were a religion of art and its 
sensuous representation’.26 This identity persists in the Greek ‘religion of art’. 
Artists create the forms in which the gods were worshipped. However Greek art 
represents a vital break from the ‘symbolic’ productions of the ‘natural 
religions’ that preceded it. It is this difference that leads Hegel in 
Phenomenology to write of ‘the first work of art’, ‘absolute art’ and to describe 
it as the work of the ‘artist’ (Kunstler) and not, as with the previous forms of 
production, the ‘artificer’ (Werkmeister). Within the classification of Lectures 
on Aesthetics it represents a new category, the ‘classical’, differentiated from 
the ‘symbolic’ form that preceded it. The earlier ‘symbolic’ production has 
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abstraction as its content; it aims to represent ‘the ‘shape’ of ‘shapelessness’’.27 
But this earlier work displays ‘the merely abstract intelligibleness of the 
form’.28 It remains ‘indeterminate’ and ‘one-sided’ in that ‘it does not yet 
possess in itself that individuality which the Ideal demands; its abstraction and 
one-sidedness leaves its shape externally defective and arbitrary’.29 It is abstract 
but it lacks individuality. The vital difference of Greek art is that, taking as its 
primary condition and content the ‘shapelessness’ of abstraction, it brings into 
play as a counterposing term to this abstraction a concept of the individual. It is 
‘free and complete’, and no longer ‘one-sided’, in that it aims to represent both 
abstraction and individual self-consciousness; to represent the abstract in an 
individual form. 
The individual appears against the background of abstraction. In ‘the night in 
which substance was betrayed’ - the collapse of Sittlichkeit – what is lost is 
‘that tranquil immediate trust in the substance’.30 With the disappearance of the 
network of connections between objects, the set of relations that describe their 
place and meaning, the void of abstraction that opens up leaves the objects that 
appear isolated in an open, infinite space, separated from any others. In this 
division they become ‘individual’, independent of others and no longer 
determined in the sense of their being by these others. The former ‘immediate’ 
(unreflective) trust in the substance ‘turns back into trust in oneself and the 
                                                
27 Hegel 1977, p. 419 
28 Hegel 1977, p. 421 
29 Hegel 1988, p. 76 
30 Hegel 1977, p. 425 
 75 
certainty of oneself’.31 In the epistemological void that follows the loss of 
representation, the only object that can be relied on with certainty is the thought 
of the self-conscious self, the individual. In the space of ‘division’ only the 
‘individual’ is undivided. The subject becomes ‘essence’. ‘Since, then, its trust 
is broken, and the substance of the nation bruised… [it] has now stepped forth 
as an extreme, that of self-consciousness grasping itself as essence’.32 The 
individual ‘has withdrawn into itself’; it ‘has dissolved within itself all the 
formerly established distinctions of its stable existence and the spheres of its 
organically ordered world’.33 It recognizes ‘the principle of pure individuality 
of self-consciousness, who now grasps ‘the unrestricted thought of his free 
self’.34 The distinction of Greek art, and its differentiation from previous forms, 
is the self-consciousness of the individual, of its own self as an ‘essence’ and 
‘the negative power’, and in this of its freedom. That this individual is both 
created by the condition of abstraction but also opposed by it is the 
contradiction that, in the reconciliation of these two terms, Greek art aims to 
cancel and undo.  
----------------------------------- 
3.2. The question, how? 
The two terms, ‘abstract’ and ‘individual’, which are not transcendental but the 
effect of a social change, the loss of ‘substance’, and which are apprehended as 
opposing each other, comprise the raw material and content of the artwork. On 
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one side – abstraction –  is an unrepresented, ‘unbound’ affect, which in so far 
as it cannot be represented shades into anxiety, terror, ‘pathos’, the sense of an 
‘alien’ and threatening ‘power’. On the other side is a sense of the self-
conscious individual, which ‘being perfectly sure of itself’ (if nothing else), 
attains to ‘unrestrained joyfulness (schrankenlosen Freudigkeit) and the freest 
enjoyment of itself’.35 Absolute freedom – ‘the absolute levity of the ethical 
Spirit which has dissolved within itself all the firmly established distinctions of 
its stable existence’36 – stands opposed to the terror of abstraction – ‘the power 
over him from which he suffers violence, as his ‘pathos’, by giving himself 
over to which his self-consciousness loses its freedom’.37 The two terms in their 
opposition comprise the ‘what’ of the work, that is the material of which it is 
composed. The work, Hegel proposes, aims to reconcile them, to ‘undo or 
cancel’ this division. 
The question for the work of art within Hegel’s framework is how? How to 
‘represent and reveal’ the ‘reconciliation’ of this former antithesis in a 
‘sensuous and objective’ form? In the first form of the ‘abstract’ work of art, 
‘the artistic product (the statue of the god) stands out as individual on the 
universal background that surrounds and houses it’.38 The abstract is a 
subjective entity in form like the power that the individual takes itself to be, but 
alien, a ‘universal’ power that ‘stands over’ the individual. This ‘abstract’ 
subject – the god – is given an ‘individual’ human form, but one which as an 
                                                
35 Hegel 1977, pp. 425-6 
36 Hegel 1977, p. 425 
37 Hegel 1977, p. 427 
38 Findlay, Hegel 1977, p. 581 
 77 
ideal, in its perfection, remains removed (abstracted) from individual existence. 
The work represents the abstract in individual form: the ‘shapeless essence’ is 
converted into a shape that, as ‘individual’, is on the same level as and can be 
recognized by the individual subject. In this ideal form, ‘an admiring crowd 
reveres it as the spirit which is their essence’.39 ‘The restless variety of actual 
individuals is brought to peace in the idealized individuality of the sculptured 
god’.40 But this work, the artist recognizes, does not represent an actual 
individual self-consciousness, the ‘troubled’ consciousness of the artist, who 
‘could impart perfection to the work only by emptying himself of particularity, 
depersonalizing himself and rising to the abstraction of pure action’.41 It 
represents ‘not the dark, but the peaceful night, the night after sunset, not 
before dawn’.42 It is only ‘abstractly individual’. The union between the 
‘abstract’ and ‘individual’ remains within the realm of the abstract – not of 
actual ‘thought and freedom’ – and therefore fails in the aim of dissolving and 
reconciling the antithetical categories. The work must move on, towards self-
consciousness. 
That this first work of art fails in this reconciliation, and achieves only an 
unsatisfactory ‘synthetic’ union of the abstract and individual, propels the 
artwork on a restless movement where in a succession of different forms it 
repeatedly attempts and repeatedly fails to reconcile the abstract and individual. 
Hegel describes seven ‘forms’ that the work of art assumes in Greek art, and 
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divides them into three categories. The two forms of the ‘abstract’ work of art 
(the statue and the hymn) are succeeded by the forms of the ‘living’ work of art 
(the Bacchic mysteries and the ideal athlete); and finally by the three forms of 
the ‘spiritual’ (geistige) work of art (the epic, tragedy and comedy). The 
symmetrical pairs of the forms of the ‘abstract’ and ‘living’ works of art 
represent the abstract/individual alternatively at rest and in motion, in the static 
form of a body and as the movement of a language: ‘in ‘the determination of 
the Thing’ and as ‘pure activity’.43 After the failure of the first ‘abstract’ work 
of art – the statue – to represent and reveal ‘actual’ individual self-
consciousness, the work, in its migration towards self-consciousness, enters the 
‘higher element’ of language. In this form ‘it is pure thought, or the devotion 
whose inwardness in the hymn has at the same time an outer existence’.44 But 
the language of the hymn is not the articulated language of self-consciousness: 
both ‘sublime’ and ‘trivial’, it remains ‘the language of an alien self-
consciousness’.45 Even as the individual, participating in the collective action 
of the hymn, renders itself one with a collective and externally represented 
abstraction, it loses its actual individual self-consciousness in a ‘universal 
individuality’.46  
In the ‘living’ work of art two similarly related forms are presented at a further 
level of development. The cult of the Dionysian mysteries enters into an 
abstract language of bodies; like the participants in the hymn, the participants in 
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the cult experience an abstraction of consciousness. Inspired in origin by ‘the 
divine Light of the risen Sun’, which ‘enters into the objective existence of the 
fruit’, and through ‘the fruit’ (as wine) into actual self-consciousness, the work 
of the mysteries ‘attains to genuine reality’ in an actual abstraction of 
consciousness.47 The Bacchanalian revel is ‘True’, but a truth that persists only 
so long as it remains in motion.48 It is the consciousness only of ‘absolute [i.e. 
abstract] Spirit, which is this simple essence, not Spirit as it is in its own self’.49 
‘This undisciplined revelry… must bring itself to rest as an object’.50 The final 
form of the ‘living’ work of art echoes the first ‘abstract’ form: ‘as in the 
previous form the statue confronts the artist; as a work, moreover, that is 
equally complete, but not, however, as an intrinsically lifeless, but as a living, 
self’.51 In the ideal figure of the athlete, the abstract perfection of the statue 
returns, but this time in the form of an actual individual: ‘here we have the 
abstract moment of the living corporeality of essence’.52 The ideal athlete, ‘an 
inspired and living work of art that matches strength with its beauty… [is] the 
highest bodily representation among the people of their essence’.53 But this 
‘work’, even if it has a ‘non-spiritual clarity’, has no ‘inwardness’; it lacks true 
self-consciousness. 
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All of these forms fail in the aim of reconciling abstraction with the actual 
individual. They are ‘one-sided’, ‘still not equally balanced against each 
other’.54 Taking as their subject ‘abstraction’ – the ‘alien power’ – and the 
‘pathos’ of the division between this abstraction and actual individual 
existence, they aim to ‘subdue’ the alien power, to ‘master’ the ‘pathos’, by 
representing the abstract in an individual form, either as an object to which the 
individual stands in reverent identification (the ‘Apollonian’), or as an actual 
individual experience of abstraction (the ‘Dionysian’). In either case, and 
whether unbalanced on the side of the ‘abstract’ or the ‘living’, the 
representation remains alien, abstract and removed from the actual experience 
of the self-conscious individual. The work expresses the ‘pathos’ but does not 
articulate it or reintroduce it to self-consciousness.55 It remains within the 
domain of ‘picture-thinking’, presenting a ‘synthetic’, abstract image or idea of 
the union of abstract and individual, but not an actual reconciliation. The work, 
in the ambition of its aim, must therefore continue its migration towards self-
consciousness. 
In the final ‘spiritual’ (geistige) category, the work of art returns to the medium 
of language, ‘(t)he perfect element in which inwardness is just as external and 
externality is inward’.56 This is no longer the inchoate language of ‘the 
emotional hymn’ nor ‘the meaningless stammer of the Bacchic frenzy’, but an 
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 81 
‘imaginative language’ (vorstellenden Sprache) whose content is ‘lucid’ 
(klaren) ‘because the artist has worked his way out of the initial enthusiasm, 
originating wholly from substance, into a [definite] shape’.57 The category of 
the ‘spiritual’ work of art, representing the developed consciousness of Greek 
art, not only expresses but also articulates the content of the work. The relation 
of the abstract to the individual is not only ‘implicitly accomplished’ but is 
‘presented to consciousness’.58 In the final three forms of Greek art that Hegel 
considers – the epic, tragedy and comedy – distinct modes of response to the 
problem of abstraction are presented, different structural approaches by which 
an attempt is made to reconcile the ‘individual’ to ‘abstraction’.  
From the failure of the first work of art to achieve art’s aim, the restless 
succession and development of new forms is driven by the failure of preceding 
forms to reconcile the abstract and individual. In Hegel’s narrative this 
movement is also a progressive, evolving development, as the work moves 
towards self-consciousness. The epic represents the culmination, in lucid and 
imaginative language, of the ‘ideal’ mode, in which a perfect, ‘full’ signifier is 
used to fill the gap – the chasm rendered in the social fabric – caused by the 
ending of the ‘objective’ ethical order. But this form fails as the earlier forms of 
‘abstract’ and ‘living’ work failed; in its representation of the abstract in an 
‘ideal’ form it fails to represent the actual effect of abstraction on the 
individual. Tragedy, born out of the first part of the epic, corrects this defect. 
Overcoming the ‘one-sidedness’ of the earlier forms, it moves beyond the 
simple ideal of the epic, presenting not only the ‘ideal’ and individual shape of 
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the hero, but against this an opposing power of ‘abstract Necessity’, ‘the 
negative power of all the [individual] shapes that appear, a power in which they 
do not recognize themselves but, on the contrary, perish’.59 Tragedy takes as its 
content the explicit opposition of the abstract and individual, linked together in 
a relationship of necessity. It is the drama of this opposition. If the earlier forms 
of art implicitly expressed the failure of the reconciliation of abstract and 
individual, tragedy explicitly articulates this failure. In the opposition of 
‘powers and persons’, tragedy is the structure of failure, the impossibility of the 
ideal or the fullness of representation, and the necessity of ruin. It articulates 
this failure not as the accidental feature of a particular mode of representation 
or the inadequacy of an individual representation, but, in the character that it 
gives to the abstract, as Necessity. 
Hegel analyses in detail the first six forms that the work of art assumes. The 
passage through a succession of different forms – ‘abstract’, ‘living’ and 
‘spiritual’ with each transformation born out of the failure of the previous form, 
but ending in its own failure, is a necessary prelude to establishing the 
‘unrestrained joyfulness’ of art’s eventual homecoming. In the last form that in 
Hegel’s analysis the work of art assumes – comedy – it finally, after a long 
odyssey, finds its way home. In the form of comedy, Hegel proposes, the 
ambition that has motivated art since the beginning is finally fulfilled. ‘In it, the 
religion of art is consummated and has completely returned to itself’.60 Comedy 
accomplishes the reconciliation of abstraction and the individual that art has 
sought throughout its history. The absolute power, the abstract universal, ‘has 
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lost the form of something presented to consciousness, something altogether 
separate from consciousness and alien to it’.61 The abstract is ‘dissolved’ in 
individual consciousness, at the same time as the ‘individual’ is dissolved by 
abstraction. ‘The self… stands forth in its own nakedness and ordinariness, 
which it shows to be not distinct from the genuine self, the actor, or from the 
spectator’.62 In the work of comedy, artist and audience, no longer divided, 
achieve ‘a state of spiritual well-being and of repose therein, such as is not to 
be found anywhere outside of this Comedy’.63 In this final form, where ‘Fate is 
now united with self-consciousness’,64 art achieves its end and its own 
dissolution.  
----------------------------------- 
 
3.3. Hegelian comedy 
Comedy is a form of dissolution. It ‘dissolves’ abstraction, revealing the 
individual at a new level of being by a ‘comic turn’, which is a reversal of the 
procedure of the earlier forms of art. of tragedy, the epic etc. Where these 
previous forms sought to ‘master’ or ‘subdue’ the ‘alien power’ of abstraction 
by making a representation of it and containing it within the determination of a 
‘shape’ or form, comedy moves beyond the limits of representation. ‘For 
Hegel, the passage from tragedy to comedy is about overcoming the limits of 
                                                
61 Hegel 1977, p. 452 
62 Hegel 1977, p. 450 
63 Hegel 1977, p. 453 
64 Hegel 1977, p. 452 
 84 
representation’65. Comedy does not ‘represent’ abstraction; rather, in comedy 
the absolute power ‘has lost the form of something presented to consciousness, 
something altogether separate from consciousness and alien to it, as were the 
statue, and also the living beautiful corporeality, or the content of the Epic and 
the powers and persons of Tragedy’.66 In comedy, individual consciousness 
dissolves abstraction, but not in the sense that abstraction does not exist for it, 
that it eliminates, denies or forecloses abstraction; it dissolves the determinate 
representations of abstraction only as it itself is equally dissolved by 
abstraction.  
The form  of comedy demonstrates a movement in the relationship between the 
individual and ‘abstraction’ which has several valences. Comedy, in Hegel’s 
‘universal’ description, is more than comic. For the  specific procedure of 
comedy – the movement of the ‘comic turn’ – is characteristic not only of a 
genre of art, but is a displacement of the position of the individual in relation to 
both ‘abstraction’ and ‘representation’ that, Hegel’s theory suggests, is the 
essence of art. Comedy is a genre of art, but also, according to Hegel, its last 
form, where art fulfils its ‘final end and aim’, where it overcomes the ‘one-
sidedness’ and failure of the preceding forms and accomplishes the ambition 
which has motivated it since the beginning. In comedy art ‘returns to itself’; it 
becomes what it is. Comedy, as Hegel understands it, is therefore more than 
another genre of art, but demonstrates an approach, a procedure and a way of 
being, ‘represented and revealed’ in the work, that is essential for the fulfilment 
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and success of art. What is ‘absolute’ in art, and differentiates it from the 
merely generic, and from religious or ideological production, is an element of 
the comic reversal. 
The ‘consummation’ of art is also a development of consciousness. Hegel’s 
narrative in the Phenomenology of the successive forms of art, which 
culminates in the form of comedy, is also a narrative of the development of 
individual consciousness. Each of different forms of Greek art represent and 
reveal, in ‘sensuous and objective’ form, successive stages in the development 
of consciousness, different ‘shapes’ of consciousness. There is an ‘epic’ and 
‘tragic’ consciousness, as there is, as Hegel writes, a ‘comic consciousness’. In 
this last, as comedy accomplishes the fulfilment of art, consciousness realises 
the ‘absolute levity’ which is its own ‘return to itself’. In this it is a 
consciousness which is no longer ‘abstract’, no longer the subject of 
abstraction, but instead ‘actual’. The ‘genuine self’ of the individual steps forth 
‘in its own nakedness and ordinariness’.67 
The fulfilment of ‘absolute’ art in the procedure of comedy and the emergence 
of an ‘actual’ individual consciousness are both related to an escape from a 
certain ideological structure. In the earlier forms of the ‘religion of art’ Greek 
art remains within a structure of ideology and within the ‘picture-thinking’ that 
is the mode of representation of religion. Its procedures are the procedures of 
ideology. It represents abstraction as an ‘Absolute, Other Subject’,68 an abstract 
Subject to which the individual, as the reciprocal of this other Subject, remains 
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subject. Within these forms, ‘individuals are ‘abstract’ with regards to the 
subjects which they always-already are’.69 In comedy the forms of art transcend 
the forms of ideology: ‘the gods, as also their moments… vanish’.70 These 
representations of abstraction, and generally those powers which previously 
assumed for consciousness ‘the form of essentiality over against it’, are 
dissolved in an individual self-consciousness. In this movement, art escapes 
from the ideological structure which previously contained it, and ‘actual’ 
individual consciousness, freed from ‘abstract’ subjectivity and subjection, 
emerges into being.  
As a reordering of the relationship between the individual and abstract, the 
scope of Hegel’s idea of comedy extends not only in the general dimension of 
art but also into those of individual consciousness and the ideological 
structuring of society. It connects them through an idea of freedom. In the 
‘universal’ form that Hegel articulates, the theoretical import and practical 
application of ‘comedy’ is not only in aesthetics and the practise of art, but also 
in psychology and politics. It points towards an idea of an ‘absolute’ art distinct 
from generic forms of cultural production, but an idea which in its relation to 
the other two dimensions is not only ‘abstract’ but ‘entangled in an actual 
existence’.71 It concerns an actual and not imaginary relationship of individuals 
to their real conditions of existence.72 This is the ‘value’ of the procedure of 
comedy, a value opposed to those ‘powers and persons’ which seek to ‘master’ 
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abstraction within the confines of a political economy. What this procedure 
consists of, the movement that constitutes in this definition ‘comedy’, its 
differentiation from the previous ideological and ‘subjective’ forms, its specific 
idea of ‘abstraction’ and the consequences of this for the individual – now 
recognised ‘in its universality and its commonness’73 – can be articulated by 
first considering, in terms of the relationship they establish between 
‘abstraction’ and the individual, in the dimensions of ideology, consciousness 
and art, the forms of the preceding ‘epic’ and ‘tragic’ regimes. 
----------------------------------- 
3.4. The elementary ideological operation 
‘A set of fears and anxieties emerges, a name is retrospectively and arbitrarily 
attached to those fears and anxieties: suddenly, that bundle of fears and 
anxieties becomes a single thing, and that thing comes to function as a cause or 
ground of whatever is disturbing. What first appeared as a disorganized field of 
social anxiety is transformed by a certain performative operation into an 
ordered universe with an identifiable cause.’74  Judith Butler’s summary 
description of Zizek’s ‘elementary ideological operation’75 outlines the basic 
procedure of ideology but also the basic procedure of the ‘religion of art’. In 
this ‘performative operation’ there is at the outset an undefined, unspecified, 
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‘set of fears and anxieties’, ‘a disorganized field of social anxiety’; by virtue of 
a ‘name’ being attached to them ‘in an act of purely formal conversion’, these 
‘free-floating, inconsistent fears’ are anchored by being ‘reified’ into ‘a single 
thing’.76 The ‘elementary ideological operation’ takes a pure affect to which no 
ideational content is attached and which is therefore ‘abstract’, attaching to this 
affect some ideational content in the form of an image or name. This 
representation makes the object of fear visible; it fixes it at a specific location 
within the social field rather than it being dispersed inconsistently throughout 
it; it brings it into language and into an organised structure of meaning. The 
representation contains the abstract, both in the sense that its content is 
abstraction, but also in that the dispersed, ‘inconsistent’ affects are held in a 
determinate place within the confines of a form. The abstract, nameless fear is 
thereby ‘anchored’ and made stable, given an identity by which it can be 
incorporated within a system of individual or social meaning; it is ‘organised’ 
under the sign of the representation.  
In this conception, ideology works and is exposed within the relationship 
between ‘abstraction’ – the undefined ‘set of fears and anxieties’ – and its 
‘representation’ – the signifier that stands in for and covers over the abstract 
affect. Ideology works in the space ‘between visible and non-visible, between 
imaginable and non-imaginable’.77 The ideological signifier, the representation 
into which the ‘non-visible’ abstraction is converted in ‘the elementary 
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ideological operation’ is ‘precisely empty, without content’.78 It ‘is not the 
container of a presence, but the place-holder of an absence’.79 But this ‘empty 
signifier’, in the function it fulfils, is also ‘full’. Taking as its material and 
content a hole in the system of representation that is the social order, the 
ideological operation converts this abstraction into a ‘positive’ representation 
that fills the void and is itself the element around which the social order is 
reconstructed. The empty/full ideological signifier ‘comes to function as a 
cause or ground’; the ‘abstract’ representation is a subject that underlies and 
guarantees the thought of ‘an ordered universe’. 
The work of the ‘religion of art’ that Hegel describes performs this elementary 
ideological operation; the conversion of an ‘empty’ abstraction into a ‘full’ 
representation. Constructed out of the ‘absolute unrest’ of the void that opens 
up with ‘the passing away of the ethical order’, and the ‘pathos’ that is the 
relation of the individual to this non-meaning, the first ‘abstract’ work of art – 
the statue of the god – acts as the full signifier. It is the ‘single thing’ that re-
establishes the collective identity of the community, the ‘admiring crowd’ who 
‘reveres it as the Spirit which is their own essence’.80This work represents 
abstraction, ‘the shapeless essence’, in an individual form, as a thing which the 
individual can recognise and in which it can recognise itself. It is ‘abstract’ in 
that it does not represent an actual individual, but an ideal one. As an ‘ideal’ 
form – in its perfection – it remains ‘abstract’, removed from actual existence, 
and as an ideal it represents not the individual existence but the collective 
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aspiration of the crowd. Occupying the negative space of abstraction, it ‘fills’ 
this space, representing abstraction as a subject, an ‘absolute, other Subject’ to 
which individuals can relate and through which they relate to each other. It is in 
their relation to this absolute, abstract Subject – the god – that the crowd of 
separate individuals is re-established in the collective identity of a social order.  
The ‘ideal’ ideological signifier, which occupies the place of abstraction and 
fills it, becoming itself the abstract element or value which reconnects the 
social order, re-establishes a system of order at the cost of the individual, who 
is converted by the ideological operation into a ‘subject’ that is itself abstract. 
Althusser identifies the ‘decisive central term’ of ideology, the determinate 
place at which all its various names come to rest, and the field in which 
ultimately it always operates. This place is the ‘subject’. The category of the 
subject, he writes, ‘is the constitutive category of all ideology’ in that ‘all 
ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete 
individuals as subjects’.81 The ‘subject’ is the individual transformed by 
ideology, in this transformation surrendering actual individuality, the 
consciousness of itself and its real conditions of existence, and substituting 
instead an ‘abstract individuality’ – an imaginary relationship to its real 
conditions of existence and a representation of itself which is structured and 
imposed by an external, ‘alien’ and abstract power. The ‘name’ under which 
the abstract subject of ideology is constituted is ‘you’. In Althusser’s 
‘theoretical theatre’, the basic ideological act of hailing or interpellation (‘Hey, 
you there!’) provokes a response in which the individual, recognising that ‘the 
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hail was ‘really’ addressed to him’82 – in recognising himself in the ‘you’ – 
becomes a subject. The individual is born into and exists in ideology, has 
‘always-already’ been interpellated as a subject. Thus it is that ‘individuals are 
“abstract” with respect to the subjects which they always-already are’.83 
Althusser emphasises the ambiguous, doubled nature of the ideological subject, 
which is formed in the ‘speculary’ mirror-structure of ideology. The 
interpellation of the individual as subject pre-supposes the ‘existence’ of 
another (capitalised) Subject, a ‘Unique, Absolute, Other Subject’,84 in whose 
Name the individual is interpellated as a subject. Individuals become subjects 
in their subjection to the Subject, in the recognition of themselves in the 
Subject. That subjects ‘work by themselves’ is explained in the ambiguity of 
the term ‘subject’, which means both ‘a free subjectivity, a centre of initiatives, 
author of and responsible for its actions’, but also ‘a subjected being, who 
submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom except 
that of freely accepting his submission’.85 The ideological subject is a reflection 
in the ‘duplicate mirror structure of ideology’86, caught between subject and 
Subject, active subjectivity and the pathos of subjection, divided also between 
the individuality of its ‘name’ and the abstraction of its content.  
The ambiguity that Althusser identifies in the ‘subject’, between passive 
subjection and active subjectivity, between abstraction and the expression of an 
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individual form, is already implicitly present in the ‘ideal’ ideological signifier. 
As ‘ideal’ it is abstract, that is, removed from actual existence. But while 
retaining this implicitly abstract being, the ideological operation converts the 
abstract negation of the ‘shapeless essence’ – re-presents it – in the form of a 
‘positive’ signifier. The ideal Subject represents the absolute inverse of actual 
abstraction, an absolute power of transformation, a ‘positive power’ whose 
function is the overcoming of actual abstraction. The individual subject is 
constituted as the reciprocal of this ideal Subject and, within the ‘doubly 
speculary’ structure of ideology, reproduces its implicit ambiguity in the 
consciousness of its own being. For Althusser, as for Marx, the paradigm and 
original form of ideology is religion.87 The first ‘abstract’ work of the religion 
of art demonstrates in an ‘ideal’ form the ideological operation. In this instance 
it remains however within the restricted context of religion: the community that 
is reconstructed through the ideological signifier is limited to the religious 
congregation or the cult, and the attitude of the congregation is one of passive 
‘reverence’, the rituals expressing in ‘objective’ form this reverence. It is only 
in the first form of the ‘spiritual’ (geistige) work of art – the epic where the 
ideological signifier is no longer divine but human – that the function of the 
work becomes fully ‘ideological’. In the epic, the ‘middle term’ that mediates 
between abstraction and actual individual existence is, Hegel writes, ‘the nation 
in its heroes’.88 The epic is first of all a national epic. Its purpose is ‘to give 
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shape to a specific world’, the world of ‘one specific people’.89 Following the 
loss of the ‘life of custom’ it recreates a collective identity in the idea of a 
nation. This ethical order acquires its ‘objective’ existence ‘in and through the 
actions and character of individuals’.90 
The epic, like the first ‘abstract’ work of art, presents an ideal form, but here 
the ideal is not merely the abstract perfection of a divine being, but of a 
‘world’. The epic world is ‘a world perfect in itself… a world distinct from 
dispersed actuality’.91 It is ‘universal… in the sense of completeness’.92 The 
‘actions and character’ of the individual heroes and the values they represent, 
constitute not merely an ideal subject, but the substance of an ideal world 
whose fullness and ethical order is placed in distinction with ‘dispersed 
actuality’. The ideal world is constituted out of the actions of the heroes and the 
assertion of their individual subjectivity. As the representation of an ideal 
through human action, rather than in the inert form of the statue of a god, the 
epic proposes to its audience a relation not of passive reverence but active 
emulation. The epic forms ‘evoke an awareness that what is of intrinsic worth 
must be regarded as a human duty’; its ethical aim is ‘warning, teaching and 
summoning to an inherently sterling moral life’.93 As an instructive example it 
demands the response of an active subjectivity, of a ‘heroic’ action by which ‘a 
world perfect in itself’ can be recreated. But even as the epic, in the image and 
example of the hero, creates the demand in the individual subject for action, 
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this action, Hegel insists , is not ‘individual’ but is subordinated to an abstract 
idea.  
The contradiction that Althusser identifies in the term ‘subject’, between active 
subjectivity and passive subjection, is present in the epic, but only implicitly. 
‘The content is an action of self-conscious essence’.94 This action is the 
expression of ‘the free self of the individual’.95 But the active individuality 
which is the explicit content of the work is implicitly contradicted by its form. 
The epic takes the ‘objective’ form of a narrative, but the narrator, ‘the actual 
individual’, ‘keeps himself outside and is lost in his performance’.96 ‘(T)he poet 
as subject must retire in the face of the object and lose himself in it’.97 He is 
‘the organ that vanishes in its content’.98 The artist himself is denied the active 
subjectivity that the work promotes. And while the work proposes to the 
audience a ‘heroic’ action that is capable of creating an ideal world and is 
therefore oriented to the future, the form of the epic, as narrative, necessarily 
locates this action and this ideal in the past, existing only as memory. The 
‘pathos’ of the epic, Hegel writes, is ‘Mnemosyne’ (memory), ‘the 
remembrance of an essence that formerly was present’.99 The ‘ideal’, which 
appears in the content as a possibility realisable through individual ethical 
action, is implicitly, in the form of the work, placed out of reach as something 
belonging only to the past, in contrast to which the actual situation of the 
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present is experienced as a fall and with a sense of loss. As a result, ‘an air of 
mourning is wafted over the whole epic’.100 The ideal, which in its ‘epic’ form 
presents the possibility of overcoming ‘abstraction’ through ‘moral life’ and 
action, also contains within its own form ‘abstraction’, that is a removal from 
and critique of the actual individual.  
----------------------------------- 
 
3.5. The higher language of tragedy 
The procedure of ideological conversion, in which a ‘name’ or other 
representation ‘contains’ a set of dispersed, abstract affects, is, Butler writes, 
‘always and only tenuous’. ‘The contingency that the name seeks to subdue 
returns precisely as the spectre of the thing’s dissolution’.101 In the epic this 
‘spectre’ remains in the background, implicit only in the past tense of the 
narrative form, but unrepresented in the ‘ideal’ content. The epic represents 
abstraction in a ideal form, the representation of an idea of ‘a world, perfect in 
itself’. Even as this ideal representation is used to establish a collective identity 
in the ‘nation’, the actual individual ‘vanishes in its content’. In the (individual) 
representation of abstraction – the abstract ideal – actual abstraction passes over 
to the side of the individual. The actual individual is dissolved by the ‘spectre’, 
the ‘ideal’ that can exist only as ‘past’ and in the absence of presence that is 
memory. In psychoanalytic terms the ideal ego becomes the superego, the 
critical agency that suppresses the actual individual. But at the stage of the epic 
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the ‘abstraction’ that is practiced is still only implicit, implied by the form in 
which the individual shapes are made visible. The ‘childlike consciousness of a 
people’102 – which still retains the memory of a time when all action was the 
subject of another and there was no thought of freedom – remains within the 
domain of ‘picture thinking’, satisfied with ideal images which conceal their 
actual abstraction.  
The ‘higher language’ of tragedy brings the ‘spectre of dissolution’ into the 
explicit content of the work. Where the epic represented abstraction as a ‘single 
thing’, in the ‘positive’ form of the ideal, and its actual ‘negative’ aspect only 
returned implicitly in the form of the work, in tragedy both of these elements 
form part of the work’s content. Tragedy presents on the one side the individual 
hero and the principle of ethical action, and on the other, an opposing abstract 
power: ‘the negative power of all the shapes that appear, a power in which they 
do not recognize themselves but, on the contrary, perish’.103 In the hero, it 
represents abstraction in a ‘positive’, individual form that has the ethical and 
‘ideal’ character of the epic hero; but this abstraction is also simultaneously 
represented in an ‘abstract’ form, not as a subject – an ideal or ‘single thing’ – 
but as the ‘negative power’ to which Hegel gives the name ‘abstract 
Necessity’.104 The form of tragedy consists precisely in the depiction of this 
division and opposition, in the representation both of the ‘hero’ and the 
‘abstract’ power which leads to the hero’s destruction, of both the ‘thing’ and 
the ‘thing’s dissolution’; it presents both the ‘positive’ representation and the 
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ethical meaning invested in it, as well as the abstract force that is the 
‘necessary’ undoing  of this meaning. 
These two opposing ‘powers’ that make up the content of tragedy, though set in 
opposition to one another, are not strictly separate but are held together in a 
relationship of necessity. That the ‘negative power’ in which the individual 
shapes that appear perish is one of ‘abstract Necessity’ makes their destruction 
not merely accidental or contingent but necessary. But this ‘necessity’ is not 
only on the side of the abstract, but also of the individual, as its ‘tragic flaw’. 
The individual – as it appears in tragedy – produces abstraction, as it itself is 
produced by it. The hero of tragedy, like that of the epic, represents an ethical 
aim, but where in the epic that aim is consistent with the interests of the 
‘nation’ and the individual is subordinated to that collective interest, the tragic 
hero is properly ‘individual’; ‘its law is only a law of its character’.105 In 
tragedy the self-conscious individual emerges ‘as the ground and cause of 
everything’.106 The ethical aim of the individual in tragedy is ‘one-sided’. That 
this aim is ‘one-sided’ and individual is the effect of abstraction. The ‘ethical 
bond’, which in the epic held together individuals in the unity of the ‘nation’, 
has been snapped. Abstraction produces the consciousness of the individual and 
its ‘one-sided’ ethical aims. Equally the individual produces abstraction. The 
basis of tragic drama - ‘the prominent point on which the whole thing turns’107 
– is, Hegel writes, the ‘collision’ of an individual, ‘one-sided’ ethical aim with 
the other equally ‘one-sided’ aims of other individuals. What appears in tragedy 
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as a force independent of the individuals and as abstract is itself the effect of 
this ‘collision’ between ‘one-sided’ individuals. Abstraction and tragic 
individuality produce each other. The structure of tragedy is this cycle of 
reproduction, in which abstraction produces ‘one-sided’ individuals, whose 
actions then produce more abstraction in a self-sustaining cycle, the necessary 
outcome of which is the abstraction whereby individuals ‘do not recognize 
themselves but, on the contrary, perish’. 
The ‘signifier’ of tragedy is neither the individual hero nor the abstract power, 
but the logic of division, a division and contradiction in which these two 
‘opposing’ terms exist in a relationship where they mutually reinforce each 
other. The division is not only between these terms but within them, and is 
itself as present in the ‘individual’ as it is in the inherent separation of 
abstraction. The consciousness of tragedy is that of ‘an amphibious animal’, 
living ‘in two contradictory worlds at once, so that even consciousness wanders 
back and forth in this contradiction, and, shuttlecocked from side to side, is 
unable to satisfy itself as itself on the one side as on the other’.108 The division 
of tragedy is present in and between the character, the actor, and the spectator. 
The character ‘finds himself … in the antithesis of knowing and not-knowing’; 
‘this knowing is, in its principle, immediately a not-knowing, because 
consciousness, in its action, is in its own self this antithesis’.109 For the hero, 
‘the distinction through and in which actual consciousness exists has its basis in 
that inner being that destroys it; … the clear conscious assurance of certainty 
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has its confirmation in forgetfulness’.110 In the epic narrative the ‘actual 
individual’ - the narrator - is invisible and ‘vanishes in its content’. In the 
dramatic form of tragedy the characters ‘exist as actual human beings who 
impersonate the heroes and portray them, not in the form of a narrative, but in 
the actual speech of the actors themselves’.111 At this level of the form of the 
work the division of the characters is repeated. ‘The hero who appears before 
the onlookers splits up into his mask and the actor, into the person in the play 
and the actual self’.112 The division that is the logic of tragedy, expressed at the 
level of the character who is caught between ‘knowing and not-knowing’, in the 
split between character and actor, is reflected also in the spectator. ‘Spectator-
consciousness’ is itself divided. On the one hand it identifies with the hero, 
participates vicariously in the action and has a knowledge of the outcome 
denied even to the character; on the other ‘it is conscious only of a paralysing 
terror of this movement, of an equally helpless pity, and as the end of it all, the 
empty repose of submission to Necessity’.113 
The ‘elementary’ operation of ideology, as Butler and Zizek describe it, 
converts ‘abstraction’ – an undefined set of fears and anxieties – into an 
individual representation, ‘a single thing’ or ‘full signifier’ that fills the space 
of abstraction and serves to re-establish the social order, the loss of which the 
original abstraction marked. The ideology utilises and puts to work the abstract 
fears and anxieties; its power derives from the power of these affects. In the 
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elementary form, the ‘ideal’ signifier represses and covers over abstraction; it 
protects against its disturbance, even if the price of this protection is the 
suppression of actual individuality. The form of tragedy moves beyond this 
elementary mode. In its presentation of both an ideal individual form and a 
form of ‘abstraction’, it reproduces in the signifiers that make up its content the 
structure of ideology. These two terms are identified and placed in relation to 
each other in a form in which they dynamically operate on each other. The 
representation of abstraction in its negative, destructive form creates anxiety 
and stimulates the demand for an ‘ideal’ form that protects against this 
disturbance. But the ideal form of tragedy is an individuality whose ‘one-
sidedness’, in its collision with others, itself produces ‘actual’ abstraction. This 
structure of self-reinforcing division is instituted not only in the public 
signifiers of society, but in the ‘subject’; in the character divided between 
‘individual’ knowing and ‘abstract’ not-knowing; in the ‘mask’ of the active 
character, who is divided from the actor subordinated to his role; and in 
‘spectator-consciousness’. The dynamic structure of ideology is constituted in 
individual subjects who, in the effectiveness of the tragic ideology, ‘work by 
themselves’.114 
The ‘childlike consciousness’ of the epic, remaining within the confines of 
‘picture-thinking’, substitutes an imaginary relationship with an ideal 
representation for its own real conditions of existence. The imaginary 
identification with an ideal power covers over its own actual passivity and 
powerlessness. This ‘feudal’ form of ideology is superseded by the ‘tragic’ 
form, where an active and individual subjectivity appears, but where the 
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assertion of this subjectivity serves only to create the ‘abstraction’ that is the 
condition of the individual’s subjection. Althusser highlights this contradiction: 
‘the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject… in order that he shall 
(freely) accept his subjection’115. This tragic structure of division, in its broader 
social dimension, is, Hegel implies, specifically a modern phenomenon. The 
antitheses implicit in it may have ‘from all time’ preoccupied and disquieted 
human consciousness, but it is ‘modern culture’ that has ‘forced them up to a 
point of most unbending contradiction’.116 It is modern culture that ‘strips the 
world of its living and flourishing reality and dissolves it into abstractions’.117 
‘In modern times… the individual finds the abstract form ready-made’.118 
Abstraction exists here not only in consciousness but in culture; it has an 
‘objective’ and actual existence and is itself manufactured as part of an 
ideology that in its structure can only be described as ‘tragic’. Abstraction no 
longer represents the breakdown of the social order but is part of the social 
order.  
The problem of abstraction in both its actual and ideal forms, is that it 
dominates and suppresses the actual individual, subjugating its individuality in 
the name of an abstraction, and substitutes an abstract subject, subject to 
‘abstract Necessity’, for this individual shape. Modern tragedy makes an 
‘actual’ representation of abstraction, existing as an active and ‘living’ force in 
society so that the ‘abstraction’ of an imaginary relationship to the real 
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conditions of existence is supplemented by a real relation to imaginary 
conditions of existence. Hegel’s analysis of the form of tragedy suggests a 
secondary problem in the condition of a tragic ideology; as the tragic structure 
‘contains’ its opposition, the opposition to abstraction is complicit in what it 
opposes. The ethical opposition to ‘abstraction’, and in particular an ethics 
based on a concept of the individual, itself forms part of an ideological 
structure whose effect is to promote and extend the power of abstraction. In 
Butler’s words, ‘we think we have found a point of opposition to domination, 
and then realize that that very point of opposition is the instrument through 
which domination works, and that we have unwittingly enforced the powers of 
domination through our participation in its opposition’.119 As the epic form is 
implicitly ‘tragic’ in its temporal impossibility, a tragedy raised to the status of 
an ideal only by a ‘childlike consciousness’, an effective opposition to tragic 
and actual abstraction is no more to be found in an epic ‘fullness’ than it is in 
the ‘one-sided’ ethos of the individual. In the face of this impasse, comedy 
proposes an alternative identity and structure of relation between the abstract 
and individualin individual consciousness and its ideological relation to power. 
----------------------------------- 
3.6. Art’s return to itself 
Hegel’s theoretical narrative begins with ‘the abstract work of art’ and ends 
with comedy; the story of ‘the religion of art’ concludes in a comic 
reconciliation. Comedy succeeds, Hegel proposes, where the previous forms of 
art have failed; it achieves the reconciliation of the abstract and individual that 
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art has sought since its beginning. These categories are dissolved, and are 
shown to be self-dissolving; not that ‘they do not exist at all, but they exist 
reconciled’. In the form of comedy, ‘art is consummated and has completely 
returned to itself’.120 It becomes what it is, escaping from its original context of 
religion as in it ‘the gods, as also their moments… vanish’.121 In the ‘rational 
thinking’ of comedy what in the previous forms had appeared as absolute is 
revealed in ‘its contingent shape’. The ‘universal’ forms of the gods are 
reduced to ‘the bareness of their immediate existence; they are clouds, an 
evanescent mist’.122 The ethical maxims, laws and ‘specific concepts of duty 
and of right’ that constituted the ethical order lose ‘the absolute validity 
previously attached to them’ in the emergence of ‘the consciousness of the 
dialectic contained in these maxims and laws’.123 ‘The pure thoughts of the 
Beautiful and the Good thus display a comic spectacle … they become empty, 
and for that reason the sport of mere opinion and the caprice of any chance 
individuality’.124 In the self-consciousness of comedy, ‘whatever assumes the 
form of essentiality over against it, is instead dissolved in it’.125  
In comedy ‘the gods, as also their moments… vanish’ in a comic movement in 
which the ‘individual self’ is ‘raised above such a moment’. In this movement 
‘abstraction’ – as previously represented in the form of gods, ethical maxims 
and laws, specific concepts of duty and right – are viewed below the position of 
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the individual self, and from this position recognized in their ‘contingent 
shape’. They and their ‘absolute validity’ are ‘dissolved’ in individual 
consciousness. Previously, abstraction, ‘the absolute power’, took ‘the form of 
something presented to consciousness, something altogether separate from 
consciousness and alien to it’.126 As something ‘separate from consciousness’ 
and ‘presented to consciousness’ this abstraction has the form of a 
representation. The abstract was brought over to the side of representation. 
Now, with the movement in which the ‘individual self’ – ‘the actual self [who] 
does not have such an abstract moment for its substance and content’127 – is 
raised above such moments, they lose their essential, ‘universal’ necessity. ‘The 
pretensions of universal essentiality are uncovered in the self’.128 Raised above 
such ‘a single property’, the individual ‘proclaims the irony of such a property 
wanting to be something on its own account’.129 The individual self ‘dissolves’ 
abstraction, recognizing the ‘contingent shape’ of such representations as ‘the 
statue, and also the living beautiful corporeality, or the content of the Epic and 
the powers and persons of Tragedy’.130 In the ‘vanishing’ and disappearance of 
the abstract forms and moments variously represented in the previous forms of 
the religion of art, the ‘individual self’ does not lose itself in ‘the emptiness of 
this disappearance but, on the contrary, preserves itself in this very nothingness, 
abides with itself and is the sole actuality’.131  
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The general principle of comedy, as Hegel explains it, is the movement in the 
relative position of individual self-consciousness and abstraction. Previously 
abstraction was represented as something that stands over the individual. The 
individual remains ‘subject’ – the subject and creature of gods, ethical maxims, 
‘Necessity’, or some other absolute Subject. Now, in comedy, the individual, 
who ‘does not have such an abstract moment for its substance and content’, is 
‘raised above’ such abstractions. From this positions the representations of 
abstraction appear in their ‘contingent shape’, as ‘semblance’ and not in the 
truth of abstraction. ‘Fate’, which had previously appeared as the will of gods, 
as ‘Necessity’ etc., ‘is now united with self-consciousness’.132 Comedy is to 
assume a position from which the contingency of these ‘universal’ abstractions 
becomes apparent. 
Comedy, as Hegel proposes it, dissolves the ‘absolute validity’ that was 
previously attached to ‘universal’ and essential forms. ‘The pretensions of 
universal essentiality are uncovered in the self’.133 But Hegel’s comedy does 
not in this eliminate or dispose of abstraction. It is in its abstraction that it 
retains its true, subversive force. Alenka Zupancic, in her analysis of Hegelian 
comedy,134 makes a distinction between false ‘conservative’ comedy and true 
‘subversive’ comedy. The former views comedy as the insistence on the 
concrete, on the material finitude of corporeal existence, over the claims of the 
abstract or universal. Comedy, in these terms, is ‘the return of the physical into 
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the metaphysical’.135  But this view of comedy, by separating out the concrete, 
‘the Real of human limitations and deficiencies’, from the abstract, and 
ascribing the comic moment to the ‘human’ side of this duality, in practice 
leaves abstraction ‘not only untouched, but also reinforced’.136 ‘This kind of 
comedy remains caught in an abstract dualism of the concrete and the universal 
and, much as it may emphasize the side of the concrete, this concrete remains 
but one element in the constellation of the universal and the concrete, which is 
purely abstract.’137 This ‘modern’ form of comedy, or modern interpretation of 
comedy, which keeps the comic safely on the side of the concrete and leaves 
the ‘abstract’ untouched, functions within and reinforces a structure that is 
essentially tragic. It is, Zupancic writes, ‘irresistibly driven towards pathos’.138 
Paralleling Zupancic’s distinction between conservative and subversive 
comedy, Hegel makes a clear distinction between the false geniality of ironic 
consciousness and the movement of true comedy. Irony, ‘taken in the abstract, 
borders closely on the principle of comedy; but yet within this affinity the 
comic must be essentially be distinguished from the ironical.139 The distinction 
between mere irony and the principle of true, subversive comedy is in the final 
iteration that consciousness, and the work of art, takes. It is in the fate of the 
‘individual self’. In the first movement of comedy ‘the Subject’ is raised above 
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the abstract moments and properties, and ‘clothed in this mask it proclaims the 
irony of such a property wanting to be something on its own account’.140 
Individual consciousness becomes that which ‘dissolves’ these abstract 
representations to reveal that they are ‘mere semblance’ and not ‘true and real’. 
But as these abstract representations are the ‘full signifiers’ around which the 
architecture of the whole symbolic order is constructed, the reduction to ‘mere 
semblance’ of these representations reduces to semblance the whole system of 
representation. In dissolving ‘abstraction’ it dissolves representation. 
Representation becomes abstract. In the ironic consciousness all representations 
are rendered equal and equally worthless. But this irony that reduces to 
‘semblance’ all representations retains one absolute abstract representation that 
is exempt in the general dissolution. In irony the ‘I’ is established as ‘the 
absolute principle of all knowledge’, in which ‘every content is negated’.141 
Every positive matter is annihilated by absorption into the ‘abstract freedom 
and unity’ of the ‘I’. ‘Whatever is, is only by favour of the I, and what is by my 
favour I am in turn able to annihilate’.142  
‘Now, if we abide by these utterly empty forms which have their origin in 
the absoluteness of the abstract I, then nothing has value in its real and actual 
nature, and regarded in itself, but only as produced by the subjectivity of the 
I. But if so, it follows that the I is able to remain lord and master of 
everything, and in no sphere of morality or legality, of things human or 
divine, profane or sacred, is there anything that would not have to begin by 
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being given position by the I, and that might not, therefore, just as well be in 
turn annihilated thereby. This amounts to making all that is actual in its own 
right a mere semblance, not true and real for its own sake and by its own 
means, but a mere appearance due to the I, within whose power and caprice 
it remains, and at its free disposal. To admit it or to annihilate it stands 
purely in the pleasure of the I which has attained absoluteness in itself and 
simply as I.’143  
In irony ‘the Subject’ is raised above the abstract moments and ‘preserves itself 
in this very nothingness’. But it preserves itself as the one abstract 
representation, the only thing there is that counts for anything and on which 
everything else is dependent. In this position it acquires a ‘God-like geniality, 
for which every possible thing is a mere dead creature, to which the free 
creator, knowing himself to be wholly unattached, feels in no way bound, 
seeing that he can annihilate as well as create it.’144 But this absolute I is 
‘utterly abstract and formal’, empty of content because for it all content is 
contingent and it itself is the only necessity. Divided in itself between the 
enjoyment of its freedom and the unhappiness of its conscience, or its ‘craving 
for the solid and substantial’, the ‘I’ of ironical consciousness remains at a 
point of view where ‘all appears to it as nothing worth and as futile, excepting 
its own subjectivity, which thereby becomes hollow and empty, and itself mere 
conceit’.145  
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The distinction between irony and comedy is first what it is that is ‘dissolved’ 
and ‘brought to nothing’ in individual consciousness. In irony it is ‘all that is 
objective’;146 all positive content, without distinction, is subsumed in the 
‘absolute subjectivity’ of the I. The comic, by contrast, ‘must be limited to 
bringing to nothing what is itself null, a false and self-contradictory 
phenomenon’.147 Irony, and what Hegel describes as ‘ironical artist life’, is 
indiscriminate in what it annihilates because the subject’s sense of himself – 
‘the absolute negativity in which the subject is related to himself’148 – requires 
‘the annihilation of everything specific and one-sided’; not only ‘what is 
inherently null and manifests itself in its hollowness, but equally everything 
excellent and solid’.149 It is in ‘annihilating everything everywhere’ that the 
individual self preserves itself in the idea of itself as absolute. But this idea is 
abstract, and the ‘God-like geniality’ of this ironical consciousness is a ‘mask’; 
‘it will not let itself go in actual action and production, because it is frightened 
of being polluted by contact with finitude… [and] has a sense of the deficiency 
of this abstraction’.150 
In comedy the individual ‘shows itself to be entangled in actual existence, and 
drops the mask because it wants to be something genuine. The self plays with 
the mask which it once put on in order to act its part; but it as quickly breaks 
out again from this illusory character and stands forth in its nakedness and 
ordinariness, which it shows not to be different from the genuine self, the actor, 
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or from the spectator.’151 The ‘genuine self’ (eigentlichen Selbst) breaks out in 
comedy, whose being as actor is no different from its being as spectator. Where 
previously the individual was ‘subject’ – in its active subjectivity wearing the 
mask of the absolute Subject, but also always simultaneously in its actual self 
the passive subject and spectator of this other Subject – now the individual is 
no longer subject to this Subject nor wears its mask. The difference of comedy 
from the previous forms, from the ‘abstract’ work of art, the epic, tragedy and 
indeed irony, is that in these forms ‘abstraction’ was represented as areal and 
absolute Subject to which the individual was subject and in whose image he 
was represented. In irony the individual, recognizing the abstraction of these 
previous representations of the absolute Subject, is raised above these 
representations and takes the individual self as the absolute Subject. In the 
movement of comedy, instead of ‘abstraction’ being brought over to the side of 
the individual in being represented as a subject, the individual passes over to 
the side of abstraction. Not, as in irony, that it itself becomes the absolute 
abstract Subject. Irony annihilates all subjects except its own individual self 
which is ‘preserved in this very nothingness’ as the active principle of 
everything and the only subject. In comedy the individual self is itself 
annihilated. As abstraction is ‘dissolved’ in individual consciousness, so the 
individual is dissolved in abstraction. Comedy completes the third movement of 
the ‘sublation’ (aufhebung) of the ‘individual self’, in which, having been 
‘raised’ above the previous abstract moments, ‘preserved’ in this nothingness, it 
finally ‘cancels’ itself.  
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Comedy is ‘inwardly self-dissolving’.152 It is ‘the laughter in which the 
characters dissolve everything, including themselves’;153 its ‘ruling principle 
the caprice and contingency of subjective life’.154 Where in the previous forms 
an attempt had been made  to convert the inherent emptiness of abstraction into 
a full signifier and to identify in its non-meaning an absolute meaning, in 
comedy the individual recognises abstraction for what it is and recognises itself 
in this abstraction. The ‘absolute freedom of spirit’ to be found in ‘this world of 
private serenity’155 is the tranquil acceptance of its own annihilation. This is 
not, as in tragedy, ‘the individuality of the hero who … feels his life is broken 
and sorrowfully awaits an early death’.156 In comedy the annihilation of the 
individual has already happened. Recognising that the individual is ‘the 
negative power’ (die negative Kraft), and a principle of ‘infinite absolute 
negativity’, it is in the negation of itself and its own aims that the individual 
discovers his own freedom. What is comical ‘is a personality or subject who 
makes his own actions contradictory and so brings them to nothing, while 
remaining tranquil and self-assured in the process’.157 The individual no longer 
represents abstraction but is abstraction;158 this nothing is its ‘genuine self’. Its 
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contentedness and ‘complete loss of fear’, as it passes over to the side of a 
‘history without a subject’, is ‘a state of spiritual well-being and of repose… 
such as is not to be found outside of this comedy’.159 
---------------------------------- 
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4. The (surplus) value of abstraction (Marx) 
 
4.1. The question of value 
‘All beginnings are difficult’1, but the particular difficulty with which Capital 
begins is the question of value. What is ‘value’ in capital?  The value-form ‘is 
very simple and slight in content’, but a mystery that has eluded the human 
mind for 2,000 years.2 ‘Value’ appears in commodities (‘its particular or, so to 
say, disguised mode’) and in money (‘its general mode’), but is separate from 
either of those things. If capital, as the general formula M-C-M represents, 
consists of the conversion of money into commodities and of commodities into 
money, both commodities and money function only as ‘different modes of 
existence of value itself’. 3 In the circulation of capital, value changes from one 
form to the other ‘without becoming lost in this movement: it thus becomes 
transformed into an automatic subject’.4  
Capital begins with an investigation of value. In an ascent from the concrete to 
the abstract (whose purpose is to reveal the flow in practice in the opposite 
direction), different types of value (use-value, exchange-value and ‘value’) are 
identified. The commodity is analyzed in terms of the values it represents, in 
terms eventually of the ‘value’, abstract and unrelated to its form and function, 
                                                
1‘ Aller Anfang ist schwer.’ Preface to the First Edition of K. Marx. Capital: A 
Critique of Political Economy, Volume One tr. B. Fowkes, London and New 
York, Penguin Books, 1990, p. 89 (Marx 1990). K. Marx. Selected Writings ed. 
D. McLellan, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2000 p. 460). 
(Marx 2000).  
2 Marx 1990, p. 90. 
3 Marx 1990, p. 255. 
4 Marx 1990, p. 255. 
 114 
through which the commodity becomes something that speaks its own 
language, relating socially in exchange with other commodities, without 
reference to any use-value. Actual commodities appear finally, in practice, as 
abstract. In the universal commodity – money – value assumes its ‘fully-
developed shape’, casting off the disguise of use-value and the satisfaction of 
wants to assumes an abstract, universal form. In the transformation of money 
into capital – the valorization process and the formation of surplus-value – 
value is revealed as the means by which capital produces and reproduces itself. 
This valorization process is a process also of self-valorization, whereby capital 
becomes an ‘automatic subject’. ‘Value’, as central to ‘the mystery of money’5, 
is the abstract substance by which capital is reproduced, the value-form the 
‘economic cell-form’ of bourgeois society. Concerning the question of value, 
Marx writes, ‘All understanding of the facts depends on this.’6 
A certain ideal and abstract value, as it appears in capital and in art, is the 
subject of the present chapter. Value in capital (labour and labour-time) and 
value for capital (surplus-value, the valorization process) can be productively 
separated. The first is an actual substance and magnitude of value, whose value 
is the transformation that labour effects (the work), and which, if it results in a 
use-value and satisfies a want, may be recuperated in exchange; the second an 
ideological restatement of value, an ‘ideal and notional’ form that is 
                                                
5 Marx 1990, p. 139. 
6 ‘The best points of my book are: (1) the twofold character of labour, 
according to whether it is expressed in use-value or exchange-value. (All 
understanding of the facts depends on this.) It is emphasized immediately, in 
the first chapter; (2) the treatment of surplus value independently of its 
particular forms as profit, interest, ground rent, etc.’ Marx to Engels, 24 August 
1867. Included in K. Marx. Selected Writings, ed. D. McLellan, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford and New York, 2000 (Marx 2000), p. 564. 
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represented in commodities and money, but whose ‘fully developed shape’ is 
the money-form. The latter value, emerging as it were mysteriously and 
automatically, in the valorization process, enables the appearance of capital as 
an independent subject and an autonomous movement capable of endlessly 
reproducing itself. The aim of the present chapter is to explore the workings of 
a value that is precisely abstract; a power or idea of transformation independent 
of any specific content. The concept of art, historically, represents this value. 
Artworks are both commodities within a system of circulation and instruments 
of labour in an idea of transformation that, taken to an absolute point, capital 
makes its own. The work of art, in representing value and the imaginable limit 
point of the power of transformation, becomes an ideal commodity – the 
‘ultimate product’ of surplus-value in the form of a commodity. How in 
practice it resists this form, resembling money but going beyond it, is the 
question that an analysis of value preludes.  
------------------------------------ 
4.2. Abstract value 
Commodities and money circulate in capital in a ‘restless never-ending 
process’; economic activity, the ‘general formula for capital’ (M-C-M), consists 
of the conversion of money into commodities and the conversion of 
commodities into money; the fruits of capital, an ‘immense collection’ of 
commodities is simultaneously represented in its totality in the ‘ideal and 
notional form’ of money. Both commodities and money, however, function 
only as ‘different modes of existence of value itself’; in the money-form in ‘its 
general mode’, and in the commodity-form in ‘its particular or, so to say, 
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disguised mode’.7 In the circulation of capital, value changes from one form to 
the other ‘without becoming lost in this movement: it thus becomes 
transformed into an automatic subject’.8 Value is something independent of the 
forms of the commodity and of money; it is the ‘subject’ of the process of 
circulation that drives the process and a subject that is ‘automatic’ in that it 
functions by itself, apparently without the intervention of any outside agent. 
The capitalist as much as the worker is ‘no more than the instrument of the 
valorization process’, enslaved by its ‘highly impoverished and abstract 
content’.9 ‘Value’ is the ‘secret’ of capital and fundamental to understanding its 
workings; it is the ‘elementary element’ of capital. The value-form is the 
‘economic cell-form’ of bourgeois society, relating to it as the cells in the body 
relate to the body as a whole. Like the cells of the body it is both more 
fundamental and more difficult to analyze than ‘more composite and complex 
forms’: despite its elementary nature ‘the human mind has sought in vain for 
more than 2,000 years to get to the bottom of it’.10  And where the biologist, in 
analyzing the cells of the body, has access to such tools as microscopes and 
chemical reagents, in the analysis of the cellular value-form, Marx tells us, ‘the 
power of abstraction must replace both’.11  
Value in capital, Marx makes clear, is abstract, and this abstraction accounts for 
the difficulty of the concept. The ‘method of ascent from the abstract to the 
                                                
7 Marx 1990, p. 255. 
8 Marx 1990, p. 255. 
9 Marx 1990, p. 990. 
10 Marx 1990, p. 90. 
11 (die Abstraktionskraft) (Marx 1990, p. 90) 
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concrete’12 takes as its starting point the commodity as the elementary ‘cell’ 
and initial abstraction, unfolding from its abstract value the concrete material 
implications that affect the total economic organization of society.13 In the 
elementary form of a commodity Marx first identifies the different values of 
use-value, exchange-value and ‘value’, the last being the substance whose 
‘form of appearance’ is exchange-value. These categories ‘are absolutely 
fundamental to everything that follows. They are the pivot upon which the 
whole analysis of capital turns.’14 The method of ascent proceeds from use-
                                                
12 The methodological basis of Marxist analysis consisted of the singling out of 
commodity as the elementary “cell” and initial abstraction on which 
investigation could be built. From The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1979) 
http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com 
13 ‘Capital, as is well known, begins with a most thorough and detailed analysis 
of the category of value, i.e., of the real form of economic relations that is the 
universal and elementary form of the being of capital. In this analysis, Marx’s 
field of vision encompasses a single and, as we have already noted, extremely 
rare, in developed capitalism, factual relation between men – direct exchange of 
one commodity for another. At this stage of his inquiry into the capitalist 
system, Marx intentionally leaves out of account any other forms – money or 
profit or wages. All of these things are as yet believed to be non-existent. 
Nevertheless, analysis of this single form of economic relations yields, as its 
result, a theoretical expression of the objectively universal form of all 
phenomena and categories of developed capitalism without exception, an 
expression of a developed concreteness, a theoretical expression of value as 
such, of the universal form of value. 
The elementary type of the existence of value coincides with value in general, 
and the real actually traceable development of this form of value into other 
forms constitutes the objective content of the deduction of the categories of 
Capital.’  
Evald Ilyenkov The Dialectics of the Abstract & the Concrete in Marx’s 
Capital, tr. S. Kuzyakov, Progress Publishers 1960. Chapter 5 – ‘The Method 
of Ascent from the Abstract to the Concrete in Marx’s Capital.’ 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/abstra5a.htm 
14 David Harvey. The Limits to Capital, Verso, London and New York, 2006. 
(Harvey 2006, 1). Harvey’s assessment follows Marx’s own. ‘The best points 
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value to exchange-value, a progressive abstraction and identification of a 
process of abstraction. Value represents the abstraction of a substance. From 
this specific content of an actual commodity, Marx traces value as it is 
represented in the abstract form of money, and then, in the valorization process, 
as abstract money acting as capital produces value out of itself, lays golden 
eggs, to the point where value produces value, valorizes itself out of the power 
of itself, and enables capital to become fully automatic. In a finally abstract 
form, whose implications are wholly material, value appears as the value of 
capital, the value of value for capital. It is through the value of this abstraction 
– the value of capital, that is money to the power of itself – that it becomes a 
universal leviathan dominating all.  
Value is both initially, as represented in the cell-form of a commodity, and 
finally, as it signifies the end and purpose of capital, abstract. This abstraction 
is the representation of an absolute, seductive power and value, which appears 
in a fragmentary form in the commodity, disguised by use-value but also itself 
becoming a use-value, since it satisfies a want, albeit a want formed in the 
subjectivization of capital. If capital appears in a sphere separated from human 
wants, it appears in a sphere of its own wants. Commodities speak their own 
language and engage in exchange among themselves in a sphere animated by 
money to which both capitalist and worker are enslaved. It is as the use of 
value, to capital, that value appears in its most abstract form, an abstraction that 
                                                                                                                             
of my book are: (1) the twofold character of labour, according to whether it is 
expressed in use-value or exchange-value. (All understanding of the facts 
depends on this.) It is emphasized immediately, in the first chapter; (2) the 
treatment of surplus value independently of its particular forms as profit, 
interest, ground rent, etc.’ Marx to Engels, 24 August 1867. Included in Marx 
2000, p. 564. 
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also, we argue, contains the contradiction of capital and its subjects. To arrive 
at this abstract value, which is a corruption and perversion of utility represented 
in money and in art it is as well to retrace the ascent from the concrete starting 
point of use. 
------------------------------------ 
 4.3. Use-value, exchange-value and value 
The commodity, Marx writes, is first of all ‘a thing which through its qualities 
satisfies human needs of whatever kind. The nature of these needs, whether 
they arise, for example, from the stomach, or the imagination [der Phantasie], 
makes no difference.’ The usefulness of a commodity – the way in which it 
satisfies some want or other – makes it a use-value, and this use-value is 
conditioned by the physical properties of the commodity. A clear line is drawn 
from a material form, a use derived from that form and a value of that use in the 
satisfaction of a want. The nature of that want is immaterial. It may be a 
material want (arising from the stomach, for example), or may not. A whim is 
equally a want. Central to Marx’s historical understanding is that there is no 
fixed category of human wants or use-values. History is the formation of new 
use-values, of new wants that become part of the ‘socially necessary’ cost of 
labour reproducing itself. Even in use-value, Marx establishes a clear line from 
the material to the immaterial, from the concrete to the abstract, before 
proceeding to the particular abstraction of capital. 
Separate and distinct from use-value is another value; that which appears in the 
quantitative relation in which commodities of one kind can be exchanged for 
commodities of another kind. This value changes constantly, is ‘something 
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accidental and purely relative’ and therefore distinct from an intrinsic value; ‘an 
exchange-value that is inseparably connected with the commodity, inherent in 
it, seems a contradiction in terms’.15 Exchange-values express something equal, 
‘a common element, of which they represent a greater or lesser quantity’. ‘This 
common element cannot be a geometrical, physical, chemical or other natural 
property of commodities. Such properties come into consideration only to the 
extent that they make commodities useful, i.e. turn them into use-values. But 
clearly, the exchange relation of commodities is characterized precisely by its 
abstraction from their use-values.’16 ‘As use-values, commodities differ above 
all in quality, while as exchange-values they can only differ in quantity, and 
therefore do not contain an atom of use-value.’17 Though commodities all 
represent different use-values – otherwise there would be no purpose to 
exchange – what is represented in exchange-value, for them to be 
exchangeable, is a common substance of which they merely represent different 
quantities. 
The commodity, Marx writes, has a ‘dual nature’: on one side (for the 
consumer) it is a use-value; on the other (for capital) it is an exchange-value. 
Capital itself, as a mode of production, appears as a parallel system; it produces 
commodities with their attendant use-values, but commodities are merely a 
‘disguised’ form that value assumes to achieve its own ends. Use-values are 
‘the material content of wealth’, but ‘in the form of society considered here’, in 
capital, ‘they are also the material bearers (Träger) of… exchange-
                                                
15 Marx 1990, p. 126. 
16 Marx 1990, p. 127. 
17 Marx 1990, p. 128. 
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value.’18‘Use-values must therefore never be treated as the immediate aim of 
the capitalist’.19 ‘Use-values are produced by capitalists only because and in so 
far as they form the material substratum of exchange-value, are the bearers of 
exchange-value.’20 The dominance in capital of exchange-value over use-value, 
and the fact that production is not driven by the satisfaction of human wants, 
which are only incidental to the purposes of capital and serve its ends, makes it 
‘a social formation in which the process of production has mastery over man, 
instead of the opposite’.21 Capital appears therefore as an ‘automatic subject’ 
and the products of labour as ‘autonomous figures, endowed with a life of their 
own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human 
race’.22  ‘If commodities could speak, they would say this: our use-values may 
interest men, but it does not belong to us as objects. What does belong to us as 
objects, however, is our value. Our own intercourse as commodities proves it. 
We relate to each other merely as exchange-values.’23  
The common element that Marx identifies in commodities is that they are all 
products of labour, ‘congealed quantities of homogenous human labour’.24 The 
substance that exchange-value is the ‘form of appearance’ (Erscheinungsform) 
of is labour. But just as in identifying exchange-value it is necessary to abstract 
from the material constituents and forms that make a commodity a use-value, 
                                                
18 Marx 1990, p. 126. 
19 Marx 1990, p. 254. 
20 Marx 1990, p. 293.  
21 Marx 1990, p. 175. 
22 Marx 1990, p. 165. 
23 Marx 1990, p. 177. 
24 Marx 1990, p. 128. 
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so with ‘value’ it is necessary to abstract from the different concrete forms of 
labour. These different forms produce different use-values. With the 
disappearance of use-value these different forms also disappear. ‘They can no 
longer be distinguished, but are all together reduced to the same kind of labour, 
human labour in the abstract’.25  Commodities, in their exchange-value are 
‘congealed quantities … of human-labour power expended without regard to 
the form of expenditure’. A useful object has value only because ‘abstract 
human labour is objectified or materialized in it’.26 The magnitude of value is 
measured by means of the quantity of the ‘value forming substance’, the 
average, ‘socially necessary’ labour-time expended in its production. Marx 
concludes: ‘Now we know the substance of value. It is labour. We know the 
measure of its magnitude. It is labour-time.’27   
------------------------------------ 
 
4.4. Money 
Value appears in its ‘fully developed shape’ in money. Money is for 
commodities an ‘ideal and notional form’28 that ‘serves only in an imaginary or 
ideal capacity’29. In the basic form of gold, money is another commodity, with 
a value corresponding to the labour-time of its production, but it is a 
commodity that by separating itself from all others can act as a universal 
                                                
25 Marx 1990, p. 128. 
26 Marx 1990, p. 129. 
27 Marx 1990, p. 131. 
28 Marx 1990, p. 189. 
29 Marx 1990, p. 190. 
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equivalent, and a measure therefore of their value to each other. It is a power 
‘always ready to be used’.30 ‘Gold is, in the hands of the commodity-owner, his 
own commodity divested of its original shape by being alienated... Gold, as we 
saw, became ideal money, or a measure of value, because all commodities 
measured their values in it, and thus made it the imaginary opposite of their 
natural shape as objects of utility, hence the shape of their value’.31 Money 
therefore appears as a shapeless form of value, without a use-value of its own 
(excluding its aesthetic use, a form of hoarding),33 and it is precisely in this 
paucity, in its ‘highly impoverished and abstract content’, that it stands for a 
universal power, in any and all exchange. ‘Just as in money every qualitative 
difference between commodities is extinguished, so too for its part, as a radical 
leveller, it extinguishes all distinctions.’34 Gold, in sufficient amount, ‘will 
make black, white; foul, fair; wrong, right; base, noble; old, young; coward, 
valiant.’35  
Value remains what it is in money. But whereas in other commodities value 
takes a particular form in the shape of the commodity, in money value is 
abstract. Commodities propose a particular transformation effected by labour 
power, while money is a pure principle of transformation in which any 
individual form of labour is made abstract. ‘Qualitatively… money is 
independent of all limits (schrankenlosen), that is, it is the universal 
representative of material wealth because it is directly convertible into any 
                                                
30 Marx 1990, p. 229. 
31 Marx 1990, p. 204 
33 see Marx 1990, p. 231. 
34 Marx 1990, p. 229 
35 Marx 1990, p. 229n. 
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other commodity’. At the same time, any actual sum of money is limited in 
amount, and therefore limited in the efficacy of what it can purchase. ‘ This 
contradiction between the quantitative limitation and qualitative lack of 
limitation of money keeps driving the hoarder back to his Sisyphean task: 
accumulation. He is in the same situation as a world conqueror, who discovers 
a new boundary with each country he annexes.’36 
‘It is in the world market that money first functions to its full extent as the 
commodity whose natural form is also the directly social form of realization of 
human labour in the abstract. Its mode of existence becomes adequate to its 
concept.’37 Money is produced by the circulation of commodities. Disregarding 
the material content of this circulation and the exchange of use-values, and 
considering ‘only the economic forms brought into being by this process, we 
find that its ultimate product is money. This ultimate product of commodity 
circulation is the first form of appearance of capital.’38 If money is the ultimate 
product of the circulation of commodities, capital, in the form of circulation 
that is its own, iterates the value of money, transforming it into an independent 
power. The difference between ‘simple’ or ‘direct’ circulation (C-M-C) and the 
form of circulation of capital (M-C-M) is in the relative position of money and 
commodities. In simple circulation, money serves as a medium of exchange of 
commodities, enabling the ‘social and general’ exchange of use-values. In 
capital, the value of money becomes separated from use, and a value in itself, 
serving only its own reproduction. Capital is the independent subject that, 
                                                
36 Marx 1990, p. 231. 
37 Marx 1990, p. 241. 
38 Marx 1990, p. 247. 
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producing money out of money, produces itself as a value: money to the power 
of itself. If capital is the domination of this abstract (universal) value, its 
‘ultimate product’ contains the contradiction of capital. 
------------------------------------ 
4.5. The value of money 
Gold, we observed, ‘will make black, white; foul, fair; wrong, right; base, 
noble; old, young; coward, valiant.’ Money represents a general power of 
transformation. Through its ability to be converted into any commodity or any 
use-value, and to satisfy therefore any want, it is a universal power and the 
‘absolutely social form of wealth’. In its value it represents abstract labour and 
the work of material transformation by which use-value and value are created; 
not any individual labour or individual transformation, but any and all actual 
and possible transformation that labour can bring about. It represents an 
abstract and universal power of transformation. The commodity in itself is an 
object that through labour has undergone a material transformation to become a 
use-value: but as a use-value, it satisfies a human want, and in this satisfaction 
it effects a subjective transformation in the user of the commodity, from hunger 
to satiety, cold to warmth, dissatisfaction to satisfaction. Money, as the 
universal commodity convertible into all others, represents the total of all 
possible material and subjective transformation, the abstract possibility of 
transformation. This power that it possesses it transfers to its owner. 
‘What I have thanks to money, what I pay for, i.e. what money can buy, that 
is what I, the possessor of money, am myself. My power is as great as the 
power of money. The properties of money are my – (its owner’s) – 
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properties and faculties. Thus what I am and what I am capable of is by no 
means determined by my individuality. I am ugly, but I can buy myself the 
most beautiful women. Consequently I am not ugly, for the effect of 
ugliness, the power of repulsion, is annulled by money. As an individual, I 
am lame, but money can create twenty-four feet for me; so I am not lame; I 
am a wicked, dishonest man without conscience or intellect, but money is 
honoured and so also is its possessor. Money relieves me of the trouble of 
being dishonest; so I am presumed to be honest. I may have no intellect, but 
money is the true mind of all things and so how should its possessor have no 
intellect? Moreover he can buy himself intellectuals and is not the man who 
has power over intellectuals not more intellectual than they? I who can get 
with money everything that the human heart longs for, do I not possess all 
human capacities? Does not my money thus change all my incapacities into 
their opposite?’39  
Money is not only a means of acquiring specific use-values, but a vehicle of 
personal transformation. In acquiring food, my hunger is transformed into 
satiety; equally, any other ‘incapacity’, the want or lack of beauty, mobility, 
virtue, intellect or any other human faculty can be overcome by a 
transformation that money enables. It represents the sum of human faculties, 
‘the externalized capacities of humanity’40. 
Money, in this idea, is no longer the representative of wealth because it is 
convertible into any commodity, but is the bearer of a wholly abstract power of 
                                                
39 Karl Marx. ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’ (1844), in K. Marx. 
Selected Writings, ed. D. McLellan, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New 
York, 2000, p. 118. (Marx 2000). 
40 Marx 2000, p. 118. 
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transformation, with any individual amount of money representing a fraction of 
this abstract aggregate. It represents in the abstract the power of transforming 
anything into anything else, the absolute transformation of the individual who 
is the possessor of money. This power is not limited to actual, existing ‘human 
and natural qualities’. As Marx emphasizes, it is also, beyond this, the power to 
alter the nature of reality, to turn what is merely imaginary into reality and 
reality into mere imagination. It crosses the boundary between thought and 
being.  
‘If I long for a meal, or wish to take the mail coach because I am not strong 
enough to make the journey on foot, then money procures the meal and the 
mail coach for me. This means that it changes my wishes from being 
imaginary, and translates them from their being in thought, imagination and 
will into a sensuous, real being, from imagination to life, from imaginary 
being to real being. The truly creative force in this mediation is money.’41  
A demand that is not supported by money ‘is simply an imaginary entity that 
has no effective existence’; it ‘remains unreal and without an object’. Money is 
the difference between a demand that is effective and one that is ineffective – 
‘the difference between being and thought, between a representation that 
merely exists within me and one that is outside me as a real object.’42 As the 
‘truly creative force’ in the mediation between thought and being, money is the 
‘universal means and power… to turn imagination into reality and reality into 
mere imagination. Similarly it turns real and human natural faculties into mere 
abstract representations and thus imperfections and painful imaginings, while 
                                                
41 Marx 2000, pp. 118-9 
42 Marx 2000, p. 119 
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on the other hand it turns the real imperfections and imaginings, the really 
powerless faculties that exist only in the imagination of the individual, into real 
faculties and powers’.43 
------------------------------------ 
4.6. Absolute wealth 
Money, Marx’s early writings propose, represents a generalized power of 
transformation, a power that is qualitatively unlimited. It is the sum of what can 
be imagined and made a reality – ‘the externalized capacities of humanity’. As 
a power that is transferred to its possessor, it is a power of subjective 
transformation. It belongs to the subject: that is, the idea and value of an 
absolute transformation is a property of the subject of capital. ‘The properties 
of money are my… properties and faculties’. The value that money represents – 
abstract labour, the material and subjective transformations that labour can 
bring about – undergoes its own transformation in capital. If money represents 
a general power of transformation, capital alters this value both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. Value, as surplus-value, in the system of capital, belongs no 
longer to labour but to capital. While any actual material or subjective 
transformation is in practice only the result of labour, this value appears in 
capital as a property of money. A power of transformation, which is in practice 
the power of labour, takes on the appearance of a power that belongs to money. 
With money, any possible subjective transformation can be achieved precisely 
without labour. Money therefore represents a weightless power of 
                                                
43 Marx 2000, p. 119 
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transformation, a movement and change freed from material labour. Money is 
made out of money.  
The process of capital reinforces this representation. Surplus-value, which is 
the product of surplus labour, appears through the valorization process as a 
value produced by value, the ‘occult ability’ by which money makes money out 
of itself. Surplus-value is the determining purpose of capital. The capitalist is 
the ‘instrument’ of the valorization process, in his actions functioning as 
‘capital personified and endowed with consciousness’.44 The process of 
producing surplus-value appears as an ‘occult ability’ in which capital, the 
‘dominant subject’ (übergreifendes Subjekt) of the process, ‘brings forth living 
offspring, or at least lays golden eggs’.45 In Marx’s strictly materialist account, 
value – abstract labour – labour that as abstract is itself a commodity, provides 
the mechanism for the production of surplus-value. As the value of a 
commodity is the average labour time necessary for its production, abstract 
labour, itself a commodity, has a value that is the labour time necessary to 
sustain and reproduce it. The necessary labour of labour is the time necessary to 
reproduce itself. Labour is a commodity however capable of producing value 
greater than the value of itself (its own cost of reproduction). It possesses the 
specific use-value ‘of being a source not only of value, but of more value than 
it has itself’.46 Capital, purchasing labour-power along with the other 
commodities necessary for production, extends the working day beyond the 
time necessary for labour to reproduce itself; this surplus labour produces 
                                                
44 Marx 1990, p. 254. 
45 Marx 1990, p. 255. 
46 Marx 1990, p. 301. 
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surplus-value. Surplus-value is simply more value, the value created by labour 
in excess of its own value as a commodity, this latter being the labour-time 
necessary for labour to sustain itself.  This value, the quantitative excess of 
labour, is owned by the purchaser of labour-power, and alienated by capital. 
‘By turning his money into commodities which serve as the building 
materials for a new product, and as factors in the labour process, by 
incorporating living labour into their lifeless objectivity, the capitalist 
simultaneously transforms value, i.e. past labour in its objectified and 
lifeless form, into capital, value which can perform its own valorization 
process, an animated monster which begins to ‘work’, ‘as if its body were by 
love possessed’.’47 
Though money represents in principle an absolute power of transformation 
‘without limit’, in practice any actual sum of money is limited and can produce 
only a limited transformation. Capital is the work of correcting this deficit. If 
money qualitatively represents an unlimited power of transformation (limited 
only by imagination), capital, approaching a quantitative equivalence of this 
essence – ‘absolute wealth’ – approaches an actual, ‘absolute’ power of 
transformation. In simple circulation the process is completed and comes to an 
end ‘in a final purpose (Endzweck) which lies outside it, namely consumption, 
the satisfaction of definite needs’48. The circulation of capital by contrast is 
endless, ‘an end in itself, for the valorization of value takes place only within 
this constantly renewed movement.’ 49 The production of surplus-value is ‘the 
                                                
47Marx 1990, p. 302. 
48 Marx 1990, p. 252. 
49 Marx 1990, p. 253. 
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determining purpose, the driving force and the final result of the capitalist 
process of production’,50 its movement therefore ‘limitless’, a ‘restless never-
ending process’, for ‘at the end of the movement, money emerges once again as 
its starting point’.51 Capital, in Aristotle’s distinction cited by Marx, is not 
strictly an economics, concerned with definite, material aims, but chrematistic, 
in that ‘there are no bounds to its aims, these aims being absolute wealth’.52 
‘Absolute wealth’, an absolute power of transformation that is no longer merely 
an ideal power, an abstract value represented in money, but an actual power, 
appears as the goal and endpoint of capital. 
------------------------------------ 
3.7. Tragedy 
Value, an abstract power of transformation, is changed in capital into a 
universal value, both through a quantitative increase as capital approaches its 
end-point of an absolute power of transformation (‘absolute wealth’), and 
through a qualitative transformation. In the ideological shift that attributes this 
power to capital it appears as weightless, without labour, as a power that 
expands itself automatically. A power of transformation is represented in 
commodities, the material transformation that they have undergone and the 
subjective transformation that as use-values they enable. The conversion of 
value in capital – that is its abstraction – gives rise to the idea of an absolute, 
effortless transformation, a new form of social wealth, in turn giving rise in this 
to a new abstract want and use-value. Human wants, use-values, are not for 
                                                
50 Marx 1990, p. 976. 
51 Marx 1990, p. 253. 
52 Marx 1990, p. 253n 
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Marx a fixed category. Human history is the expansion of use-values, where 
ideas, technologies and forms of production both create and satisfy human 
wants. In capital, an absolute, abstract want is added to the sum of human 
possibilities and desires, which capital itself provides the technology to satisfy. 
An idea of subjective power assumes an economic form. This value, 
historically represented in money, is now represented also in commodities. 
Where in simple circulation, money represents commodities, and is an 
abstraction of specific use-values, in capital commodities represent also the 
abstract value of money. No longer primarily objects that have undergone a 
specific material transformation to satisfy a specific want or to effect a specific 
subjective transformation, they become instead representations of an abstract 
transformation, the abstract want of a subject to be other than it is. They 
become symbols of otherness. Capital creates the want satisfied by this value, 
forming in its own image the subject whose subjectivity demands its own 
transcendence.  
The sum of possible transformations, ‘the externalised capacities of humanity’, 
appear as if projected on to the screen of capital. Any possible want of fantasy 
or imagination is made real in its projection on the screen where, within only 
the limits of imagination and identification – and the suspension of disbelief – 
any subjective transformation is enabled. The screen is the ultimate product for 
the representation of value, a metonym and instrument for the spectacle. In 
itself nothing, devoid of content and therefore abstract, it is capable of 
assuming any imaginable form and satisfying any want of fantasy. Projected on 
to the screen of capital, the spectacle in general gives the abstract a concrete 
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form: its ‘manner of being concrete is, precisely, abstraction’.53 The abstract 
power that money in capital represents appears in the spectacle as a series of 
weightless transformations in a total technological theatre in which all 
production – which now includes the production of consumption, and therefore 
producers, products and consumers acting as one – collectively participates. 
The genre of this production is the issue we question.  
As the screen on which all transformations are projected, capital itself remains 
constant. In itself it is abstract and without content, a blank canvas on to which 
any fantasy can be projected; this content, in the symbolic structure of capital, 
is imaginary while only capital is real. The contradiction of capital, within the 
terms of its own value, is that for all  the power of absolute transformation it 
holds as a value, it itself always returns to the same place. If it enables any 
imaginable story to be projected on to the screen, in practice the same film is 
always showing – ‘Capital’. The actual social form that value reproduces in 
capital, which is the ultimate product of the valorization process, and what 
surplus-value produces and reproduces, is the social formation of capital: class 
division. As surplus-value, appropriated by the owners of constant capital, is 
returned as capital to the production of more surplus-value, in a process 
repeated ad infinitum, it mechanically reproduces and expands the social 
division between capital and labour. ‘Capitalist production is the production 
and reproduction of the specifically capitalist relations of production’.54 It 
                                                
53 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle. tr. Donald Nicholson-Smith, New 
York, Zone Books, 1995, p. 22. 
54 Marx 1990, p. 948. 
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produces and reproduces as its final product the form of bourgeois society. 
Universal value returns to a specific form. 
In the process in which value creates value, capital becomes an ‘automatic 
subject’, the ‘dominant subject’ of the process. Value, as it is transformed in 
capital, an absolutely weightless power of transformation, is the abstract term 
that takes an individual form in the subject of capital. This subjectivity is an 
unreconciled opposition of abstract and individual, and is transferred through 
the interpellations of ideology and real abstraction to the subjects of capital, 
that is, to the capitalists who are its personifications. The bourgeois idea is to be 
other than it is. The contradictions that abstract value produces in these 
individual forms (the social formation of capital, the actual individual who is 
the subject of capital) are inherent in the concept of value that, in capital, is 
represented in money. The ‘universal’ value of money is destroyed when it is 
used; absolute wealth, absolute transformation, logically entails the destruction 
of the individual forms that are the bearers of it (capital itself, the individual 
who is its subject). The relation of capital to actual production and the immense 
surplus labour time engaged in an endless, universal material transformation, 
appears as that of the ironic subject. Its ‘geniality’ is precisely that the ceaseless 
work of material transformation appears as abstract and two-dimensional, 
counting for nothing other than its relation to the subject. Every positive 
content is annihilated by absorption into the ‘absolute freedom and unity’ of the 
‘I’. The contradiction of value is resolved by displacing abstraction, an absence 
of real content, into the world, which becomes imaginary except as it reinforces 
the value of the subject. This ‘I’ (the individual subject of capital) is however 
‘utterly abstract and formal’ and without content because for it all content is 
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contingent and it alone is the only necessity. In its abstraction, like the ironic 
subject, it has a ‘craving for the solid and substantial’. The principle of value, 
of transformation, requires that it make itself into something real, and this 
realization entails its own destruction.  
The superficial drama in tragedy, in Hegel’s analysis, is the conflict between a 
concept of the individual and an opposing power of abstract necessity. In 
practice, this ‘necessity’ is the product of a one-sided individuality that, taking 
itself as the ground and cause of everything, can find no reconciliation with 
other equally one-sided individuals. The collision and conflict between 
individuals is in practice a symptom and outward manifestation of a conflict 
that takes place within the individual who is the hero of this form of drama. 
Revealed in soliloquy – the subject talking to itself – a conflict (brought in 
Hamlet to a point of paralysing indecision) is the dynamic from which all the 
action flows. This conflict takes several forms: between opposing laws, agency 
and passivity, knowing and not-knowing, the mask and the actor. Represented 
in the opposition of (economic) necessity and the individual, opposing laws and 
values, a competition between nations and between individuals, these conflicts 
are in the tragic idea concentrated in the subject. It is a division and conflict, we 
suggest, between meaning and non-meaning.  
The individual subject of capital repeats the contradiction inherent in the value 
of capital. Shot through with an abstract possibility of being, the individual can 
find itself only in what it is not. Its own subjective transformation, or what it is 
as an absolute condition of possibility, it owes to money. The value that it has, 
its freedom, is a function of capital; it is simultaneously therefore both subject 
(in the sense of an independent agent, free in the idea of itself) and subject (the 
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passive subject of an Other Subject). Divided in itself, the abstract (universal) 
confronts the individual on both sides. As the possessor of a universal power of 
transformation and the ability to be anything, it confronts the fact that it is one 
thing, and can only be anything by ceasing to be itself. Its freedom necessitates 
its own destruction. On the other side, the possibility of absolute transformation 
appears to the individual as a principle of absolute otherness, as an abstract 
demand that it cannot recognize or recognize itself in. From both the side of the 
individual and the abstract, the other appears as alien, as something in its 
divided consciousness that is both part of itself and other, an alien internal 
object that itself constitutes the subject.  
For capital, content is abstract in that capital is indifferent to the particular 
forms that are produced: the function of production is to produce abstract value. 
In this it suffers a loss of language: content and differential terms no longer 
mean anything, they all say the same thing which is their exchange-value. 
Equally, language loses its function as the practical and social relation between 
people. As commodities, objects relate to each other. The loss of language, that 
all that any sentence says is ‘I’, an abstract capitalized subject, reproduces a 
new condition of abstraction in language. This inability to articulate its own 
conditions of existence or to realize itself in this way is the frustration and 
violence of the subject. It cannot realize itself as other; it cannot even realize 
itself as itself. The value of capital, of absolute transformation, in the absence 
of the language and imagination to articulate another form of being, can still 
realize its value in absolute destruction. ‘The bomb’, as the actual possibility of 
absolute destruction, stands above money and the spectacle in the triad of forms 
through which the ‘Empire’ of capital represents itself. The end of the world 
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appears as the limit point of capital and the only alternative to the endless 
reproduction of its own form. ‘It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than 
the end of capitalism’55. Fisher’s citation points directly to the alternative 
capital proposes: the end of the world or the end of capital. The logic of value 
dictates the transformation of the specific form of capital. Its logic requires its 
own extinction. The contradictions inherent in the form, where the abstract and 
individual render each other void, are resolved only in the destruction of the 
subject. The material form that satisfies its abstract want, that represents its 
value, is death. As its value is other than what it is, it is only capable of 
becoming real, of realizing its value, in its own extinction.  
------------------------------------ 
                                                
55 Mark Fisher. Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Zero Books, 
Ripley, 2008 p. 1. 
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5. Comedy 
 
5.1. Freud’s joke 
Comedy, which begins in abstraction, begins therefore in loss. Abstraction, as 
we have defined it, is a socially determined condition, a loss of Sittlichkeit or 
whatever the then familiar structure of the social is. Freud renders this loss in 
the microcosm of the family and individual psychology. Object-loss, a central 
event in Freudian psychology that is implicit in all repression, neuroses and 
fixations, presents an economic model of abstraction and the attempted forms 
of recuperation from it. ‘Objectlessness’ is the condition that whether through 
normal or neurotic channels the binding instinct of eros seeks to overcome. In 
the distinction Freud makes between normal object-loss (mourning, the death of 
a love object) and the situations that give rise to the pathological condition of 
melancholia, different responses to abstraction are illuminated. Mourning 
provides a model for a normal situation of loss, and Freud lays out the 
pathways for a normal recovery. It is other situations, not necessarily involving 
an actual death, but some other loss and betrayal – ‘those situations of being 
slighted, neglected or disappointed’1 – that in Freud’s narrative give rise to the 
condition of melancholia, ‘An object-choice, an attachment of the libido to a 
particular person, had at one time existed; then, owing to a real slight or 
                                                
1 ‘In melancholia, the occasions which give rise to the illness extend for the 
most part beyond the clear case of a loss by death, and include all those 
situations of being slighted, neglected or disappointed, which can import 
opposed feelings of love or hate into the relationship or reinforce an already 
existing ambivalence’. S. Freud. ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917),  
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 
Volume XIV, tr. James Strachey, London; Hogarth Press, 1957, p. 251  
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disappointment coming from this loved person, the object-relationship was 
shattered’.2 Object-loss in its generality is not that some love-object has died or 
no longer exists, but that a former relationship with an object, an attachment 
and investment of psychic energy bound up in an object (which may be an 
abstraction as much as an actual person) is ‘shattered’. ‘The object has not 
perhaps actually died, but has been lost as an object of love’.3  
Freud specifies the psychic mechanism that takes place in object loss, the 
‘withdrawal of cathexis’. A quota of affect, of psychic (or libidinal) energy is 
detached from the idea (object) to which it was previously attached. Affect is 
separated from idea or object (which may be either or both a psychic or a real 
object) and circulates unattached to any object and unbound. The desire for a 
object, in economic terms, is this surplus. All withdrawals of cathexis induce an 
unbinding, a condition of objectlessness characterized by a feeling of 
helplessness, a dissolution of the ego’s boundaries, the experience of symbolic 
death. The fate of unbound energy is anxiety; but this anxiety, in the first 
instance, is not attached to an object (a phobia), for it is precisely the lack of 
connection to an object that causes it. It is free-floating, dispersed throughout 
the social field. The character and fate of this unbound affect determines a 
normal or pathological condition. In the separation of the affect from any 
ideational content, from any representation or object to which it relates, it is 
abstract. Anxiety emerges in the absence of social context. 
Repression (the pathological part of the unconscious, where there is resistance 
to it becoming conscious) is the product of loss. The withdrawal of cathexis, 
                                                
2 Freud (1917) p. 249 
3 Freud (1917)  p. 245 
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Freud writes, is what all repression has in common.4 In the case of melancholia 
what is lost is not merely an object, but the ability to represent what is lost. In 
this instance something in addition to the object is lost; ‘there is a loss of a 
more ideal kind’5 It is however not immediately clear, either to the analyst or to 
the patient, what this is. ‘This, indeed, might be so even if the patient is aware 
of the loss which has given rise to the melancholia, but only in the sense that he 
knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him’ (Freud 14. 245). This 
additional ‘unknown loss’, which is ‘withdrawn from consciousness’ is not the 
loss of a ‘whom’, of a person (an object), but a loss of a general kind, a loss of 
love and a loss in language. 
Object-loss, motivated by anxiety, is driven to forms of recuperation. Unbound 
energy is re-attached either (in the case of a normal recovery from mourning) to 
other people, or to other real or ideal objects. In the particular pathology of 
melancholia the unbound affect is attached to an internal object that substitutes 
for and takes the place of the lost object. In this case, ‘the free libido was not 
displaced on to another object; it was withdrawn into the ego. There, however, 
it was not employed in any unspecified way, but served to establish an 
identification of the ego with the abandoned object. Thus the shadow of the 
object falls on the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special 
agency, as though it were an object, the forsaken object.’6  
                                                
4 Sigmund Freud. ‘Repression’ (1915) Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XIV, tr. James Strachey, 
London; Hogarth Press, 1999, pp. 154-5. ‘the mechanisms of repression have at 
least this one thing in common: a withdrawal of the cathexis of energy’  
5 Freud (1917) p. 245 
6 Freud (1917) p. 249 
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The ego and its character is determined by loss.7 The motivation for this 
movement is a desire to hold on to and preserve the lost object. ‘By taking 
flight into the ego love escapes extinction’.8 In this movement, the substitution 
of a narcissistic, purely internal object relation for an external (anaclitic) one, 
an interior world takes precedence over an external one. The character of this 
world is determined by the manner of the subject’s loss and its mode of 
recuperation. The vicissitudes of the instincts, searching for and thwarted by 
objects, produce a subject that reproduces itself and its loss in the world.  
In the event that conditions melancholia, that is the betrayal in which the 
object-relation is ‘shattered’, the circumstances of the loss provokes and brings 
to the fore an affective ambivalence – ‘opposed feelings of love and hate’9 – in 
the relation to the object. The libidinal energy invested in the object turns round 
                                                
7 Judith Butler argues that the ego is the object that replaces the lost object; that 
melancholic loss produces the ego. ‘The turn from the object to the ego 
produces the ego, which substitutes for the object lost. This production is a 
tropological generation and follows from the psychic compulsion to substitute 
for objects lost. Thus, in melancholia not only does the ego substitute for the 
object, but this act of substitution institutes the ego as a necessary response to 
or “defense” against loss.’ Judith Butler. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories 
in Subjection, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1997, pp. 168-9. Freud 
accords a more structural position to the ego, but concedes that its character is 
determined by this loss. ‘An object which was lost has been set up again within 
the ego – that is, that an object-cathexis has been replaced by an 
identification… this kind of substitution has a great share in determining the 
form taken by the ego and … it makes an essential contribution towards 
building up what is called its ‘character’.’7 ‘The character of the ego is a 
precipitate of its abandoned object-cathexes and … it contains the history of 
those object-choices.’ S. Freud. ‘The Ego and the Id’ (1923) Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XIX, tr. James 
Strachey, London; Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 28 
8 Freud (1917) p. 257 
9 Freud (1917) p. 251 
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into its opposite, and the quota of affect detached from the object is as much 
aggressive and hostile as it is libidinal or loving. The ambivalence of affect, 
attached to the ego, accounts for the division of the subject, the Ambivalenz 
Konflikt being, if not resolved, dealt with by the ‘splitting’10 of the internal 
object and, by projection, external objects into good and bad objects. On one 
side, a good object, stripped wholly of its negative determination, an ideal and 
absolute of love, whose idea assumed by the subject through identification and 
projected as an actual object in the external world: on the other, the critical, 
destructive tendencies, whose emanation from the subject is repressed,. A 
system of values and a morality of objects, comes into play.  
The melancholy subject’s mode of being is identification. The internal object, 
formed as a way of  ‘clinging to the object through the medium of a 
hallucinatory wishful psychosis’11 assumes the form and character of the lost 
object and the manner of its loss. The object-relationship in all its ambivalence 
is internalized, and reappears as the relation the subject has with itself and as a 
relation incorporated into the structure of the ego. The narcissism of the subject 
is its sufficient relation with itself: I = I. Formed out of identification with the 
object and its loss, it now identifies only with what is like itself. Having made 
itself an object, it seeks to give this object an objective form, to recreate it in 
the world and thus to create a world it can recognize itself in. But this object, 
the subjects own ego formed in the conditions of its loss, is clouded with 
                                                
10 ‘an idea that has a contradictory – an ambivalent – content becomes divided 
into two sharply contrasting opposites’. S. Freud. ‘A Seventeenth-Century 
Demonological Neurosis’ (1923 [1922]) Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XIX, tr. James Strachey, 
London; Hogarth Press, 1961 p. 86 
11 Freud (1917) p. 244 
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ambivalence. The work of love is also a work of (repressed) hate and 
destruction. The death that the subject – as one who loves itself – fears is in 
practice the abstraction and objectlessness incorporated in the ego in an event 
that has already occurred. As something that is incorporated in the subject, and 
which the subject identifies with, in seeking to represent itself and to create an 
objective form that it can form a narcissistic identification with, the subject 
works towards its own death.12 
In the description of melancholia, Freud presents the mechanism of the 
formation of a tragic subject. A withdrawal of cathexis, a state of 
objectlessness, is followed by the formation of an internal object that, having 
‘lost a world’, is itself both ego and inhibition. The ego here is not simply an 
agency that inhibits or represses another agency (the id), but one that in itself, 
through its own particular structure of substitute objects, is repressed. What is 
repressed is its own unbound, free-floating energy, and an unconscious that is 
contradictory, immoral and lacking in sense, which under the constitution of the 
ego cannot articulate its actual self but bypasses inhibition through its 
(mis)representation in the symptom, in dreams, everyday slips and jokes. These 
last three are normal, non-pathological means of overcoming repression. 
Though treated by Freud as equivalents in their psychic value, each of these 
forms is objectively different. Dreams are, by their nature, private; a space of 
coded fantasy withdrawn from the social. The psychopathological slips of 
everyday life, though taking an objective form in word or gesture, remain 
                                                
12 Freud’s insight that death (in the mind of the subject) is really loss is in S. 
Freud,  ‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’ (1915) (SE 14) Its 
implication alters the view in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920) (SE 18). 
The death drive becomes the specific formation of the melancholic subject. 
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invisible as part of a social unconscious (until brought to light by Freud). Jokes, 
however, do not merely bypass repression or operate when the censor of 
consciousness is either asleep or otherwise engaged. They are a direct, public 
and social assault on repression. The joke represents a rebellion against 
authority, ‘a liberation from its pressure’13. The repression that the joke 
overcomes is social, the renunciation of instinctual life that is the product of 
‘civilization and higher education’14, , but is also that of the internal object, the 
repressive structure of the subject’s own substitute investments and 
identifications. This overcoming of repression takes place not in the subject’s 
removal to a withdrawn space of dreams or fantasies, but in a return to the 
social.  
The economic explanation of laughter is made clear: ‘laughter arises if a quota 
of psychical energy which has earlier been used for the cathexis of particular 
psychical paths has become unusable, so that it can find free discharge’.15 ‘In 
laughter therefore… a sum of psychical energy finds free discharge’. 16 ‘…the 
cathected energy used for the inhibition has now suddenly become superfluous 
and has been lifted, and is therefore now ready to be discharged by laughter’.17 
The mechanism at work here is the same mechanism – the withdrawal of 
cathexis – that is found in a situation of loss. In the melancholic situation, 
                                                
13 S. Freud. ‘Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious’ (1905). The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume VIII, 
Hogarth Press, London, 1960, p 105. (Freud 1905) 
14 Freud 1905, p. 101. 
15 Freud 1905, p. 147. 
16 Freud 1905, p. 148. 
17 Freud 1905, p. 149. 
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however, the loss of the love object that brings into being ‘objectlessness’, sets 
in train the formation of the ego in its substitute objects and repressed 
ambivalence. In the instance of jokes and comedy, it is this melancholy 
structure that is itself lost as an object. The process is reversed. The ego and its 
system of objects are what the quota of affect is withdrawn from. The subject 
returns to a state of objectlessness. This objectlessness, abstraction or 
momentary ‘absence’ is the precondition of the joke and the objective form 
through which the subject returns to the social. No longer in isolation, but 
through the shared object of the joke (the signifier of a light and harmless 
objectlessness) the subject returns to the collectivity of comedy. 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.2. Bergson’s grace 
Bergson demurs from imprisoning the comic spirit in a definition. ‘We regard 
it, above all, as a living thing.’18 It has, however, a logic of its own. Bergson’s 
emphasis is on one condition of the comic, the appearance of something 
mechanical encrusted on the living.19 The mechanical is situated against life, 
against the vitality that is ‘the very principle of our intellectual and moral 
life’,20 whose ‘fundamental law’ is ‘the negation of repetition’.21 The 
philosophy of our imagination sees in every human form ‘a soul which is 
                                                
18 Henri Bergson. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, tr. C. 
Brereton and F. Rothwell, Macmillan, London, 1935, p. 2. 
19 Bergson 1935, p. 37. 
20 Bergson 1935, p. 50. 
21 Bergson 1935, p. 32. 
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infinitely supple and perpetually in motion, subject to no law of gravitation, for 
it is not the earth that attracts it.’22 When a human form is encountered whose 
attitudes, gestures and movements remind us of a machine, the effect is comic. 
A lack of elasticity, absence of mind or physical obstinacy, a rigidity that gives 
the human the appearance of a puppet – in this it is automatism that makes us 
laugh. Physical comedy – the incongruity between the lofty aspirations of the 
soul and the low accidents of the body – produces its effect as a result of a 
mechanical inelasticity in the living. What is comic is also a mental inelasticity, 
‘the rigidity of a fixed idea’23. 
‘Suppose, then, we imagine a mind always thinking of what it has just done 
and never of what it is doing, like a song that lags behind its 
accompaniment. Let us try to picture to ourselves a certain inborn lack of 
elasticity of both senses and intelligence, which brings it to pass that we 
continue to see what is no longer visible, to hear what is no longer audible, 
to say what is no longer to the point: in short, to adapt ourselves to a past 
and therefore imaginary situation, when we ought to be shaping our conduct 
in accordance with the reality which is present. This time the comic will take 
up abode in the person himself…’24 
What applies to body and mind applies also to society, which, as we are both in 
it and of it, we cannot help treating as a living being. 
‘Any image then, suggestive of the notion of a society disguising itself, or of 
a social masquerade, so to speak, will be laughable. Now, such a notion is 
                                                
22 Bergson 1935, p. 28. 
23 Bergson 1935, p. 14. 
24 Bergson 1935, p. 11. 
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formed when we perceive anything inert or stereotyped, or simply ready-
made, on the surface of living society. There we have rigidity over again, 
clashing with the innermost suppleness of life.’25 
Bergson’s argument here concerns the comic object, whether this object is 
body, mind or society. The appearance of the mechanical is on its own 
insufficient to explain comedy (a person performing a mechanical operation is 
not in itself funny), as the object is insufficient to explain laughter. The 
mechanical is contrasted with the living, but this ‘living’ is of a special quality. 
In considering the comic in relation to ugliness (in caricature), Bergson 
concludes that to define the comic in relation to its opposite it should be 
contrasted with gracefulness more than with beauty. ‘It partakes rather of the 
unsprightly rather than the unsightly, of rigidness rather than of ugliness.’26 The 
comic, then, is a certain combination of mechanical rigidity and grace (in a 
purely material sense). The distribution of these two qualities, within the comic 
object and between the object and the subject who laughs, accounts for the 
comic both in terms of incongruity and superiority. The difference between 
what is de jure and de facto comic depends on the subject-position of the 
observer. Where things are funny in theory (de jure), but not in practice, it is 
because, ‘the continuity of custom having deadened within them the comic 
quality’27, the viewers apprehension of the object is as ‘mechanical’ as the 
object. It has no more grace than the object. The grace that is necessary to 
perceive the object as mechanical, and comic, may come from the object itself, 
                                                
25 Bergson 1935, p. 44. 
26 Bergson 1935, p. 29. 
27 Bergson 1935, p. 39. 
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which combines the graceful and the mechanical, but the viewer identifies with 
the former in order to laugh at the latter. Spontaneous jokes as well as physical 
comedy may present this form. To the extent that the audience, through 
identification, borrows and assumes the grace of the comedian, he laughs not 
only at the object but also his former, rigid self from which he is temporarily 
released. 
Bergson’s concept of the mechanical, extended along the axis that runs from 
grace to the mechanical – the former encompassing lightness (of weight, touch 
or thought) and the latter a form of repetition or rigidity – accounts for comedy 
in terms of incongruity (the graceful and the mechanical), of superiority (the 
assumed graceful subject position of the viewer versus the mechanical, rigid 
quality of the object) and of release. Laughter is the response of the subject’s 
unexpected release from its own former rigidity, from the repression that is its 
normal condition. The art of the comedian is to engender the feeling of grace, 
of the suspension of repression. ‘Freedom produces jokes and jokes produce 
freedom.’28 For Bergson, the comic ‘oscillates between art and life’. Life, in 
this instance, is characterized by the repetition that occurs whenever economy 
comes into play, and of a mode of perception subsumed to instrumental action. 
Art, for Bergson, ‘has no other object than to brush aside the utilitarian 
symbols, the conventional and socially accepted generalities, in short, 
everything that veils reality from us, in order to come face to face with reality 
itself’. If comedy is situated between art and life, this is not only in that it deals 
with generalities, with types rather than individuals, and makes this its subject 
                                                
28 Jean Paul Richter, quoted in Freud (1905), p. 41. 
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matter, but that, unlike tragic art, which sets itself apart from social life, it 
engages with these forms and has the intention to correct and instruct. 
 Laughter, in Bergson’s account, is a form of social critique. The comic 
expresses ‘a special lack of adaptability to society’,29 an inelasticity in respect 
of society’s demands. This first appears as the critique by society of the 
individual who ‘goes his own way without troubling himself about getting on 
with his fellow beings. It is the part of laughter to reprove his 
absentmindedness and wake him out of his dream.’30 The individual, Bergson 
suggests, is sanctioned in the confined space of (tragic) art, but where it appears 
in life, in a non-threatening form, in gesture rather than in action, laughter is the 
gestural response that corrects this deviation. Beyond this conventional 
comedy, representing the prejudices of groups in society, comedy also 
functions in the reverse direction, acting as a critique of the social and the 
accepted generalities it entails. This critique is not from the position of the 
(tragic) artist, that is an individual withdrawn from society – but from a 
position that, though individual, imagines a society of individuals. It remains a 
critique of unsociability, but in this case a critique of the unsociability of 
society, of the rigid and mechanical in the accepted generalities that govern 
perception and behavior, of society’s substitution of gesture and form for action 
and thought. It functions through the presentation of a subject-position of 
greater grace. Two opposing directions of comedy are allowed for in Bergson’s 
theory. At issue in the distinction between them is the distribution of grace and 
                                                
29 Bergson 1935, p. 133. 
30 Bergson 1935, p. 134. 
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the mechanical between the comic object and subject-position, the level at 
which the meaning of the comic object is attacked. 
In the distinction Zupancic makes between conventional comedy and 
subversive comedy,31 the former – of which the typical Hollywood rom-com is 
an example – uses as its material the accidental, rigid or mechanical 
impediments – the base materiality – that the characters encounter, but leaves in 
place the categories that govern the story and its resolution. Love, as 
conventionally conceived, is not questioned; indeed, in that it survives and 
persists through the accidents that befall it, the concept is reinforced. In this 
way, repetition, rigidity and persistence of a concept remains part of the comic 
object: for all the variation of character or incident, the form of resolution of the 
narrative is always the same. At the end of the work the abstract universal 
remains in place and strengthened. Subversive comedy (true comedy for 
Zupancic) is an assault on the categories, on the abstract universal that itself 
becomes the comic object. When, in the archetypal comic incident, the toffee-
nosed baron slips on a banana peel, the comedy is not the intrusion of the 
material into the ideal – the revelation that the baron is also human, a body 
subject to accident and gravity like anyone else. It is the abstract universal that 
comes a cropper, his ‘baronness’ that, through the device of the banana skin, 
becomes the comic object.32 True comedy, the comedy of grace, entails a 
categorical shift, an absence or failure of repetition on the part of the categories 
governing the situation. Where there is repetition or rigidity, it is not on the side 
                                                
31 Alenka Zupancic. The Odd One In: On Comedy. Cambridge, Mass. and 
London, MIT Press, 2007, pp. 30-34. (Zupancic 2007) 
32 In the case of Heraclitus, it is ‘philosophy’ that falls in the well. 
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of the categories but of phenomena, words or incidents that are repeated or 
reappear in a different light through a categorical shift. Comic repetition 
‘reactivates the ground or presupposition of a given structure, and makes it 
appear as an object’.33 
If jokes do not bear repetition, the repetition to be avoided applies also to the 
idea of what a joke is. Comedy, Bergson and Wittgenstein agree, is by 
definition resistant to definition. For if comedy, in the avoidance of repetition, 
negates all categories, it also dissolves the category of the comic, which 
therefore evolves, not in a predictable or rule-based series but as a succession 
of surprises. Bergson describes comedy as characterized by an absence of 
feeling, though in practice the sharing of humour engenders its own feeling as a 
particular warmth in the connection between people. Comedy is better 
characterized by an absence of investment, the suspension of the attachment of 
affect to objects, not least the object that is the subject’s own ego. In Freud’s 
account of the formation of the joke, there is a momentary ‘absence’ before the 
joke appears, as if fully formed.34 According to Herbert Spencer, laughter is the 
indication of an effort that suddenly encounters a void.35 Bergson quotes Kant’s 
similar statement: ‘Laughter is the result of an expectation which, of a sudden, 
                                                
33 Zupancic 2007, p. 178. 
34 ‘A joke has quite outstandingly the characteristic of being a notion that has 
occurred to us ‘involuntarily’. What happens is not that we know a moment 
beforehand what joke we are going to make, and that all it then needs is to be 
clothed in words. We have an indefinable feeling, rather, which I can best 
compare with an ‘absence’, a sudden release of intellectual tension, and then all 
at once the joke is there – as a rule ready-clothed in words.’ Freud (1905) p. 
167. 
35 See Bergson 1935, p. 85. 
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ends in nothing’.36 In Spencer’s view the comic consists of a ‘descending 
incongruity’, a bathetic fall. The ‘baron’s’ fall onto the pavement is for the 
viewing subject a fall into a void – into ‘nothing’ – which, because there is no 
hard landing in a void but only a release from gravity, provokes laughter. For 
Freud, looking at the issue from the position of the one making a joke, the void 
precedes the joke, establishing the subject-position from which the joke 
becomes visible as already there. ‘Humour’, Wittgenstein writes, ‘is not a mood 
but a way of looking at the world.’37 It entails a particular subject-position. As a 
point of maximum grace, the comic in general –  the position from which the 
comic, in whatever form, becomes visible – has no structure or arrangement of 
objects and investments through which it constitutes itself. In itself it is 
nothing. In jokes, Freud writes, ‘what at one moment seemed to have meaning, 
we now see is completely meaningless’.38 The bathetic fall of comedy is a 
movement from meaning to meaninglessness. Laughter is an expression of 
‘pleasure in nonsense’, where nonsense means not silliness but the absence of 
‘good’ sense. Assuming momentarily a position of ‘nothing’, the comic subject 
encounters an objectlessness and absence of meaning that in the comic world is 
in no way a meaningful event. 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.3. Malevich’s ‘nothing’ 
                                                
36 Bergson 1935, p. 85. 
37 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, tr. P. Winch, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1980, p. 78e. 
38 Freud (1905), p. 12. 
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If Malevich’s work does not appear obviously comic, the situation of the time 
of its production – the great war, October 1917, the period of war communism 
– may be a sufficient explanation. Malevich was from the beginning (the Black 
Square) a social realist, and neither the realities of the time nor the utopianism 
with which they were countered readily lend themselves as comic material. 
Malevich proposed and presented a particular version of abstraction – ‘non-
objectivity’ (bespredmetnost) – an objectlessness found in ‘the non-objective 
world’ (the real world, to be sure) and articulated a subject-position in the work 
that, we propose, is akin to the comic. In this subject-position comedy and the 
modern show their affinity. 
Malevich’s 1915 tract, From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The New 
Realism in Painting 39, is critical of ‘the rubbish-filled pool of Academic art’,40 
but also of impressionism, cubism and futurism. Even as these latter artists 
‘cast off the robes of the past’ and open themselves to the new in modern life, 
making their subject-matter planes and automobiles rather than saints and 
madonnas, in their mode of representation they remain tied to the ideas of the 
past, to ‘the forms of utilitarian reason’.41 Malevich, conventionally, opposes 
‘intuition’ to instrumental reason – the latter the source of the failure of those 
futurist pictures where construction ‘is calculated to achieve an impression’ and 
whose appeal is limited to ‘aesthetic taste’. It is where intuition comes from 
that defines the position from which this critique is made. ‘The intuitive form 
                                                
39 K. Malevich. ‘From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The New 
Realism in Painting’ (1916). Included in T. Andersen (ed.), K.S. Malevich. 
Essays on Art 1915-1933, Vol. 1, tr. X. Glowacki-Prus and A. McMillin, 
Copenhagen and London, Rapp & Whiting, 1969, p.38. 
40 Malevich 1916, p. 19. 
41 Malevich 1916, p. 30. 
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comes from nothing’. 
The first Suprematist exhibition of 1915, ‘0. 10’, which Malevich’s text 
accompanied, takes its title from the artists’ intention:  ‘we intend to reduce 
everything to zero… [and] will then go beyond zero’42. This zero – the absence 
of presumption, the void in which the work appears – is first the subject-
position of the artist. ‘I have transformed myself in the zero of form...’.43 Not 
merely the presumption of a fresh start and a disavowal of a particular history, 
Malevich avers a positive nihilism, translating the zero of form or ‘nothing’ 
into a positive entity. ‘Nothing influences me and “nothing”, as an entity, 
determines my consciousness’.44 Malevich’s ‘target of destruction’ is ‘the world 
of objects’, ‘the circle of things’45 from which the artist has escaped. In the 
passage to the non-objective world the artist ‘should abandon subject and 
objects’, abandon itself as subject in a disinvestment from not simply individual 
objects, but the object world as such. ‘The contours of the objective world fade 
more and more and so it goes, step by step, until finally the world – “everything 
we have loved and by which we have lived” – becomes lost to sight’.46 The 
object-world is dissolved: not, obviously, that such things as planes and 
                                                
42 The full title of the exhibition was 0.10: The Last Futurist Exhibition of 
Pictures’ (Poslednyaya futuristicheskaya vystavka kartin). The ‘10’ referred to 
the original number of participants (subsequently expanded to 14). The 
statement ‘we intend to reduce everything to zero...’ comes from a letter of 
May 1915, quoted in B. Alsthuler. The Avant-Garde in Exhibition: New Art in 
the 20th Century, Harry N. Abrahams, New York 1994, p. 78 
43 ‘I have transformed myself in the zero of form and dragged myself out of the 
rubbish-filled pool of Academic art. ’ (Malevich 1916, 19) 
44 K. Malevich. ‘God is Not Cast Down’ (1922). Included in T. Andersen (ed.) 
1969, p. 188 
45 Malevich (1916), p. 19. 
46 Malevich ‘The Non-Objective World’ (1927). (Chipp (ed.) 1968, 342). 
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automobiles, and even saints and madonnas, cease to exist, but that the 
consciousness that sees the world as a set of objects, connected by a set of other 
objects – concepts and rules that can be understood through a method – is 
replaced by a consciousness that is ‘non-objective’. ‘Nothing in the objective 
world is as ‘secure and unshakeable’ as it appears to our conscious minds. We 
should accept nothing as pre-determined – as constituted for eternity. Every 
“firmly established” familiar thing can be shifted about and brought under a 
new and, primarily, unfamiliar order’.47 An absolute contingency of 
determination – ‘nothing’ – aims to ‘teach our consciousness to see everything 
in nature not as real forms and objects, but as material masses from which 
forms must be made, which have nothing in common with nature’.48  
Emmanuel Martineau distinguishes in Malevich a different procedure of 
abstraction, one that is ‘absolute’ or ‘total’, and is contrasted with the common 
(vulgaire) concept and procedure of abstraction.49 The latter is an ‘abstraction 
from’ (abstractio ab), a methodological reduction that removes the individuality 
of entities and instances, abstracts from them, to arrive at general concepts and 
forms. This procedure is sanctified by a method that it attributes to nature but is 
in fact already complicit in the construction of what nature is. Malevich’s 
opposition to method is an attempt to ‘disengage the essence of art from its 
vulgar interpretation as power (pouvoir), können, which places this power 
                                                
47 Malevich ‘The Non-Objective World’ (1927). (Chipp (ed.) 1968, 344). 
48 Malevich (1916), (Andersen (ed.) 1969, p. 25). 
49 E. Martineau. Malevitch et la Philosophie, Lausanne 1977, pp. 15-61. Cited 
in J-C. Marcade. ‘K. S. Malevich: From Black Quadrilateral (1913) to White on 
White (1917); from the Eclipse of Objects to the Liberation of Space’, in S. 
Barron and M. Tuchman (ed.). The Avant-Garde in Russia, 1910-1930: New 
Perspectives, Cambridge, Mass. and London, MIT Press, 1980, p. 23n. 
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under the rule of a knowing how (savoir faire)’.50 Common abstraction remains 
beholden in its method to a concept of nature and natural representation, or a 
form of representation that reveals the truth of nature. In the same way, the 
Futurists, even as they moved beyond natural objects as their subject-matter 
and aimed to depict pure movement, remained in a naturalized form of 
representation, in the ‘nature’ of painting or sculpture. It is not in fact nature, 
but history, that is embedded in this form of abstraction. An idea of tradition is 
the hidden term in its purported rationality – a universal lawgiver the repressed 
term of its universal laws. In Martineau’s distinction between common 
abstraction and the absolute abstraction of Suprematism, a different temporality 
is at work. ‘Total abstraction’ is not from anything but only an abstraction to 
(abstractio ad) something, which, starting with nothing, opens itself only to the 
field of possibility, to the future. In the non-objective world ‘life itself, indeed, 
is already futurist’51, as the meaning of things is always yet to be constructed.  
The black square52 is a sign with variable meanings. In Malevich’s writings it 
stands at different times for ‘world economy’, Lenin, ‘non-objective feeling’ 
and ‘nothing’.53 If Malevich’s work is ‘haunted by the dream of painting at last 
                                                
50 Martineau 1977, 28. 
51 K. Malevich. The Non-Objective World (1927). (Chipp (ed.) 1968, 339) 
52 Including Malevich’s 1915 painting, the later versions of this work, the 
appearance of the sign in the works of his followers (Lissitzky), in publications, 
and as the shoulder and lapel badges of UNOVIS delegations 
53 ‘The black square as the whole field was the first form in which non-
objective feeling came to be expresses. The square = feeling, the whole field = 
the void beyond feeling.’ K. Malevich. The Non-Objective World (1927). 
Included in H. Chipp (ed.). Theories of Modern Art: A Source Book by Artists 
and Critics. University of California Press, Berkeley, L.A. and London, 1968, 
p. 343. (Malevich 1927) In 1924 Malevich submitted a proposal for a 
monument to Lenin consisted of a pedestal composed of machinery on top of 
which was a simple cube. When asked, ‘But where’s Lenin?’ Malevich pointed 
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leaving the realm of convention behind, of attaining immediacy’,54 this is not 
the immediacy of the auratic object or ‘truth to materials’ (for the sign appears 
in different contexts and materials) but of a signification ‘the contents of which 
are not known to the artist’. The black square, in its various manifestations, is a 
sign of the arbitrariness of signs; a sign of the times, of ‘a world where the sign 
is arbitrary, because subject to endless social convolutions’.55 The crisis of 
representation and the general collapse in ‘confidence in the sign’, Clark writes, 
affected ‘capitalism’s most precious means of representation, money. [Nestor] 
Makhno as usual saw the point. The money he issued in the anarchist republic 
had printed on it the message that no-one would be prosecuted for forging it.’56 
Malevich’s abstraction is not the absence of signification or representation, but 
about signification, an attempt to represent a ‘non-objective world’ where 
things are visible as having the arbitrariness of signs.  
For Martineau, Malevich uses ‘nothing’ as an instrument of ‘the liberation of 
freedom’.57 Malevich, in the period of UNOVIS, linked the program of non-
objectivity with a political program. ‘Communism is already non-objective. Its 
problem is to make consciousness non-objective, to free the world from the 
                                                                                                                             
to the cube. T. J. Clark. Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of 
Modernism. Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1999, p. 225. ‘The 
black square is the mark of world economy’. UNOVIS leaflet, quoted in L. 
Zhadova. Malevich, Suprematism and Revolution in Russian Art 1910-1930, 
Thames and Hudson, London 1982 p. 299. ‘Black = death = matter = nothing.’ 
(T. J. Clark, 1999, 251) 
54 T. J. Clark (1999), p. 253. 
55 T. J. Clark (1999), p. 256. 
56 T. J. Clark (1999), p. 257. 
57 ‘libération de la liberté’. E. Martineau. Malévitch et la Philosophie: La 
Question de la Peinture Abstraite, Lausanne, L’Age d’Homme, 1977, p. 33. 
‘L’Abstraction picturale est un libération, celle qui libère le Rien’. Martineau 
1977, 47. 
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attempts of men to grasp it as their own possession’.58 The surrender of the self, 
transformed in a zero of form, was part of a general dissolution of all objective 
categories into the desert of feeling, now put to the service of an actual political 
transformation. ‘The self must be annihilated, in the name of unity, in the name 
of coming together’.59 ‘I’ is to be replaced by ‘we’: ‘We, as utilitarian 
perfection’.60 The scope of the transformation that was heralded – a total 
transformation of thought – is brought into direct contrast with the paucity of 
the material out of which the transformation is to be made. ‘From our point of 
view, what matters is simply the extraordinary being-together in 1920 of the 
grossest struggle with the realm of necessity and the grandest (or at least most 
overweening) attempt to imagine necessity otherwise. Imagining otherwise was 
for a while actually instituted as part of the state apparatus. Some might say it 
was what the state did best – the one realm in which production propaganda 
really had results.’61 Clark refers to Malevich’s ‘manic assertions’ and ‘mad 
rant’. In a period where an ‘economics of the transition period’ is called for, it 
seems perfectly reasonable. The contingency of signs and that there is no 
natural object as there is no natural language for representing objects, marks a 
moment in consciousness – a deferring of meanings and perceptions, a shuttling 
between spaces, kinds of materiality and narrative construction – that is not 
only historically modern. If, Clark writes, this is what it would be like to live in 
                                                
58 K. Malevich. Appendix From the Book on Non-Objectivity (1924). Andersen 
(ed.) 1969, p. 348. 
59 K. Malevich. ‘Concerning the ‘ego’ and the collective’. UNOVIS Almanac 1, 
quoted in A. Shatskikh, ‘Unovis: Epicentre of a New World’ in The Great 
Utopia. The Russian and Soviet Avant-Garde, 1915-1932. Guggenheim 
Museum, New York, 1992, p. 56. 
60 Title of a UNOVIS publication announced in 1920 but never published. 
Quoted in T. J. Clark, 1999, p. 264. 
61 T. J. Clark, 1999, p. 245. 
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a world where the sign was arbitrary, ‘it is not a world we shall live in without 
the revolution taking place’62. The undecidability of the Black Square – ‘at once 
the strongest instance of the new belief-system and its reductio ad absurdam’ – 
qualifies it as a sign of this modern consciousness. ‘Among its many other 
undecideables – is it figure? is it ground? is it matter? is it spirit? is it fullness? 
is it emptiness? is it end? is it beginning? is it nothing? is it everything? is it 
manic assertion? or absolute letting-go? – is the question of whether it laughs 
itself to scorn. (And even if it does, laughter and scorn could well be 
Nietzschean positives as Duchampian nay-saying. They might lead the way to 
the Nothing that is.)’63 
------------------------------------ 
 
4.4. A singular modernity 
In A Singular Modernity, Jameson considers the various attempts to locate 
modernity as a historical period. Modernity ‘always means setting a date and 
positing a beginning’.64 Recapitulating the various dates and events ascribed to 
modernity’s inception – an array of theories about the beginning of the period 
of modernity: the Protestant Reformation, the discovery of the Americas, the 
Cartesian break, Galileo, the French and Industrial revolutions, the 
Enlightenment etc. – he concludes that modernity must be considered less a 
historical period than an idea, in so far as the idea of distinct and differentiable 
                                                
62 T. J. Clark, 1999, p. 256. 
63 T. J. Clark, 1999, 254 
64 Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity: Essays on the Ontology of the 
Present, Verso, London and New York, 2002, p. 31. (Jameson 2002) 
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historical periods is itself a modern conceit. The ‘grand narrative’ which 
discerns the ‘essence’ of an age is itself part of a way of looking at the world 
that is characteristic of modernity. It is only from within the conceptual 
framework of modernity that we can think of modernity as a distinct historical 
period. What is important in the concept is not that in modernity a new 
historical figure emerged on the historical stage, for new figures had emerged 
throughout history, but that the modern figure thought of itself as new. 
‘Modern’, in its first usage, simply means ‘now’ or ‘the time of the now’; but in 
the concept, as it is transferred from individual experience to a collective sense 
of the age, there is the idea of a decisive break, a forceful separation of the past 
from the present. Jameson cites Schelling: ‘There can in fact be no past without 
a powerful present, a present achieved in the disjunction [of our past] from 
ourselves. That person incapable of confronting his or her own past 
antagonistically really can be said to have no past; or better still, he never gets 
out of his own past, and lives perpetually within it still.’65 In this ‘unique 
moment’, ‘the past is created by way of its energetic separation from the 
present; by way of a powerful act of dissociation whereby the present seals off 
its past from itself and expels and ejects it; an act without which neither present 
nor past truly exist, the past not yet fully constituted, the present still living on 
within the force field of a past not yet over and done with.’66 
If modernity, for Jameson, is to be considered ‘a unique kind of rhetorical 
effect, or, if you prefer, a trope’,67 it is one wholly different in structure from 
                                                
65 Jameson 2002, pp. 24-5. 
66 Jameson 2002, p. 25. 
67 Jameson 2002, p. 34. 
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the traditional figures that have been catalogued since antiquity. As a collective 
idea of its own difference, the trope of modernity brings the modern into being 
by its own articulation. Its appearance ‘signals the emergence of a new kind of 
figure, a decisive break with previous forms of figurality, and it is to that extent 
a sign of its own existence, a signifier that indicates itself, and whose form is its 
very content’.68 Its content is the ‘now’ (distinct from the then), ‘the time of the 
now that is also, because it distinguishes itself from history, everything that 
comes before the new-time (Neuzeit). The temporality of the new, dispelling 
and excluding the past into history, is first of all a distinction of tenses, of past 
and present (whose futural dimension will become clear), but which when 
attached to personal pronouns also changes the meaning of these shifters. The 
modern idea here, articulated by Descartes (writing in the first person) is ‘to 
demolish everything and start again right from the foundations’:69 to demolish 
therefore all the categories of experience and knowledge, to reduce the 
individual to an essence from which anything becomes possible. This modern 
moment, in general experience, is felt as a break, ‘a perturbation of causality as 
such… the moment in which the continuities of an older social and cultural 
logic come to an incomprehensible end’70. A categorical loss of this type, the 
fall of the Roman empire and a consequent age that is still dark, is implicit in 
the modernus that Cassiodorus refers to, here still freighted with melancholy.71 
In the modern usage of the term (apparent already, according to Jameson, in the 
                                                
68 Jameson 2002, p. 34. 
69 Descartes, Réné, ‘Meditations of a First Philosophy’ in Descartes: Selected 
Philosophical Writings, tr. J. Cottingham and R. Stoothoff, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 76. 
70 Jameson 2002, p. 27. 
71 See Jameson 2002, p. 18. 
 162 
various Renaissances of the 9th to 15th centuries), it has a positive valency. 
The idea of a decisive break between past and present – the effect of an older 
social and cultural logic coming to an end – has in the modern idea turned 
round into a situation that is now affirmed. Far from a melancholy loss, it is the 
positive affirmation of the new as a time reborn and the recognition of 
possibility arising in the demolition of the old order. The narrative trope, ‘for 
the first time’, Jameson writes, has a libidinal charge and is ‘the operator of a 
unique kind of intellectual excitement not normally associated with other forms 
of conceptuality’72.  The temporal orientation of this modernity – to the future – 
begins with nothing. Modernity here is an actual way of experiencing the 
world, requiring a total suspension of the customary categories. A flaw in them 
has widened to extend across the social field. The libidinal or psychic charge 
released in this situation derives from an openness of possibility and a future 
dependent only on the decision. What had appeared as objects, invested with an 
unchangeable status appears now only as ‘material masses’ out of which the 
forms of the future are to be made: the modern work. The assembly of ‘material 
masses’ – phenomenological experience – into forms becomes the energetically 
charged work of the present, its energy derived from a polemical hostility to the 
past (a past that is still present) turned round into the formation of a different 
future.  
Jameson’s characterization of modernity isolates a moment – a moment of 
isolation that is an absolute break (in thought) between past and present with 
the loss and suspension of the customary and familiar categories. Modernity, as 
a social thought-experiment, is a procedure of abstraction – the total abstraction 
                                                
72 Jameson 2002, p. 34. 
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that starts with nothing and orients its work to the future. The absolutely 
modern moment is therefore itself nothing, abstract and without content for 
there are as yet no categories to shape the noumenal into content. Without the 
reifying suffix that turns the modern into modernity – a self-conscious and self-
valorizing period – the modern is restated as an aspiration whose future 
realization is the work of the present time. Nothing that is is yet modern. The 
modern world is not to be found in the world, but only to be made. The modern 
insight, as it appears in Hegel, is that there is no natural or transcendental 
ground for meaning. There are no categories that are absolute, but only the 
successive ideas that in history have been placed over the void. History is the 
evolution of these ideas. The modern moment, Hegel’s moment, is this 
awareness, this absolute form of knowledge. If the modern, because the 
collapse of categories opens up an absolute possibility determined by the 
subject, is equivalent to ‘absolute freedom’, an absolute categorical 
transformation, and therefore of terror arising in the failure of the will to 
recognize anything other than itself, this temptation, however, is pure negation 
and not the negation of negation. For if there is no natural or transcendental 
ground for meaning, no categorical absolute, then the only basis for meaning is 
agreement, an agreement that is only free and actual – agreeable – when 
predicated on mutual recognition and the suspension of the categorical in the 
view of the other. Objects become visible as nothing more than a means of 
mediating a relation between people: the nature of this relation determines what 
sort of objects there are. Objects in a relationship of mutual recognition are 
necessarily shared, as this recognition is of the objectlessness of the other from 
a position of objectlessness, with the object coming into being only in their 
recognition of each other through it. The object is made together in the 
moment. This object, for Hegel – the manifestation of spirit – is history. 
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History in the modern moment is not a time expelled into the past and devalued 
relative to a time that declares itself modern, but a history that is in the making, 
still awaiting its evolution. The meaning of objects in a relationship of mutual 
recognition, in love for example, is experienced in consciousness; but to the 
extent that this recognition is partial and retains a categorical distinction 
between what it is and what the world is – what it does and does not recognize 
itself in – it is one-sided and remains unfulfilled. Thus romantic lovers, 
separated from the world, are doomed. History (for Hegel) is the work of 
creating universal meaning, the object world that exists when mutual 
recognition is universal. The one-sided world of the master, the tragic hero 
enslaved to ‘necessity’, exceptionalism and an absolute freedom that fails to 
recognize its identity to terror, give way in a collective categorical collapse to 
the form of comedy. 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.5. Contemporary in 1962 
The modern, modernism and modernity, have now become historical categories 
in contemporary art and theory, no longer modern in the sense of ‘now’. If 
post-modern, post-modernism and post-modernity are the obvious signifiers 
that differentiate the time of the now from the time of modernism and 
modernity, art suffices with the general signifier ‘contemporary’. – invested 
with the ‘now’ meaning that originally belonged to ‘modern’ – to differentiate 
itself from the (modern) art of the past. Some break is posited, whether the end 
of grand narratives tout court (the loss not only of an Idea but the possibility of 
an Idea) or some new distinct phase of ‘late’ capitalism. In art, generally, the 
break is very visible. The work of Warhol (in the 1960s), Beuys or Nauman is 
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immediately evident as different in its intentions and mechanisms from that of, 
say, Rothko or Matisse, the other side of a conceptual divide. That some artists 
straddle the divide, that contemporary art has precursors in practice in the 
modern era (Duchamp, Dada) and found its theoretical support in writing that 
goes back to the 19th century (Nietzsche, Freud), does not alter the idea that in 
the passage between modern and contemporary ‘something happened’. What 
and when are the final questions we address here. For Badiou, ‘an intellectual 
revolution took place at the beginning of the sixties, whose vector was 
mathematics, yet whose repercussions extend throughout the entirety of 
possible thought.’73 The ‘Cohen-event’ (Badiou’s explanation) is not normally 
thought of as the basis of the sixties revolution. An alternative event is 
proposed here, taking place at the beginning of the sixties, whose vector, in a 
sense, was mathematics, but where the realization of its material implications is 
the revolutionary event.  
The contemporary in art, we propose, can be given a precise birth date: 31 
October 1962. The reception of a specific exhibition marks a contemporary 
moment whose repercussions, generalized in culture and extending through the 
entirety of what is thought possible, marks the emergence of a new now.  
‘… on 31 October 1962 – Halloween – pop art, which had always taken a 
strong, positive attitude towards America, exploded in the media at a group 
show at the Sidney Janis Gallery in New York. To James Rosenquist the 
artists were ‘post-beat and not afraid of an atomic bomb’. They thought fear 
passé. To Robert Indiana, ‘Pop was a re-enlistment in the world. It was 
shuck the Bomb! It was the American dream – optimistic, generous and 
                                                
73 Alain Badiou. Being and Event, tr. Oliver Feltham, London and New York, 
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naïve.’ The curator Walter Hopps recalled how exuberant the opening was. 
‘Jean Tinguely showed an icebox that had been stolen from an alley outside 
Marcel Duchamp’s secret studio. When you opened it, a very noisy siren 
went off and red lights flashed. It set the noise and tone that was to continue 
all the way through the sixties. 
Andy [Warhol] had three paintings in the show, including ‘200 Campbell’s 
Soup Cans’. People pointed and whispered his name. Warhol claimed, ‘I feel 
very much a part of my times, of my culture, as much a part of it as rocket 
ships and television.’ However, to at least one onlooker that night he seemed 
more ‘like a white witch, looking at America from an alien and obtuse 
angle’. 
The Janis Gallery opening marked a changing of the guard. The older 
abstract painters affiliated to the gallery – Guston, Motherwell, Gottlieb and 
Rothko – held a meeting and resigned in disgust. On the other hand, de 
Kooning, who was also a member of the Janis Gallery, came to the opening. 
He paced back and forth in front of the paintings for two hours and left 
without saying a word. James Rosenquist:  
‘After the opening, Burton and Emily Tremaine, well-known collectors, 
invited me over to their house on Park Avenue. I went and was surprised to 
find Andy Warhol, Bob Indiana, Roy Lichtenstein and Tom Wesselmann 
there. Maids with little white hats were serving drinks and my painting 
‘Hey! Let’s Go for a Ride!’ and Warhol’s Marilyn diptych were hanging on 
the wall next to fantastic Picassos and de Koonings. 
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Right in the middle of our party, de Kooning came through the door with 
Larry Rivers. Burton Tremaine stopped them in their tracks and said, ‘Oh, so 
nice to see you. But please, at any other time.’ 
I was very surprised and so was de Kooning. He and the others with him 
soon left.  
Now Mr. Tremaine had never met de Kooning, and probably didn’t know 
him by sight, which was surprising because he had bought some of his 
paintings, but it was a shock to see de Kooning turned away. At that moment 
I thought, Something in the art world has definitely changed.’74 
The significance of Rosenquist’s insight is that it took place at the house of 
‘well-known collectors’. It is in the reception and not production of Pop art that 
a contemporary moment can be recognized. The New Realists show at Sidney 
Janis included 54 artists, of whom 12 were American. The title of the show 
came from the French movement Nouveau Réalisme, as the label ‘Pop’ was 
borrowed from the British, but the international artists were to feel that they 
had been downgraded, used as a prop for the younger American artists. To an 
American critic, the European work, less innovative than the American, had 
been included to certify the existence of a new ‘International Style’ now led by 
the New York Artists.75 The focus of critical and popular response to the show 
was on the latter. While Dine, Rosenquist, Lichtenstein, Segal and Warhol had 
shown earlier in 1962, the impact of the Janis show was of a different order of 
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magnitude. ‘In the New Yorker, Harold Rosenberg said that the show ‘hit the 
New York art world with the force of an earthquake. Within a week tremors 
had spread to art centers throughout the country.’76 He attributed the ‘sense of 
art history being made’ to the prestigious venue.77 The name Pop (as opposed 
to the ‘Factual artists’ or ‘Commonists’ that Janis had proposed) became the 
label of a movement. The New York Times: ‘Pop Goes the New Art’. Time 
Magazine: ‘Art: Pop Pop’, and, more prosaically, ‘Pop Art – Cult of the 
Commonplace’.78 
While some critics, such as Dore Ashton, tended to view the exhibition as just 
more neo-Dada of the sort seen at Martha Jackson, the recent work of 
Lichtenstein, Warhol, Indiana, Wesselman and Rosenquist clearly pointed in a 
new direction. As Tom Hess reported: ‘The point of the Janis show… was an 
implicit proclamation that the New had arrived and that it was time for the old 
fogies to pack… the New Realists were eyeing the old abstractionists like 
Khrushchev used to eye Disneyland – “We will bury you” was their motto.’79 
If it was immediately recognized after the Janis show that ‘something changed’, 
this was as much by the public as by critics. Pop art gained ‘mass popularity’80 
as rapidly as it did critical acceptance. What had changed? The extension of its 
audience suggests a change in the viewer as much as in the work, with new 
conditions in the work resonating with some new condition in the viewer. 
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Certain formal changes in the work, we propose, represent and resonate with a 
different condition of being in the aftermath of a revolution in ‘the entirety of 
possible thought’, whose proximate cause is not in art but a different event. A 
consideration both of the formal conditions of typical Pop art of the time 
(Warhol and Lichtenstein in 1962) and of the world-historical events that 
coincided with its reception provides, in combination, a conceptual 
differentiation of the contemporary. 
Pop, relative to the previously dominant movement of abstract expressionism, 
is novel in its subject-matter (in that it has subject matter), its handling and 
formal construction, and, as an effect of these, in its affect and implied viewing 
subject-position. The objects in the work are commonplace (hence 
‘commonists’) and already part of the visual landscape of the viewer. In their 
manner of depiction, there is an apparent absence of transformation, a 
deliberate refusal to represent the presence of the artist by gesture. Lichtenstein: 
‘I want my work to look as if it has been programmed. I want to hide the record 
of my hand’.81 Both of these decisions, as was immediately commented on, 
marked a change from the norms of abstract expressionism. Neither, however, 
account for why the work was considered both new and of its time. The 
elimination of gesture in the impersonal style adopted by the artist, in practice, 
only returns painting to the academic manner that expressionist (and 
impressionist) modernists had reacted against but which continued in 
commercial art. Equally, the commonplace, everyday subject matter, though 
representing the objects of its time as opposed to the ‘tragic and timeless’ 
subjects of abstract expressionism, does nothing different from the futurists or 
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any of the ‘painters of modern life’ of the 19th century. The Pop art of 1962  
does propose a different and an impersonal subject that is both the subject-
position of the artist and, through identification in the work, of the viewer. The 
principal technical means through which this is achieved is neither subject 
matter nor handling. 
The critical difference between the contemporary art discussed here and its 
‘modern’ predecessors (Abstract Expressionism) is, we propose, articulated 
through a spatial relationship in the work, through the relation of figure and 
ground. De Kooning’s Woman 1 (1950-2) typifies the basic trope of aesthetic 
modernism. Figure merges into ground, their difference barely sufficient to 
establish a distinction between them, with expressive gestures equally in both. 
The relation between figure and ground, whose disjunction is necessary for a 
figure to appear, is marked in the tradition of painting since the Renaissance by 
an equally powerful conjunction, a bringing together of figure and ground into 
a single compositional unity. The affect of the figure and the type of subject it 
is, is confirmed by the ground, such that the ground becomes another figure – 
the subject of the work – and the work achieves a unity and consistency that 
invites the viewer to suspend their own separate identity and be absorbed by the 
work. A dual absorption takes place. In the distinction Fried makes between 
absorption and theatricality (originally in respect of 18th century painting), 
absorption aims to promote ‘the fiction of the beholder’s non-existence’.82 The 
figures are absorbed in their own activity, as they are also absorbed in their 
setting, existing in a separated, unselfconscious world into which the viewer is 
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also absorbed. The means by which, in the work, figure is absorbed into ground 
is composition – a harmony of the parts and completion of pictorial unity that 
constitutes the aesthetic. Contemplation, the basic mode of viewing of aesthetic 
works, involves the suspension of the self and the absorption of the subject into 
the work: a loss therefore, but also redemption in the transformation and 
transfiguration of the subject in the aesthetic realm. Fry, for example, makes 
explicit this aim: the work of art represents ‘a world by itself, independent, 
complete, autonomous’83. Its aim is the aesthetic transformation of the subject, 
to remove the viewer from everyday life. This dual absorption, of figure into 
ground in the work, and thereby of viewer into the work, is the characteristic 
trope of modern art (since Hegel’s time). A progressive diminution and 
disappearance of the figure is visible in Romanticism, in the sublime, in 
expressive landscape (where a figure is no longer necessary and the landscape 
becomes the figure – Cezanne’s landscapes are self-portraits) and finally in 
abstraction: the logical end of this progression is the Abstract Expressionist 
paintings, unspecified landscapes that, through their scale and over-all 
composition, become ‘environments in their own right’.84 This movement 
comes to an end in 1962. 
If modernism (in this strain) had as its primary trope absorption, Pop art, in the 
disjunction of figure and ground, represented a different subject-position. A 
common feature of the (1962) work of Warhol, Lichtenstein and Dine was the 
plain, white ground. The object (soup can, comic strip, sink) sits against this 
zero-point of painting, but does not (as it cannot) merge into it. In terms of the 
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absence of transformation, the ‘forfeiture of artistic decision-making’ and 
‘death of affect’,85 the ground achieves this to a greater degree than the figure 
in the work, where misalignments and other errors of hand and making 
represent, for Foster, the return of the real.86 Whatever the perfection or 
imperfection of the object image, the relation between figure and ground is 
disjunctive. The figure appears against a ground that is not merely abstract or 
metaphysical but empty. Haskell claims that the lack of transformation in the 
object ‘transferred subjectivity to the viewer’.87 It is instead, we suggest, the 
ground of the work, against which the object is set and from which position, as 
it were, it is viewed, that proposes a subject-position – the subjectivity of the 
affectless artist that invites the recognition of the viewer. The affect of the work 
is in the self-recognition of the viewer of nothing as the ground of their own 
subjectivity. Warhol himself, in answer to a friend who asked him why he 
painted soup cans, replied ‘I wanted to paint nothing. I was looking for the 
essence of nothing, and that was it.’88 The transcendence here is of a different 
type to the modernist one.  
The no-ground of Pop art is an irreconcilable disjunction between figure and 
ground, subject and work, that presents a fundamental spatial reconfiguration 
and represents an equally fundamental temporal reconfiguration. The Janis 
show opened on Wednesday, 31 October, three days after the resolution of the 
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Cuban missile crisis on Sunday 28 October. For the previous week, ‘TV 
newsmen displayed maps with sweeping arcs showing every large city but 
Seattle to be in the range of Cuba’s missiles. Schoolchildren practiced hiding 
under their desks. Each day tension grew as missile-bearing Russian ships 
approached the blockade line. Would they try to cross it? Would they be 
stopped or sunk? Would Russia strike back then? On retiring no one knew if he 
would live to see the morning. Was the country, perhaps the world, to perish 
now?’89 
The Cuban missile crisis introduced into general consciousness a new 
temporality, introducing in history the realizable idea that human existence, by 
its own actions, might come to an imminent, premature end. Every child learnt 
that the world might come to an end at three minutes notice. Thus the end of 
history is not some happy state of universal understanding, nor some distant 
planetary extinction, but an imminent and mutually assured destruction 
achieved by human action. Whether a nuclear war in 1962 would have resulted 
in the total extinction of human life, a planet occupied at best by dragon-flies 
and cockroaches, is questionable. It was however believed. Nor was the idea in 
itself new, but had been a concern since the1950s. In the Cuban missile crisis, 
however, the idea, as an imminent actual threat became real. 
Modernity, Jameson writes, in bringing the category of a distinct present into 
being, also opens up the category of the future. If the present is different from 
the past then the future may be different from the present. Creating its modern 
present in an act of separation and judgment that differentiates itself from the 
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past and asserts it superiority, this present then invites and lives in the shadow 
of the judgment of some future time. An element of guilt, Jameson claims, is 
inseparable from the modern condition, ‘that anxiety in the face of an unknown 
future and its judgments for which the thematics of a simple posterity is a truly 
insipid characterization’90. The modern work is progressive to the extent that it 
iterates the judgments of a possible future – a ‘gaze from the future’91 – into its 
present production. It makes not only new work but also a new basis of 
judgment of work. In the conflicted temporality of modernity, the present is 
grounded in the future: while dispelling the past (in theory) it in practice retains 
its certainty through historic forms that it re-presents in modern dress. The 
completion of modernity is imagined as discarding these historic remnants, to 
be modern only in so far as the present is grounded in a different future, the 
future ground into which present subjects will be absorbed and transfigured. 
The contemporary moment, as we describe it, forecloses this future ground. It is 
not only that, in the possibility or likelihood of human self-extinction – 
autohumanicide – at some point in the future marks a point of closure of the 
future, but it eliminates a point of judgment of the future. Even the willful 
extinction of humanity cannot be considered a crime, as there would be no ‘last 
man’ to declare it so or consciousness to think it. The future ‘ancestrality’ of 
absolute extinction is literally unthinkable. The end of history is also the end of 
consciousness, memory and judgment. It is also the end of guilt therefore, of 
responsibility as Jameson more neutrally terms it, occasioning the removal even 
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of ‘the present’s responsibility for its own self-definition of its own mission’.92 
The foreclosure of the future, as a time of human existence and judgment, 
brings into being a present whose relation to the past is also changed. No longer 
either valued tradition or a superseded history, the past becomes no more than a 
series of signs to be used or misused (there is no distinction) at will in the 
present’s irresponsible self-definition. The contemporary moment consists in 
the removal of any temporal ground, the absence of temporal categorization 
being represented in spatial terms by a ground that is absolutely disjunctive to 
the objects placed on it, which can therefore be safely ignored even as it renders 
them utterly contingent. 
The aim here is not to ignore but to embrace this ground. The ‘end of the 
world’, either as dramatically staged in 1962 or as the inevitable consequence 
of economic processes in which we can all participate, is the limit point of the 
absolute transformation that is capital’s end and purpose. It is also the ground 
of comedy. Comedy embraces the logic of this loss and turns it round into the 
basis of collectivity, with objectlessness being the common object through 
which mutual recognition is mediated. As the future exists until it no longer 
does, but its judgments are nullified by its end, the present work is validated 
neither by the judgment of the future nor the values of the past, but by its own 
momentum and occasional moments of grace, when it transcends repetition and 
rigidity. 
---------------------------------- 
5.6. Conclusion: ‘The end of the world’.  
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The aim of the work has been to identify a condition, a specific abstraction in 
language. A categorical collapse and emptying out of the full signifiers that 
construct meaning in a situation fractures the connection between things, 
leaving objects in place but coloured over with an affective cast of unreality. 
The Freudian example locates this trauma in the family situation. For the child, 
whose family is its world, its abstraction and loss is the loss of a world. The 
event that Freud generalizes as object-loss, in its pathological instance, is the 
loss of a love object but also ‘a loss of a more general kind’. It is not, as in 
normal mourning, that an object of love has been lost, but that the spatial and 
temporal categories that orient the subject’s world have been shattered. 
Triangulated in the relationship of what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘mommy-
daddy-me’ the family is for the subject a spatial category; it is these coordinates 
that are rendered moot in object-loss. Equally, in the inconsistency of the event, 
the expectation of temporal continuity –literally of familiarity –is undermined.  
Object-loss and objectlessness are equated here with non-objectivity, 
abstraction, a loss in language and representation of which the event that Freud 
locates in a familiar context is but one example. The family in practice is 
interpellated by political economy; it ‘works by itself’ to act out the separation 
that capital, by colonizing even the unconscious, dictates throughout economic 
society. The trauma of object-loss is not due to an event that once occurred, but 
that the child, sensitized by an unreasonable premature exposure, re-encounters 
this separation everyday, dispersed in economic life. Abstraction is reproduced 
in capital, as the affective core of emptiness that drives surplus production. 
Real abstraction, an abstraction that is ‘readymade’ – that is, an abstraction that 
is not the result of the failure or collapse of a system of representation and 
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production but is inbuilt in the system – is the modern form that capital 
produces. In the cash nexus, money as an agent of unbinding substitutes the 
quantification of an abstraction for any and all particular forms. Instead of a 
system where individuals relate to each other in a collective exchange of 
differences (an experience now that only commodities have, as only they speak 
to each other in this way), in capital the individual comes to mean the same 
thing as the self, a self which relates not to other individuals but, as its other, to 
a generalized abstraction. 
Abstraction, as both a real loss and a continuing disturbance in language – an 
inability to articulate something and to articulate what it cannot articulate – 
belongs to the inexpressible and therefore the mystical. As such, it doesn’t 
constitute a subject, a figure or object that stands out against a ground, because 
it is itself an empty ground. That there are categories of experience that are not 
informed by a presence, an identifiable thing, but by an absence, is sufficient to 
justify the empirical claim for abstraction. The primary concern here 
(concerning the nature of art) is the forms of production that abstraction 
generates, forms that are objective, tangible and material but whose logic can 
be best explained by reference to an absent term. Abstraction, an absence (the 
absence of what is the point at issue) is manifest in specific generic forms, in a 
habit of idealization (the ‘epic’ form) but also (which is the principal ‘target of 
destruction’ of the present work) in all the different ways in which the genre of 
tragedy manifests itself. Tragedy, which plays out the founding conditions of 
abstraction over and over again, is, we claim, the dominant modern genre of 
production, the form of capital, of the spectacle, and distributed in culture as a 
general romanticism, dynamically operative in production as the play of the 
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‘individual’ and ‘abstract necessity’ – the form of consciousness of our present 
day masters. 
If abstraction is the premise of the present argument, tragedy, read as a 
particular representation and expression of abstraction, is the objective form 
that the present work takes issue with. An attempt has been made to describe 
various modes in which the tragic structure (the tragic argument) is expressed. 
These include, in the aesthetic realm, an autonomous and compositional 
aestheticism in art and a type of essentially formal abstraction that sometimes 
comes to be identified with modernism itself, of which Kandinsky is an early 
example and abstract expressionism the culmination. Rothko, for example, is a 
supreme representation of the tragic view, the work precisely appealing in its 
traditional mysticism. The prime locus of tragic abstraction is however capital, 
with the dramatic production represented in the spectacle, where the spectacle 
is not only ‘aether’ (films, TV, media etc.) but all forms of production – goods, 
architecture, infrastructure, modes of transport, practices of work – including 
necessarily the consumption that is part of work in the spectacle. Capital itself, 
in our presentation, is the tragic hero of the drama, itself subject to the logic of 
division that is the ruling logic of this genre. Economics, as a force of ‘abstract 
necessity’ confronts the unlimited power of the ‘individual’ (in practice no 
more than the psychic equivalent of private property) in a dynamic 
contradiction that produces, as its good, only more abstract production, and 
ultimately the destruction of all individual forms, including its own. Tragedy, in 
its basic form, is the drama where the flaw in the hero, a one-sidedness and 
incompletion that is covered over and repressed by idealizations, brings about 
as its consequence the tragic ending, the ‘death and oblivion’ of the hero and 
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the other principals. The innate destructiveness of this form, with certainty, 
becomes more visible. In Freud’s clear pathway, this melancholy formation 
incorporates death (whether actual or symbolic, in either case artificial) into its 
ego, its subjective being. Withdrawing fundamentally from anaclitic 
attachments, its mode of sustaining itself is narcissistic identification; its work 
therefore becomes the reproduction in objective form of itself – the value of 
itself – including the death and destructiveness that is the repressed term of its 
ambivalent being. 
The critique of tragedy (not against real tragedy but its ideological reproduction 
in art and elsewhere) is coloured by the view that the ‘epic’ form, which is both 
an appeal to a tradition and a reference to the absolute and ideal, is itself 
implicit and complicit in the genre of tragedy. Idealization is the compensating 
move to the absolute loss that constitutes abstraction and the prosthetic means 
by which the individual stabilizes itself in the loss of substance. Covering over 
and repressing the void in the subject, the ideal terms provide a superstructure 
that the base then uses as its material. The tragic/epic synthesis is not only that 
the epic is tragedy in latent form, but that tragedy, in the real abstraction of 
capital, relies on epic forms (‘universal’ values, ethical practices, the rights of 
the individual etc.) to reproduce itself. Epic ideals are the material that capital is 
the corruption of; ethical opposition, human values and individualism become 
productive goods to be recuperated in exchange value. The tragic/epic nexus is 
the military-industrial complex of contemporary society, reproduced in culture 
to assist capital’s own reproduction. The final form that the ideal assumes, 
translated through the lyric and romanticism to a minor key, is the individual – 
the cult object of our day. This is not, as Hegel would insist, an actual 
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(wirklich) individuality, but a one-sided representation that ignores its actual 
substance. Irony, the final, genial form of tragedy, is the expression of an 
individuality that, reducing everything except itself to equivalence, becomes 
abstract and without content. 
In the context of art, comedy is proposed as an alternative form of abstract 
production (the creation and disposal of surpluses), arising in response to 
abstraction but, in this case, in a form that neither traps the abstract within an 
ideal nor uses it as a force of destruction. Total abstraction (as opposed to 
formal abstraction, which is a specific form of recuperation and response to 
total abstraction) has been read from the beginning as a collapse of the 
categories, comprising the spatial and temporal conditions of thought that orient 
the subject and allow it, in a structure of representation, to be read as a 
meaning, as an object that can be held. The epic and tragedy take this 
abstraction and loss as their material; they view it from another position; that of 
representation. The subject occupies the position of before in its view of its 
actual situation, its actual individuality. Comedy, we propose, takes categorical 
collapse as its opening premise. All the categories – the beautiful, good etc. – 
are brought into question and revealed as upside-down or absurd in some 
aspect. The joke typically occurs at the moment when some signifier, retaining 
the same outward form, is thrown into a different categorical structure where it 
makes equal but completely different sense. Bergson identifies comedy with the 
absence of repetition, through which, at its logical conclusion, literally nothing 
can be taken for granted. A certain grace is the correlate of the performer 
operating in this void.  
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To the extent that abstraction is total, comedy is total. In the Greek example, 
comedy questions the validity of any and every form: as with capital, there is 
nothing that does not fall under it. All gods, sacred cows, conventions, ethical 
standards are turned upside-down and brought to their lowest value. The comic 
performer – who unlike the ironist is invested in the work – must also bring 
himself to nought (while remaining serene in the process). The individual is the 
form that disappears at the moment of comedy, reappearing as a complete, 
universal absurdity in its lightness. In the democracy of comedy, any and every 
individual can fall sway to the comic scythe. The comedian leads the sacrifice. 
Comedy here may be dissociated from laughter, where often a hysterical note, a 
too violent release from repression, is present. Our humour is cool to the extent 
that it is continuous. The basic condition of comedy, as narrative, is a happy 
ending – and the lightness that arises in the light of this.  
Comedy, abstracted theoretically as the moment when the subject assumes the 
position of the void, is identified with a position in art that is essential to the 
contemporary understanding of art. It is not only that critical moments in art 
history entail a fundamental categorical shift (from the ideal to representation, 
from representation to the object), but that, in its individual moments (Uccello, 
El Greco, Goya, Blake, to pick more obvious examples), there is a vacuity of 
categorical affirmation that produces both a comic affect and a curious 
objectivity. Comedy, we have proposed is both rational and real. Its objectivity 
however is not a relation to the real, but a relation to signs, seeing through them 
but only to the void beyond. Comedy is a form made out of the contingency of 
forms. Western art, in its Greek beginnings, Renaissance revival and classical 
age, up to the point at which it is identified in aesthetic theory as art, is a 
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mixture of cartoon and facture; it is at its highest points both representation and 
a parody of representation in equal measure. The comic spirit – the individual 
beginning that comes from a categorical vacuity – is what distinguishes art 
from skilled making. It becomes critical (in a Kantian sense) to the extent that it 
addresses the categories of thought. 
Comedy, as a form of consciousness evident in art, is also a vehicle for 
liberation. ‘Jokes produce freedom, and freedom produces jokes’. Jokes, for 
Freud, are a means of overcoming repression, but unlike symptoms and 
unconscious slips, they do not sidestep repression but attack it directly. The 
return the unconscious to the social, its primary and prelapsarian condition. The 
abstraction of comedy implies a different relation to time and to history, which 
is its record. The original moment of abstraction – the loss of the continuity and 
indifference of past, present and future in traditional society – opens up these 
categories, creating a cleavage between past and present, but also in this loss of 
temporal innocence opens up an idea of agency, of the work of a future as 
different from the present as the present is from the past. In the epic, a new 
tradition re-stabilizes the social order. In the modern re-valorization, the past 
becomes a split object, part a bad, primitive time of ignorance and superstition, 
but also the repository, in carefully selected moments, of timeless values. If, in 
the modern idea, the present is valorized as containing a greater quantity of 
these values, it equally imagines a future that surpasses the present. Such a 
progression, extended in the practical infinity of cosmological time, implies a 
final point of resolution, of the absolute wisdom that lies at the end of history. 
Utopia, a displaced search for tradition, finds its reflection in the modern’s 
search for origins, itself a displaced attempt to define the future. The end-point, 
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as Jameson points out, confers a responsibility and guilt on the present – a duty 
of labour – but also casts this production in the genre of tragedy as, at the end 
of time, this human good also comes to nought. It is in the disappearance of this 
endpoint, of the natural end to the human (the inhuman)94 that comedy appears. 
This thesis has attempted to suggest that the ‘contemporary’ (recognized in art) 
is coincident with the different temporality that arises in the technological 
ability of the human species to destroy itself, in toto. The terminal point of 
human consciousness, the point at which nothing can any longer be known, 
remembered, thought or judged, is no longer some distant cosmological event, 
following the evolution of the human to a point of resolution, but instead an 
imminent (3 minute warning), premature and unjust ending of everything. This 
new, artificial end throws into doubt any natural, futural end. In the context of 
cosmological time, human history, the sum of everything to date, is a speck. As 
a fraction of total possibility, it is closer to its beginning and absolute ignorance 
than to absolute wisdom. The modernistic hubris was to apply a millennial time 
frame to the end point of history. The west, das Abendland, recognizes itself at 
the evening of the day. Both an impossibly distant cosmological end and the 
imminent technological variant reinforce the message of knowledge as error, in 
its actually existing form as infinitesimally provisional. That the summit of 
educational, scientific, technological and industrial competence is ‘mutual 
assured destruction’ guarantees the objectivity of comedy.  
                                                
94 Lyotard’s essay, The Inhuman (J.F. Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on 
Time, tr. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1991) concerns the existential effect of this future 
cosmological event (the end of our solar system). 
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Comedy, as the suspension of all categories and a demonstration of their ability 
to shift purely by chance and accident, advertises the flimsy conditionality of 
understanding (the things and powers we stand under). Absolute ignorance, 
about something in particular but turned into a ruling principle of the character, 
is what is funny. The principle of ignorance, where nothing is more than it is, 
returns language to itself. Formed in the moment, it now appears as no more 
than an attempt, whether for pragmatic or non-instrumental purposes, to 
establish a connection with another, a temporary translation of the not-
knowing, not-being individual into the sphere of the social, where knowledge 
and being exist. The disappearance of the individual, the one that thinks and 
‘knows’ itself in the powers it claims in its name, returns language to its being 
as a collective medium, a mutually assured construction that in its moment 
supports a pragmatic and social collectivity. The signifier (including any 
pronoun) in itself is nothing but a form of convenience and a temporary vessel 
that lightly carries, in its individually different presentation, a moment of 
connection. Language, as a butterfly floating above the void, achieves this 
lightness because there is nothing beneath it. Wit is the freedom of the signifier 
(freeing itself also from the existing concept of freedom): because it is nothing, 
it only has a future.  
---------------------------------- 
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Oil on canvas, 190 x 275 cm. Private Collection. 
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Oil on canvas, 53.5 x 53.5 cm. State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg. 
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Figure 3. ‘The abstract work of art’ 
Kouros 530/520 BC, National Museum, Athens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Marcel Duchamp, Readymade: bottle rack 1914/64 
Galvanized iron, 59 x 37 cm. Original lost. Replica. Private Collection. 
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Figure 5. Willem de Kooning, Woman 1 1950-2 
Oil on canvas, 192.7 x 147.3 cm. Museum of Modern Art, New York 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Andy Warhol, Campbell’s Soup Can, 1962 
Synthetic polymer on canvas, 50.8 x 40.6 cm. Museum of Modern Art, New 
York. 
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Appendix: Notes on artwork and images 
 
 
Notes on artwork 
The work presented as part of this thesis consists of a number of photographs, 
taken with a large-format (5 x 4”) film camera; these are shown as same size 
contact prints. 134 photographs are shown, which together constitute a single 
work. The photographs are of different objects, placed on a pale grey ground. 
Variations in natural light, exposure and printing, plus the reflections cast by the 
coloured objects, produce some small variations in the shade and tone of the 
ground. The format of the images is constant: a single object – in a few cases 
more than one, in one case none – is placed on a ground that is neutral and 
devoid of context. The objects are photographed from above, though the position 
of the camera is not constant. The contact prints are presented uncropped, and 
mounted to show the mark of the negative slide-holder and film type. Each 
individual photograph is 10 x 12cm., held in a 20 x 20 cm. mount. Presented in 5 
rows and 37 columns, placed contiguously with irregular gaps, the total 
dimensions of the work are 1.0 x 7.4 m.  
The photographs are different, but of the same sort of objects. These objects, 
which appear as coloured shapes, are constructions made of Styrofoam and 
coloured paper. They are straight edged, rectilinear and simple. Collectively, 
they are coloured in a limited range of primary and secondary colours, white, 
black, and grey; individual objects may be monochrome, a single colour and 
white, or multicoloured. The scale of the objects is not immediately apparent: 
details and defects of manufacture suggest they are small.  
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The set of photographs presented here constitute a single unfinished work, In its 
present state the work has the title Toy Zoo (2010-13); in a different state or 
presentation it might have a different title. Each of the individual photographs 
also has a title. An accompanying list gives these titles together with a number 
and thumbnail image for reference. The titles of the works consist sometimes of 
a single letter, punctuated or unpunctuated (1. ‘H’, 20. T, 26. ‘I’, 124. Y?); a 
single word (5. Sea, 7. Vertical, 27. Carefully); a pair of words, for instance a 
qualified term (21. Strong man, 55. Broken dollar, 107. Alien dog); or a phrase 
or sentence (52. Time flies like an arrow, 119. In god we trust, 130. Why so 
twisted?). In some cases the relationship between title and image is clear: ‘H’ 
(1.) is an image of an object in the shape of an H. Why ‘H’ is in inverted 
commas or why the object is photographed on its side is not immediately 
apparent. In many cases the relation between title and image is not so obviously 
descriptive. An orange and white shape is titled Up (4); a similar shape, in a 
different colour, is titled Stealth (98.) An image that appears to be of a bone is 
called In god we trust (119) An irregular coloured shape is titled False economy 
(121). 
At a distance the work appears like a coloured form of lettering, broken up into 
dots as if to be machine-readable. What this might say in ordinary language is 
not apparent. A closer view shows the individual images as part of the sequence 
or pattern created by their relation to the others surrounding them. Some 
sequences appear formally related (5, 6, 7); some appear to spell something out 
(79, 80, 81); in most cases the logic of the pattern is not immediately evident. A 
closer study of individual images reveals details of their manufacture: that they 
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are photographs of actual objects rather than digital images; that the objects are 
constructed of paper or thin card on some substrate; that they are made by hand 
and not in an industrial process. Although the images are all different and the 
objects in them not generally re-used or repeated, the photographs and objects 
appear as products of a consistent process of manufacture.  
The work is a record of its making. The lack of cropping or digital editing are 
intended to leave the material process by which they are made as far as possible 
visible in the finished work. As some of this information is lost in digital 
reproductions appended here, these can usefully be supplemented by a 
description of the process.  
The work is made in a consistent process that consists of separate stages of 
drawing, manufacturing, photographing, printing, and arranging on a wall. It 
starts with a scribble. Each photograph begins with the thought of a shape – 
image or words – quickly drawn or written down. Sometimes the thought is of a 
shape alone, and appears as much out of the hand as the brain. Sometimes the 
thought is initially of a word or phrase, a title that asks for a shape. Sometimes 
the shape and the word appear together as one thought. None of these small 
drawings is much considered; they are not the outcome of a process nor defined 
by a purpose. The thoughts that provoke the drawings appear as an event whose 
significance is undetermined and does not suggest itself to any category. They 
arrive and suggest themselves for making. 
Some of these initial drawings go into production. Many are abandoned and 
remain forgotten in notebooks. As the process of manufacture is laborious, and 
reluctantly undertaken, a criteria of selection is applied before a drawing is 
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manufactured as an object. If on revision the idea retains some element of 
humour or strangeness, and adds, in our imagination, a different concept to the 
work, a scribble is taken forward into production. 
Making the objects is the most lengthy and laborious part of the process. It 
consists, with little variation, of making decisions about colour; producing a 
scaled drawing; cutting Styrofoam on a hot-wire cutter; gluing the pieces of 
Styrofoam together; priming and sanding the bare object; and measuring, 
marking, cutting and gluing small pieces of coloured paper to it. Colour 
decisions reflect a limited available range of coloured papers. Apart from the 
base, all the surfaces of the object are covered including those not visible in the 
photograph, in order for the object to retain its three-dimensional dignity. The 
manufacturing is precise, using sharp instruments and straight edges, but subject 
to the fallibility of a hand-made process. In the photographs, the objects look 
from a distance as if mechanically or digitally made, but show their faults close-
up. The objects are generally 12-18 cm in diameter. Their  scale dictated by 
economic considerations, larger objects requiring more materials, smaller ones 
more labour. More complex objects are generally a little bigger than simpler 
ones. 
The objects are then photographed. A large format (4 x 5”), film camera is used. 
The objects, placed on the same grey paper ground, are generally centered in the 
image frame as a default position. Where they are off-centre (9. Into) or spill out 
of the frame (61. Rain), this is for conceptual and not aesthetic reasons, Care is 
taken about scale. Although the objects for pragmatic reasons vary somewhat in 
scale, they are photographed at a distance so they appear the same size. If they 
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are smaller or larger in the image (14. Stop, 41. Second sun) it is because their 
concept implies this size, not because of the actual size of the object. Attention is 
paid to the angle from which the objects are photographed. The degree to which 
the camera looks down on it varies from object to object, and the objects rotated 
or camera position moved to vary the horizontal aspect. The plane-shift 
mechanism of the camera is used to adjust the perspective view. The position of 
the camera relative to the object is different in each photograph. These 
variations, however, aim for a neutrality in the view of the object. They are 
dictated by the concept, which appears as a demand of the object.  
The photographs are taken at the smallest aperture (f64) to minimize depth of 
field effects in the image. Natural light is used, supplemented sometimes with 
halogen lamps, where natural light levels are low. Exposures are generally 1-15 
seconds. In photographing the different objects, a consistency and evenness of 
effect is aimed for. 
Processing of the negatives and printing is done by a third party. Negatives are 
processed neutrally – neither pushed nor pulled. Contact prints are made, with 
different trial versions of exposure and colour settings. A consistency of tone is 
aimed for. Photographic prints may be rejected and not go on to form part of the 
work on a number of grounds. Technical flaws may render an object unusable 
and require the object to be re-photographed. Some images, though technically 
acceptable, may be rejected because they do not adequately represent a concept. 
This may be a fault of the photograph, or in the object, and either may be 
subsequently reworked. Other works, though adequate to a concept, cannot make 
a place for themselves in the work.  
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The work as whole consists of an arrangement of individual photographs. The 
work shown here consists of original contact prints, arranged as they were in the 
studio immediately prior to their exhibition. This arrangement the result of a 
process of development over the period the photographs were made (2010-13). 
The present result was not anticipated at the outset. The work started as four 
photographs (1-4), arranged in a row. As additional photographs were made they 
were added below to form a page of 20 images and a second page added. At a 
certain point this format was revised. The separate pages, which introduced a 
formal disjunction and made the work appear to consist of separate discrete 
parts, was abandoned in favour of a continuous arrangement. Gaps were 
introduced by moving or removing various images to act as punctuation. As new 
images were subsequently added a revision may also be made to the existing 
arrangement. The work as a whole is fluid. The arrangement shown here is its 
form of existence at a particular moment. In this form it retain elements of its 
original chronological structure. Earlier photographs are generally on the left and 
later ones on the right. Its vertical dimension – dictated by accessible viewing 
distance to the individual photographs – remains unchanged. It remains, 
however, a work in progress, its final form incomplete. 
Prior to any question as to what the work is about – the problems it addresses – 
is the question of what the photographs are of. Literally, they are photographs of 
Styrofoam and paper objects, but even where these objects crudely resemble 
some actual thing – a banana or an airplane (51, 52) – they could not be said to 
be photographs of a banana or airplane. As photographs, however, whose 
indexicality is guaranteed by the negative’s marks, they represent something. 
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The objects in the photographs are three-dimensional shapes. Some of the shapes 
are simple cuboids (5, 6, 46), or cuboids joined together at an angle (4, 8, 40). 
Some of these form letters (20, 97). More complex forms, made of several 
different pieces, retain an abstract geometric form (27, 37, 60). These objects are 
variously coloured. Among these geometric shapes some objects can be 
recognized as representations of actual things. Carrot (72), though crudely 
simplified, has the basic form and shape of a carrot. It is visibly not an attempt at 
representing any actual carrot. The form of production precludes such a 
possibility. It is a representation only of a generic carrot, a concept of a carrot. 
All the images equally represent a concept. Some of these concepts are of 
physical things (53. Dinosaur, 103. House, 113. Cloud); some are concepts of 
abstract things (8. Democracy, 50. Synthetic, 68. Grace); some are proper 
names. As concepts they are represented equally. 
The representation of concepts in the images is crude and approximate. The 
objects are of simple rectilinear shape. In their form they resemble objects of 
simple engineering; as representations of concepts they resemble children’s 
drawings. Two schematic eyes and a mouth are sufficient to represent a face, 
though here, with echoes of the Cheshire cat, this is titled Disappearing face 
(77). As representations of concepts, children’s drawings are more accurate than 
academic drawings: they display the economic sufficiency of the concept – that 
it is just enough to serve its function in representation. The concepts represented 
in the images are given in the titles. Some correspondence or relation is 
suggested between image or title. The form of this relation is however neither 
consistent nor always clear. Where with some objects the relation is a literal, if 
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abbreviated, resemblance, in many cases the connection between image and title 
– the way in which an object represents a concept – is not immediate. An 
apparent arbitrariness of representation is felt. In practice, every image has a 
logic that, even if convoluted or obscure, offers itself to be read. The logic of 
representation in individual works is however different. Some representations 
are literal and isomorphic, some based on other more marginal correspondences. 
In Sea (5), a blue and white cuboid is sufficient because sea does not have an 
individual shape. In Pool (83), water is given a shape. Money (6) has the same 
basic shape as Sea, being equally fungible but its colour is different and it is 
placed at an angle to suggest ambition. The logic is given in the concept, rather 
than imposed by a fixed system of representation. Different modes of 
representation, in their inconsistencies, bring representation itself into view as a 
mobile object. 
Each individual image is a representation of a thought that occurred in some 
form during the period the work was being made. Their diversity and range 
make them appear random. As a small fraction of a total content, they are not 
extracted from this mass by a method. Composed of the residues of everyday 
experience – of reading, media, personal encounters and situations, 
conversations, and the practical problems of making art – they appear as random 
condensations of material not recovered into a scheme. Individually, their appeal 
is their over-determination: as in a pun, they present in one shape different 
categorical determinations. Assembled together, they have the character of a 
dream. These seemingly random, diverse and over-determined thoughts are 
given an objective form in a consistent method of production. The process of 
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manufacturing is a form of abstract labour: the same materials are applied in the 
same repetitive processes irrespective of the content of the concept. In the 
unpredictable diversity of different concepts, the repetition of the form of 
production appears as an arbitrary constraint, a form that is therefore accidental 
rather than necessary to the content. 
In the arrangement shown here, the work – in our concept – formed itself. It is 
not only that there was not at the outset any conscious idea of its future shape, 
but that it is impossible that the work, in its current form, could have been made 
at that time. At the start the intention was to make an alphabet of conceptual 
forms that could be shuffled like a pack of cards. The early images emerged 
from theoretical ideas about cultural beginnings and contemporary politics. As 
the work developed, other themes emerged, not in an ordered sequence but as 
clusters that only became apparent after the images were made and in their 
relation to others. In its present form the work is a history of its own making, but 
also a disordered and fragmentary universal history. Reading from left to right, it 
contains ancient, medieval and modern elements, though, as history is observed 
from a present that still contains old concepts, this chronology is not exact. A 
section of images relates to the 1960s (33, 34, 37, 40, 41, 45, 49-54). Another 
can be identified with the 1980s (55-59). In this aspect, the work can be 
considered as belonging to the genre of history painting, its contemporary 
concerns emerging only in its manner of representation and as an effect of the 
process. In the arrangement of the images, concepts are allowed to form their 
own affinities. Images are placed adjacent to others because their relation forms 
another concept in addition to the concepts of the individual images: their 
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addition produces an unpredictable multiplication in which the meanings of the 
work are formed by itself. 
In the multiplication of concepts, modes of representation, correspondences, 
accidents and coincidences, the work creates its own subject. Though the work is 
the product of multiple decisions, these decisions are placed in an arbitrary 
method of production in which what they say – precisely – is nothing. The 
arbitrariness of the a mode of production appears in the work as another instance 
of the random. The multiplication of concepts and modes of representation 
refuses their recuperation into an organized scheme – into the constancy of a 
subject. Meaning, such as it is, is an effect located in the work, not in the 
position of the artist or viewer, which is left without conceptual determination 
but only affect. Formally, the gaps – the spaces between images – are where the 
affect of the work is located. These give it a mobility and lightness. The absence 
of abstract labour is given as the serenity of nothing. The wager of the work is of 
a vacuity of subject, the abstraction of the concept, that emerges into comedy. 
Appearing to say something and in this to have a use-value, the work in practice 
represents a language where overdetermined concepts are without content and 
say nothing. The value of this nothing is what the work affirms.
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Toy Zoo 1-134 (2010-2013) 
134 4x5” C type contact prints 
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Toy Zoo (detail 1) 
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Toy Zoo (detail 2) 
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Toy Zoo (detail 3) 
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Toy Zoo (detail 4) 
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Toy Zoo (detail 5) 
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Toy Zoo (detail 6) 
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Toy Zoo (detail) 
1. ‘H’   
4x5” C type contact print 
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Toy Zoo (detail) 
52. Time flies like an arrow 
4x5” C type contact print 
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Toy Zoo (detail) 
72. Carrot 
4x5” C type contact print 
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Toy Zoo (detail) 
97. E 
4x5” C type contact print 
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Toy Zoo (detail) 
121. False economy 
4x5” C type contact print 
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Toy Zoo (detail) 
134. Sparksperm 
4x5” C type contact print 
 
List of works and titles 
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1.    ‘H’ 
2.    Red face 
3.    Star 
4.    Up 
5.    Sea 
6.    Money 
7.    Vertical 
8.    Democracy 
9.    Into 
10.  The green 
11.  Pentagon 
12.  Anarchy 
13.  Zzz… 
14.  Stop 
15.  Go on 
16.   Cross off 
17.   Black square 
18.   Unfinished state 
19.   Ooh! 
20.   T 
21.   Strong man 
22.   Conditional piece 
23.   The sum of everything 
24.   Bright sun 
25.   Ratchet 
26.   ‘I’ 
27.   Carefully 
28.   Three blind mice 
29.   3 colours good 
30.   Cake
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31.   Spastika 
32.   House segment 
33.   Purple heart 
34.   Purple triangle 
35.   Smile 
36.   Silhouette  
37.   Angel 
38.   Water 
39.   Simple person 
40.   Atomic 
41.   Second sun 
42.   Norman joke 
43.   Large tear  
44.   Long nose 
45.   Swedish machine 
46.   Lawn 
47.   Bang 
48.   Angel of history 
49.   Balloon (deflating) 
50.   Synthetic 
51.   Fruit flies like a banana 
52.  Time flies like an arrow 
53.   Dinosaur 
54.   Nuclear 
55.   Broken dollar 
56.   Equal 
57.   Empty 
58.   Snake 
59.   Stacked up, Donald 
60.   Blood cancer 
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61.   Rain 
62.   Cloud (silver lining) 
63.   Forward 
64.   Square zero 
65.   Small heart 
66.   German war machine 
67.   Search light 
68.   Grace 
69.  Vertebra 
70.   Black  
71.   Gold  
72.   Carrot 
73.  Stick 
74.   Coca-coffin 
75.   Ghost 
76.   Ghislaine 
77.   Disappearing face 
78.   Bat 
79.   H2 
80.   Oh! 
81.   Tee (hee) 
82.   Electricity 
83.   Pool 
84.   Fish bomb 
85.   Fallen star 
86.   Chevron 
87.   Daddy 
88.   O 
89.   Arrow 
90.   Thin black square 
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91.    Mystic mistake 
92.    Mickey moose 
93.    Why? 
94.    Visible hand 
95.    Blobitecture 
96.    T again 
97.    E 
98.    Stealth 
99.    Red snake 
100.  Mountain to climb 
101.  The cuts 
102.  Anarchist staircase 
103.  House 
104.  Boat 
105.  3 party system 
106.  Pink person 
107.  Alien dog 
108.  Red square 
109.  Red dog 
110.  Electric lightening 
111.  Worker 
112.  Eagle 
113.  Cloud 
114.  Lightning 
115.  Frog 
116.  Kitchen sink 
117.  Robot 
118.  Plane now 
119.  In god we trust 
120.  Gold 
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121.  False economy 
122.  Shapeless essence 
123.  Zooce 
124.  Y? 
125.  Temple 
126.  Blade of grass 
127.  Shadow 
128.  The push and the pull 
129.  Jessie 
130.  Why so twisted? 
131.  Droop 
132.  Hello yellow 
133.  Top dog 
134.  Sparksperm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
